



The Army Chaplaincy

Professional Bulletin of the Unit Ministry Team

SPRING-SUMMER 2008

Maintaining the Moral High Ground

Next issue theme: World Religions

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From the Chief



Chaplain (MG) Douglas L. Carver, Chief of Chaplains

I am extremely pleased to invite you to join me in reading the latest edition of *The Army Chaplaincy*. After a two year hiatus in its publication that began with the retirement of our longtime editor, Ms. Nella Hobson, our very own branch professional journal is back in print. Kudos to outgoing USACHCS Commandant, Chaplain (COL) Clarke L. McGriff, for his leadership in this effort and to all those staff and faculty members at USACHCS who have had a part in getting our journal back up and running. Please join me as well in welcoming our new editor, Mr. Steven Hoover, to the USACHCS team and to the Chaplain Corps family.

The theme for this inaugural issue, “Maintaining the Moral High Ground,” could not be more appropriate or timely as a topic to lead off the renewed publication of *The Army Chaplaincy*. In my travels over the past year as your Chief, I have had numerous conversations with commanders, officers and NCOs, Soldiers, DoD civilians, and many of you on precisely this topic. The moral health of the force is of significant concern to the senior leadership of the Army. Our Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey Jr., has expressed his personal interest in this issue on many occasions. He has also recognized its importance by recently standing up the Army Center of Excellence for the Professional Military Ethic (PME). The purpose of the center is to contribute directly to the Army-wide development of Soldiers and leaders of character who can meet the moral challenges of a very complex security environment.

We are well into our seventh year at war with no end in sight. This persistent conflict has taken its toll on our Soldiers and their Families physically, emotionally, psychologically and spiritually. It has also affected the Army from a moral perspective. No one would argue that the ethical behavior of every Soldier who has been engaged in combat operations over the last seven years has not been flawless in every respect at all times. The grim reminder of Abu Ghraib makes that all but impossible. Yet I would suggest that one of the reasons that Abu Ghraib, or any of the other reported lapses in ethical behavior, has commanded so much media attention is precisely because they have been such glaringly exceptions to the standards of professional conduct exhibited by the majority of our formations. A few Soldiers have clearly lost their way ethically in observing the standards of military professionalism. However, most of our Soldiers have clearly been guided by a “moral compass” that has kept them on course and headed in the right direction.

The vast majority of our Soldiers *are* adhering to the tenets of the Soldier’s Creed, *are* seeking to live the Army Values, *are* conducting themselves professionally and honorably in keeping the Warrior Ethos, and *are* choosing “the hard right over the easy wrong,” often in ethically ambiguous and challenging tactical situations. The great preponderance of our Soldiers *are* taking and holding the moral high ground in this persistent conflict. If we expect our Soldiers to continue to “do what’s right -- legally and morally,” we as spiritual leaders and ethical advisors must answer two critical questions: What are we doing to assist our Soldiers and commanders in sustaining their hold on the moral high ground and how well are we doing it?

The inculcation and internalization of moral and ethical principles, the processes of spiritual formation and the dynamics of values clarification are all matters affecting character development. Additionally, religious,

spiritual and philosophical beliefs shape an individual's mindset. In view of these factors, I asked Chaplain (COL) Eric Wester to take the lead in coordinating an Ethics Consultation at Fort Jackson to look at ways in which we can assist Soldiers to maintain their moral compass during a time of persistent conflict. We have included a number of presentations from that symposium, and a few other valuable articles in the field of ethical decision making, that I believe will help stimulate our thinking as we continue to grapple with these concerns. The Consultation also marked the beginning of an ongoing process to develop initiatives directed towards our role as ethical advisors and the "conscience of the command." We will integrate these initiatives into our Chaplaincy Strategic Campaign Plan.

If we are to aid Soldiers in adhering to professional ethical standards in their lives, then we need to closely examine the ethical codes we live by as spiritual leaders and evaluate how well we as a Corps are upholding these standards. Are Unit Ministry Teams the Army's ethical standard bearers? How do our Soldiers perceive us in our role as moral and ethical advisors? What expectations do they have of us? How do we assess our own ethical standards, and are these metrics reasonable and realistic, or unreasonable and unattainable? Do our Chaplaincy SACRED values really define us as spiritual leaders, or are they merely a set of "ideal values" we carry on a card in our wallet, providing little or no influence on our personal and professional lives?

If we are going to be in the business of advising our Soldiers on ethical and moral behavior, then it behooves us to be shining examples of the conduct we so readily commend to others. The New Testament saying "Physician, heal thyself!" is a biblical injunction whose sentiment has parallels in all faith traditions. Speaking for myself as a spiritual leader, it is one of those admonitions that I hope never to receive from Almighty God. The best way to preclude that is to regularly and rigorously assess how we are doing in regards to maintaining our own personal and professional morals, values and ethics. The Apostle Paul reminds us of this in his comments about his own ministry written to the church at Corinth: "Therefore I run in such a way, as not without aim; I box in such a way, as not beating the air; but I discipline my body and make it my slave, so that, after I have preached to others, I myself will not be disqualified." (1 Corinthians 9:26-27 NASB)

In order to effectively preach personal moral values and professional ethical conduct to Soldiers, we must first be assured that we are preaching the same things to ourselves and acting upon them. As you read this publication of *The Army Chaplaincy*, I hope the efforts of these many excellent authors who have contributed their work will inspire and edify you and lead you to think deeply on these matters. My prayer is that it will also challenge each of us to examine our own lives and ministries. Are *we* standing firmly on the moral high ground?

Pro Deo et Patria!

"Spiritual Leadership for the Army Family"

From the Regimental SGM



SGM Tommy L. Marrero

What a great privilege to take part in welcoming back *The Army Chaplaincy* journal. The topic of this issue is critical in times like these for the Army and for us as Soldiers because we encounter many ethical decisions in both our personal and professional lives. In times of war, Soldiers and leaders have to be able to make quick decisions that may affect themselves and others. Sometimes those decisions decide who lives and who does not, so it is important for Soldiers to know how to make the right choices. I applaud the outstanding effort of our United States Army Chaplain Center and School staff and faculty and the contributors to this new edition of our journal for sharing their work with our Chaplain Corps and our Army.

Ethics are concerned with how a person should behave. The translation from desirable ethics to internal values to actual behavior involves choices. Ethical conduct must reflect genuine values and beliefs. Soldiers and Army civilians adhere to the Army Values because they want to live ethically and profess the values because they know what is right. Adopting good values and making ethical choices are essential to produce leaders of character.

In combat, ethical choices are not always easy. The right thing may not only be unpopular, but dangerous as well. Complex and dangerous situations often reveal who is a leader of character and who is not. It is not enough to just “know what right looks like.” The leader of character is the person who can *do* the right thing even under tough circumstances.

Once again, welcome back to our journal. I invite our unit ministry team members and other Soldiers to read and analyze the academic content in it. I encourage you all, chaplains and chaplain assistants, to consider contributing your professional thought to future issues of *The Army Chaplaincy*.

Pro Deo et Patria!

*SGM Tommy L. Marrero serves as the
Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Chief of Chaplains and Regimental SGM.*



Commandant's Notes

Chaplain (COL) Clark L. McGriff

At Fort Lewis, we heard the request of a commander to provide his Soldiers with training that would help them withstand the moral and ethical snares of the Contemporary Operating Environment. We developed and conducted that training. That request also made us turn a penetrating gaze on how we train ethics, not only to chaplains and chaplain assistants, but also to Soldiers and their commanders by our presence and by our training programs.

That one commander's request has sparked resurgence in our involvement in this arena. This, long delayed issue of our professional journal may be the most visible sign of a renaissance, but it is only the first of a stream of initiatives.

We have already intensified ethics training for chaplains and chaplain assistants here at the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School. It is a far different and more practical program than it was when the general made his request. We have also begun a process that will lead to the Army-wide availability of battlefield ethical decision-making training like that at Fort Lewis.

We have also turned our attention to how effectively we train ethics at Army schools and Training Centers. We are redoubling our efforts to mount effective training from Basic Combat Training and Basic Officer Leader Course all the way to the senior service schools.

Since the senior officer asked, we have also built partnerships with others who have roles to play in ethics training. We have gone a long way in integrating our efforts with West Point, Training and Doctrine Command, the Combined Arms Center, Army G-1, National Defense University and others.

Hearing Lieutenant General Dubik's request was the first step. We must always be open to hearing and recognizing the cry from the heart. Most importantly, we must take action. This issue of *The Army Chaplaincy* is the heart of our response. It is also the spear point of greater things to come.

Pro Deo et Patria!

Chaplain (COL) Clark L. McGriff completed his tour of duty as Commandant, U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School on June 24, 2008, in order to assume new duties as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Chaplain.

From the USACHCS CSM



CSM Bridgette Y. Smith

Ethics is our business. A big part of business is to help Soldiers live moral, self-respecting, and fulfilling lives. And I don't mean by preaching at them.

We must exemplify the highest moral and ethical standards in our own personal behavior. That goes without saying. It has been the mantra since I joined the Army.

Society now is much more complex in terms of morals and ethics. What to do or how to act is no longer so clear as it once seemed. Soldiers come from diverse backgrounds and are heavily influenced by peer groups. Many no longer have a clear moral and ethical path.

We must stand ready to advise Soldiers on questions of behavior in a practical way. The current world that Soldiers face is very difficult. It is loaded with difficult decisions in operations and in garrison, in the motor pool and at home, on patrol and in the Forward Operating Base.

They need good, sound, practical advice on how to behave, otherwise they may fall prey to the destructive forces of guilt from not doing the right things. It is also clear that they may be more subject to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder if they have not been prepared to make the right decisions.

This is more practical than anything else. Chaplain assistants, as well as chaplains have the moral compass that can lead them to make a difference in the lives of the Soldiers around them.

I charge you to lead Soldiers by example and advise them to maintain the moral high ground.

For God and Country!
"Religious Support Starts Here"

*CSM Bridgette Y. Smith serves as the
U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School Command Sergeant Major.*

Maintaining the Moral High Ground

2007 Ethics Consultation

By Chaplain (COL) Franklin Eric Wester

Perhaps you can relate to this experience.

Twice in two years, I've been asked by senior commanders a variation of this question: "Chaplain, with all that's going on, what can the chaplaincy offer to keep the 'heart and soul' of our Soldiers on the moral high ground?"

This question, posed by a three-star commander now serving in Iraq, was the genesis for the Chaplaincy Ethics Consultation convened Sept. 11–13, 2007, at the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School and hosted by the Office of the Chief of Chaplains.

Reading collected articles from the Ethics Consultation in *The Army Chaplaincy* will give you a chance to share in the presentations. You'll not hear the interdisciplinary panel discussion, nor will you share in the dinner conversation and friendly banter among the presenters. But, with careful reading, you will discover insights and see opportunities for important ministry in fostering ethical awareness and moral reflection.

These presentations express brilliant insights by gifted thinkers in areas of ethics, officership, theology, psychiatry, behavioral research, history, international relations and chaplaincy leadership. The ideas expressed are those of each author; yet for our corps, they provide points of connection and specific challenges to our work as chaplains and chaplain assistants. Whether you are new to our chaplaincy or serve as a senior leader, I believe you will find ideas with immediate relevance and application.

The presentations at the 2007 Ethics Consultation were but a fraction of the effort. In addition to eight presentations and a panel discussion, the consultation involved three working groups, including more than 50 chaplains and chaplain assistant noncommissioned officers. The Working Groups addressed questions in three domains: ethics education and training within the Army chaplaincy; chaplaincy contributions to ethics training at various service schools; chaplaincy engagement in Army-wide training on ethics.

The groups collaborated for five months on these questions. Their efforts culminated with two briefings to the Chief of Chaplains providing 25 recommendations. These recommendations form the framework of an Ethics Campaign Plan which can inform chaplaincy work in ethics for years to come.

Finally, as lead project officer on the 2007 Chaplaincy Ethics Consultation, may I underscore the professional trust Army leaders place in chaplains and chaplain assistants as advisors in ethics and moral leadership. Those commanders who asked, "What can the chaplaincy offer to keep the 'heart and soul' of our Soldiers?" believed we in the chaplaincy had answers to their question. May your careful study of the articles in this journal, your faithful application of your religious insights, and your growing insights into the military art, help you answer their question with clarity.

*Wester served as senior project officer for the Joint Transition Team to stand up the new Armed Forces Chaplaincy Center (AFCC), co-locating Navy and Air Force chaplaincy training to Fort Jackson, SC. New facilities are under construction and the AFCC will launch shared training in January 2010. He has multiple publications about ethics in *Parameters*, the professional journal of the Army War College, including "Preemption and Just War: Considering the Case of Iraq," in 2004.*

The Army Chaplaincy and Ethics

Historic roots, roles and reflections

The propitious bounty of heaven can never be expected on a nation that disregards the eternal rules of order, and the right which heaven itself has ordained.

-- George Washington

By Dr. John W. Brinsfield

The purpose of this article is to review some of the ways U.S. Army chaplains, both new arrivals and seasoned veterans, have been engaged with ethics and moral leadership during the course of our history. Hopefully, the highlights of their ministries of moral persuasion in the past can help define possibilities and even boundaries for involvement with ethics instruction in the future.

Since 1775, commanders have looked to their chaplains as ethical leaders to reinforce Soldiers' spiritual strength, commitment, cohesion, morale, and moral discipline. The roles chaplains assumed were legion: as pastors, preachers, professors, advisors to the commander, participants with their Soldiers in combat, defense counsels, senior leaders, administrators and stewards of resources, clinical team ethicists in hospitals, and since 1973, as ethics instructors in Army service schools. The roles were numerous because questions of right and wrong conduct, which required an ethical decision making process, have been present throughout the Army's history. Many of the moral leadership programs chaplains developed to address such philosophical and behavioral questions were "firsts" in the Army -- designed to support commanders and Soldiers alike.

General Washington's chaplains

Of all the American commanders of the 18th Century, General George Washington put the highest value on chaplain ministries in the Army. Washington wanted a righteous Army because he believed that only with Providential help would American independence be achieved. In their roles as preachers, pastors, and teachers, his chaplains were essential components in Washington's strategic moral leadership goals. He urged that Congress appoint one chaplain for every regiment rather than one for every brigade. He attended worship regularly and asked chaplains to pray at each important assembly of troops. He even sponsored a pay raise for chaplains during the second year of the Revolutionary War.

Washington wanted Soldiers to have a chaplain of their own faith group, so in 1775 he supported the concept of a pluralistic chaplaincy and an Army that would guarantee the free exercise of religion. This idea was revolutionary in itself in a time when only Anglican clergy could serve as chaplains in the British armies. Twelve years later, as President of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Washington would support the addition of a Bill of Rights that included the provision for the free exercise of religion for all citizens of the United States.

Between 1775 and 1783, some 218 chaplains were known to have served in the Continental Army. Ninety-nine percent were Protestants representing seven denominations. One chaplain was a Roman Catholic priest from Canada. During the war, 23 chaplains died while serving their units -- almost 11 percent of those who served. While most deaths were caused by disease, malnutrition, and exhaustion, the casualty rate for Revolutionary War chaplains was nevertheless the highest in the history of the Chaplaincy -- inclusive of all of America's wars.

Washington's expectations for his chaplains included private and public prayer, worship services for each brigade or regiment at least once a week, morale support for Soldiers who often had no pay, no shoes, and

little food, and moral discourses to serve as encouragement for good behavior. So critical were their ministries that by 1783 chaplains were forbidden to take leave without Washington's personal approval.

He believed that religion and morality went together. In a letter to General William Smallwood of Maryland, dated May 26, 1777, Washington wrote "Let vice and immorality of every kind be discouraged, as much as possible, in your brigade, and as a chaplain is allowed to each Regiment, see that the men regularly attend divine worship."¹

Washington ordered his chaplains to preach one brigade at a time so that brigades without chaplains could hear a sermon. The men met in formation, under arms, and marched to services where they stood in ranks. They heard sermons against swearing (which might offend Providence and cost them a victory), stealing (which was a serious breach of a Biblical commandment), and drunkenness (which was contrary to military law).

In addition to preaching for moral reform, when there were no other officers present, chaplains read the laws of war to the Soldiers, many of whom could not read.

Colonel Aaron Barlow of the 5th Connecticut Regiment noted on July 1, 1775, that "Every Monday morning, Paragraphs of the Military Law" relating to Soldiers were read to each company. Soldiers were not to pull down fences, fire weapons on the march, plunder or insult civilians, or "suffer any person to ease themselves except in vaults prepared for that purpose."² Evidently chaplains were concerned not only with a righteous and moral Army, but also with a healthy one.

The greatest moral and morale problem Washington faced as the war progressed was desertion. For example, at Valley Forge in February of 1778, some 1134 Soldiers were listed as deserters out of a total force of 10,000. Approximately 3000 were on sick call and 4000 men had no blankets. Rations were reduced to one cup of flour, one pinch of salt, and lots of cold water. More than 1500 horses were slaughtered for food. Turnips bought from farmers cost \$1.50 a dozen when the daily pay for a private was one shilling or about thirty cents.³

In such conditions, Washington commended Chaplain Abiel Leonard of the 3rd Connecticut Regiment for taking pains "to animate the Soldiery and impress them with a knowledge of the important rights as we are contending for... holding forth the necessity of courage and bravery and at the same time of obedience and subordination to those in command."⁴

General Henry Knox, who commanded Washington's artillery, wrote somewhat later: "Every legion must have a chaplain, of respectable talents and character, who, besides his religious functions, should impress on the minds of the youth at stated periods, in concise discourses, the eminent advantages of free governments to the happiness of society, and that such governments can only be supported by the knowledge, spirit, and virtuous conduct of the youth -- to be illustrated by the most conspicuous examples in history."⁵

Chaplains, in short, were to encourage Soldiers not to desert their comrades and to behave in accord with religious, civil and military law.

Evidently Washington concluded, toward the end of the eight-year war, that Providence had indeed blessed the Continental Army. In 1781, after Lord Cornwallis' surrender at Yorktown, the Commander-in-Chief called for a service of thanksgiving to God for the victory. In contrast to some of the Deists who denied that God intervened in human affairs, Washington believed in the "interposition" of the Almighty: "The commander-in-chief earnestly recommends that the troops not on duty should universally attend [the thanksgiving service] with that seriousness of deportment and gratitude of heart which the recognition of such reiterated and astonishing interposition of Providence demands of us. I take a particular pleasure in acknowledging that the interposing Hand of Heaven in the various instances of our extensive Preparation for this Operation [at Yorktown], has been most conspicuous and remarkable."⁶

Seen from Washington's perspective, the ministry of chaplains was absolutely essential for the cohesion and effectiveness of the Continental Army. The American Revolution was a war based on a philosophical

proposition -- that all men are created equal and endowed by their Creator with inalienable rights. The 18th Century clergy comprised the majority of religious and moral philosophers and as such strengthened the will of Soldiers to fight for their God-given rights. When Chaplain John Gano offered the final prayer at Newburgh, New York, and left the last encampment of the Continental Army, he carried more than Washington's commendation and confidence -- he carried his heartfelt thanks.

The Chaplain as Professor of Ethics

From 1818 to 1838 there was but one chaplain on active duty in the United States Army -- the Chaplain to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point who was also Professor of History, Geography and Ethics. This was a very significant position because the chaplain preached to the entire Corps of Cadets each Sunday and taught the upperclassmen history, geography, philosophical ethics, along with constitutional and international law, during the week. In effect, the Academy Chaplain taught subjects in the 19th Century that 100 years later would occupy four distinct departments at West Point, including the Department of Law and the Department of English.

The Academy Chaplain as Professor had the right to teach the textbooks of his choice, with the approval of the Academy's Academic Board, which was composed of the Superintendent and permanent professors. The influence of these textbooks on the cadets cannot be overemphasized, for the cadets had to memorize significant sections of their textbooks in order to recite correct answers to their instructors' questions in class. Cadet Thomas Jonathan Jackson of Virginia, later nicknamed "Stonewall" during the Civil War, was known to have studied his textbooks so long by the coal fireplace in his room that he said he "burned" the information into his brain.

Because chaplains at West Point left the Academy fairly frequently -- there were 11 total Professors of History, Geography and Ethics between 1813 and 1896 for an average tenure of seven and a half years -- textbooks tended to change as well.⁷ Chaplain Charles McIlvaine, former Chaplain to the U.S. Senate, who taught at West Point from 1825 to 1828, used textbooks such as Emmerich de Vattel's *Law of Nations* and Judge William Rawle's *A View of the Constitution of the United States of America*. These textbooks were published in 1758 and 1825 respectively and reflected a "limited war" approach to military ethics and a justification for secession, probably based on the threat of secession by the New England States at the Hartford Convention of 1814. Years later, Robert E. Lee (West Point Class of 1829) told Episcopal Bishop Joseph Wilmer of Virginia that had he not read Rawle's *View of the Constitution* in the Chaplain's Course, he would have never left the Union.⁸

McIlvaine was evidently also an excellent preacher, for he was the only West Point chaplain in the 19th Century selected for inclusion in a history of American preaching.⁹ His preaching must have been effective, for his cadet congregation, which included Robert E. Lee, Albert S. Johnston, Joseph E. Johnston, Jefferson Davis, and Robert Anderson, remembered many of their fellows who made new commitments of faith -- Cadet Leonidas Polk among them.¹⁰

The two chaplains who followed McIlvaine were Thomas Warner (1828-1837) and Jasper Adams (1837-1840). Warner, whose niece wrote "Jesus Loves Me" for the children in her uncle's Sunday School classes, changed textbooks as was customary for new professors. By 1832, Warner had replaced Vattel and Rawle with a radically different volume...James Kent's *Commentaries on American Law* originally published in 1826.

Kent's book was in many ways the antithesis of Vattel's *Law of Nations*. Kent believed, as a realist, that "war was the dissolution of all moralities" and was fought between "all the individuals of the one, and all the individuals of which the other nation is composed." Kent, who was a professor of law at Columbia University in New York City, also was a strong defender of the Union and opposed to secession and to the slave trade which he said was "declared to be piracy by the statute laws of England and the U.S."¹¹

Chaplain Jasper Adams, Warner's replacement in 1837, continued the use of Kent's *Commentaries*. Adams was a New England native and the cousin of President John Quincy Adams. He was a graduate of Brown University and previously the President of the College of Charleston in South Carolina.

The cadet who appreciated Kent's *Commentaries* the most was William T. Sherman of Ohio (West Point Class of 1840). Sherman found a legal basis for opposition to secession, the basis for retaliation (which he would use liberally during the Civil War), and the definition for total war as opposed to limited conflicts. At the end of the year, Sherman placed sixth in his class in moral philosophy, better than Cadets U.S. Grant, Philip Sheridan, and J.E.B. Stuart, but not as well as Lee or Jackson.¹² In later years, as Commanding General of the Army, Sherman recommended Kent's *Commentaries* to his son, Thomas, then a student at Yale. He also made sure that Kent's *Commentaries* was required reading at Fort Leavenworth's School of Application, the forerunner to the modern Command and General Staff College.¹³

By 1900 the chaplains at West Point were no longer on the teaching faculty, but limited their work to the spiritual development and sustainment of cadets. The Academic Board recruited faculty members with advanced degrees or sent them to graduate schools to secure them. The board also established new academic departments to take the place of the former chaplain professors who earlier had taught history, geography, ethics, and law. Yet, if one reads the old textbooks carefully, the earlier chaplains were ahead of their time; for most of the ethical concepts of the Civil War, i.e., secession, rebellion, gradual emancipation, abolition, total war, unconditional surrender, retaliation, and pillage were discussed in the Academy Chaplain's Course 20 years before the first gun was fired at Fort Sumter.¹⁴

The Chaplain as Advisor to the Commander

The first duty specified for chaplains in the U.S. Army regulations of 1861 was to advise the commander. Specifically, chaplains were to make written, quarterly reports "on the moral and religious condition of the regiment, and such suggestions as may conduce to the social happiness and moral improvement of the troops."¹⁵

It is interesting that the first focus of the Army was not on worship services, which were probably assumed in the Army, but on the moral improvement of the troops. A moral Soldier was presumably a better Soldier than an amoral one.

The scope of the duty for chaplains to advise their commanders has been very broad. Issues have included a wide range of topics from the effect of command policies on troops and their families, to reporting suspected war crimes, to discussing individual cases of Soldier stress, to recommending new religious, morale or moral instruction programs to the commander. In many cases commanders expect the chaplain to advise them, especially when all of the pertinent facts may not be immediately available or when extenuating circumstances were simply overlooked.

In the first year of the Civil War, Colonel Ulysses S. Grant took command of the 21st Illinois Infantry Regiment. His chaplain was a Methodist by the name of James L. Crane. At first Chaplain Crane was hesitant to offer advice which might be contrary to his commander's decisions. Grant let him know that he valued and expected his chaplain's advice. The following account is taken from Crane's memoirs:

When we halted at Salt River, Missouri, two of our young bloods, supposing that it was necessary to show their hatred to the rebellion by some valorous exploit, had hardly pitched their tents when they started off, on their own responsibility, to seek for the enemies of the Union. They left in the afternoon, stayed all night, and came back the next day with flying colors, bringing with them a "secesher" and two of his horses. Grant was seated by the door of his tent when the two heroes brought the trophies of their victory before him. He did not rise from his seat, nor pull his pipe from his mouth, but quietly asked the boys: "Who gave you permission to be absent from camp?"

“Nobody; we just thought we’d go out and look after some ‘seceshers,’ and we’ve found this feller and brought him up;” and they pointed triumphantly to the prisoner, who was still sitting on his horse, and looked as if he expected to be shot before he could say his prayers.

“I’ll attend to your case first,” said the colonel; and the flush of victory began to fade from their faces as he continued: “Captain, you will take these boys, and have them tied to a tree for six hours, for leaving camp without permission.”

The boys looked crestfallen, and disappeared in company with the captain. After Grant had questioned the trembling farmer, and his professions of attachment to the Union were found to be satisfactory, and he freely took the oath of allegiance, he set him at liberty, and leisurely resumed his smoking, and in half a minute looked as though nothing unusual had happened. Then turning to me, with apparently no aim in his remark, he inquired:

“Chaplain, what do you think of camp-life by this time?”

“It is entirely a new phase of life to me, Colonel, and I have hardly been able to come to a definite conclusion yet.”

“What did you think of the conduct of those two young men?” he asked, as coolly as if he were inquiring about the weather.

“I think the young men were not intentionally guilty of a violation of discipline; the method was irregular; but they, doubtless, thought they were doing a good thing for the country.”

“Do you think I punished them too severely?”

“Well, Colonel, I do not know that I am prepared to judge of what is too severe in military life.”

“I don’t ask you for a military opinion; I ask for your opinion as a citizen. Chaplains are not supposed to be military men; they are supposed to carry into camp the same feelings and views of justice and right they had in civil life.” And he raised his eyes as if to see whether I was appreciating his remarks.

“As you have asked me for a candid opinion, I will give it. I think the punishment of those boys was not proportioned to their offence. If it were I, six hours tied up to a tree would be a serious business. I think it was rather too severe on the boys, Colonel.”

“But, Chaplain, suppose we were surrounded by an enemy, and men were allowed to stray from camp; they would be taken prisoners or lose their lives in such a case.”

“That appears reasonable, Colonel; but we are not near an enemy. Besides, the boys are in a new position, and know not exactly what is expected of them, and had no idea what they were bringing on themselves.”

“But we should so prepare when the enemy is at a distance that we may be ready when he is near at hand.”

“That is true, sir; yet I still think a milder punishment for unwitting offenders would as effectually work the same result.”

“The colonel stroked his beard with his left hand, a habit to which he is accustomed when there is the slightest interruption to the current of his thoughts, and he puffed his smoke with renewed vigor, and, reflecting a moment, called out:

“Orderly, go and tell the guard to release those boys tied to the trees; they have been punished long enough.”¹⁶

Chaplains, of course, not only advise their regimental or battalion commanders, but also general officers on occasion. Chaplain (CPT) Art Weber, a Missouri Synod Lutheran, and for many years the Lutheran pastor for cadets at West Point, was one case in point.

Weber graduated from the Chaplain School in 1944 and then reported to his unit which was engaged at that time in the Battle of the Bulge in Europe. His first duty when he got to Belgium was to bury 700 paratroopers in the icy ground.

Weber stayed with his unit until the war was over and then was assigned to Heidelberg, Germany, Headquarters for the Seventh Army. At that time, venereal disease was rampant throughout the armies of occupation. There were 3000 cases in Heidelberg alone among the French and American troops. So the staff officers all got together and tried to convince the Commanding General of the Seventh Army, Gen. Alexander Patch, to station Military Police at the houses of ill repute and send doctors down to check out the women and give them penicillin shots.

When Chaplain Weber heard that, he got together with his fellow chaplains, and told them, “This will never fly in America. We are going to have to do something about this.” All of the chaplains in Heidelberg went together to see Patch at his headquarters. They said, “Sir, very respectfully, we have been with you all the way across France and halfway across Germany. We have taken casualties, and we have looked after your Soldiers; but if you sanction this program, it is never going to fly with the American people. It is not going to fly with the surgeons who have to do this. It is not going to fly with the God-fearing MPs that have to stand out there to break up fights, and it is certainly not going to fly with the news media.”

Patch said, “I was just waiting for somebody to advise me of that because it is not going to happen.”

As a matter of fact, he found jobs for those women in the PX and in various places so that they could earn the kind of living that they needed to, and get out of the business of prostitution just to feed their children.¹⁷

There are many other illustrations of chaplains advising their commanders from other wars including Vietnam and Operation Desert Storm. The point they make is that one does not have to be an instructor in a class to teach or reinforce moral leadership. Most chaplains do it everyday in a variety of roles.

The Chaplain as participant in combat

Of the more than 25,000 chaplains who have served in the Army Chaplaincy since 1775, 400 have died during times of war. Six chaplains have been authorized to wear the Medal of Honor for individual acts of heroism. Twenty-seven were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross in World War I alone. In a sense all of these chaplains were making ethical statements by their service and sacrifice.

All of their stories are not known, but some are. The sacrifices of the four chaplains who went down on the *Dorchester* in 1943 may be the most famous, but there were many other chaplains who personified personal courage, selfless service and loyalty to God and Country in equally trying circumstances. Three examples from World War II, Korea, and Operation Desert Storm are worthy of mention.

Chaplain Albert Hoffman, Italy

Chaplain Albert Hoffman was a Roman Catholic priest from Iowa and, in 1944 was described in the national news media as the most highly decorated Army chaplain in World War II. He served with the 34th

Infantry Division at Monte Cassino, Italy, and practiced moral leadership by example.

At Monte Cassino, Hoffman was riding with a patrol on point when he saw a Soldier in a minefield, wounded but moving his hand. Father Hoffmann felt it was his duty as a priest to go rescue that man and give him last rites. Nobody in the patrol initially volunteered to go with him, because it was an active minefield; but eventually two medics decided to accompany him. Hoffmann set out gingerly with his team through the minefield. He managed to reach the Soldier safely and picked him up, put him on his shoulder, and got him almost back. Then, sadly, Hoffman stepped on a mine that blew his leg off. He lay out there in the minefield for four hours before the medics could clear enough mines to get him out. He survived, and so did the Soldier. The fallen Soldier, by the way, was a German.

When he got back to London, Hoffman got a prosthesis and immediately volunteered, not to go home, but to serve as a chaplain on an amputation ward in an American military hospital in London. That, he said, meant he hadn't lost a leg, he had gained a ministry.

Chaplain James Conner, Korea

Thirteen chaplains gave their lives during the Korean War, four of them as prisoners of war. Chaplain James Connor was one who was killed while trying to save wounded Soldiers. Conner was an Episcopal priest from Washington, D.C. He served in Korea with the 31st Infantry Regiment. He was wounded at the Chosin Reservoir, but he helped the other walking wounded get over a hill so they could make it to the U.S. Marine Corps lines.

In the process of doing this, Conner turned around and saw American Soldiers, who were incapable of fighting, being shot and their bodies put on a truck. He went running back down the hill, holding his arm and waving the other one, trying to get the Chinese to stop shooting the wounded. Instead, the Chinese shot him, put him in the truck along with the others, and then set fire to the truck, cremating all of the bodies.

In 2004, 54 years later, Conner received the Silver Star medal posthumously by a special act of Congress. A retired chaplain, Lieutenant Colonel Don Hill, had tracked down some survivors, gotten some testimony, and successfully persuaded his congressman to sponsor a bill.

Conner's two daughters were very young in 1950 when he was listed as missing in action. They never knew what happened to their father. For 54 years, their father had not had a memorial service. In the summer of 2004 in Newbern, N.C., Chaplain (Colonel) Hank Steinhilber and Congressmen Walter B. Jones (R-NC) presented the Silver Star to Conner's two daughters.

Chaplain Tom Solhjem, Iraq

During Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the 82nd Airborne Division made a wide sweep on the western flank of the coalition forces. At 2:10 p.m., on the afternoon of Feb. 24, the French 6th Armored Division and the 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, attacked the Iraqis near the town of as-Salman. By 6 p.m., as-Salman was surrounded.

Mounted on trucks, the 82nd Airborne Division's 1st Brigade was prepared to clear any pockets of resistance to the south that the lead Corps' forces had bypassed as they attacked farther north. The attack had been so rapid that many Iraqi soldiers had been bypassed in their bunkers along Main Supply Route Texas.

In the 2nd Brigade convoy following the attack, Solhjem and his chaplain assistant, Specialist Pheron Brown, were looking for bunkers that had been abandoned by Iraqi soldiers. During one of their halts, Chaplain Solhjem dismounted from his vehicle and walked to the top of a sandy berm. Approximately 50 meters in front of him, he saw a bunker with some Iraqis sitting around it gesturing toward him. He thought that there were at least two machine guns trained on him at that time. He was unarmed, except for a knife which he used to open his meal rations. He realized that there was only one possible course of action; he

would have to walk over to the Iraqis, completely exposed to their fire and advise them to surrender.

Solhjem walked to the bunker and asked if there were any Iraqi soldiers inside who spoke English. By this time, there were approximately 25 Iraqi soldiers with their weapons in his line of sight. One soldier came forward and identified himself as an English speaker. Chaplain Solhjem told him that he was a chaplain in the U.S. Army, which to them meant that he was a holy Imam, the Muslim title for a religious teacher.

Chaplain Solhjem told the Iraqis that there were many American Soldiers on the other side of the berm who would kill them if they did not surrender. As it happened, the Iraqi who was speaking with him not only knew English but had studied briefly at a branch of the University of Minnesota, near Solhjem's seminary in the United States. Solhjem was able to convince him to direct the other Iraqi soldiers to surrender in order to save lives. After a good deal of sitting and pointing and conversations in their own language, the Iraqi soldiers began to file out of the bunker.

In the meantime, Solhjem's absence was noticed in the convoy. A platoon sergeant went over the berm and saw him with the Iraqis. He shouted for the chaplain to come back, but Solhjem had the attention of the Iraqi soldiers. By the time they all filed out and turned over their weapons, he had personally captured 80 armed Iraqi soldiers. He brought the soldiers back to the convoy and turned them over to the Military Police who, in turn, searched and fed them and prepared them for evacuation to Saudi Arabia.

Chaplain Solhjem regarded this incident as somewhat miraculous in that he was able to locate an Iraqi soldier who had actually studied not only in his home state but also spoke English which established a common ground of understanding between them. His act of courage was symbolic of many other courageous actions chaplains and chaplain assistants performed in Iraq which often saved lives.

Chaplains as Service School and Medical Ethics Instructors

As a result of the My Lai massacre in 1968 and the Peers Report thereafter, General William Westmoreland, then Army Chief of Staff, ordered the Army War College to conduct a study of the Army's professionalism in 1970, which included ethics and ethics instruction for officers and Soldiers. Most of the ethics and morality lectures before the Vietnam War had been directed toward enlisted men. It became clear in the aftermath of the Vietnam War that ethics must be included in officer professional education as well.

Those events eventually led to chaplains being appointed to teach ethics in 23 Army service schools. Chaplain (MG) Gerhardt Hyatt, former Army Chief of Chaplains, appointed Chaplain (COL) Joseph Beasley to teach ethics at West Point in 1971 and Chaplain (COL) Charles Kriete to teach ethics at the Army War College in 1974.

In 1976, Chaplain (MG) Orris Kelly, who had followed Hyatt as Chief of Chaplains, declined proponenty for military ethics on part of the Chaplain Corps. Kelly believed that professional ethics should be a command function with chaplains in support. He said it was not in the professional jurisdiction of the Chaplaincy to be the proponent for defining military ethics. He did promise full instructional support to the Army.

Kelly wanted to keep the focus on religious leadership, on what was necessary as a pastor, a preacher, and one who handles ordinances and sacraments. He felt the content of defining and illustrating the ethics of the military profession should be put together by the Army Judge Advocate and combat arms officers even if the chaplains were to help teach it.

As a result of these initiatives, the first chaplain service school instructors reported to the Air Defense Artillery School, the Armor School, the Field Artillery School, the Infantry School, the Academy of Health Sciences, the Sergeants Major Academy, the Quartermaster School, the Transportation School, and the Defense Race Relations Institute in 1974.

By 1980, chaplains had moved into the field of biomedical ethics. Chaplain (LTC) David Dedonato established a Chaplain Ethics Committee at the Academy of Health Sciences at Fort Sam Houston and then

another one at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. In 1982, chaplains were sent to Harvard University and to Rice University to study ethics as part of a new fully-funded civilian education program for chaplain ethics instructors, and Army Regulation 165-1 was drafted to include the Moral Leadership Program, a successor to the Character Guidance lectures that began at the end of World War II.

Since 1999, there have been many developments in defining Army values and in refining ethics instruction as part of the Army Transformation. The current emphasis on re-visiting the ethics of preemptive strikes, treatment of enemy prisoners, and interrogation techniques have engaged the government, the media and the American people in debate. However those issues turn out, chaplains will still have moral leadership and ethics instruction within their professional jurisdiction. We are expected to be role models wherever we are and to be advisors to the commander on a wide range of issues.

The lessons of history, as we perceive them, encourage us to recall that most ethics instruction takes place outside the classroom and that the most effective instructional technique is by personal example. Chaplains have been most effective when they worked together and not alone. Chaplains have repeatedly demonstrated moral leadership as patriots, pastors, preachers, professors, advisors, participants in combat with all of its stresses, and as instructors and bioethicists in some of the nation's leading educational and medical institutions.

No matter what the setting, chaplains have historically accepted their challenge to live in accord with their highest values in order to fulfill their missions as spiritual, religious and ethical leaders and to help their Soldiers succeed in becoming not only excellent warriors, but also leaders of wisdom, integrity faith, and compassion.

Endnotes

¹ John W. Brinsfield, "The Chaplaincy and Moral Leadership," *The Army Chaplaincy*, Summer 1995, 13.

² Ibid. 15.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ John W. Brinsfield, "Our Roots for Ministry," *Military Chaplains' Review*, Fall 1987, 28.

⁶ William J. Federer, *America's God and Country: Encyclopedia of Quotations* (St. Louis: Amerisearch, Inc., 1999) 646.

⁷ Herman A. Norton, *Struggling for Recognition: The United States Army Chaplaincy, 1791-1865* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Chaplains, 1977), 24-40.

⁸ John W. Brinsfield, "The Chaplain As Professor at West Point," *Military Chaplains' Review*, Fall 1987, 68.

⁹ Herman A. Norton, *Struggling for Recognition: The United States Army Chaplaincy, 1791-1865* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Chaplains, 1977), 29.

¹⁰ Ibid. 31. All of the Southern cadets on this list became Confederate generals except for Robert Anderson who was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General, USA, after his stubborn defense of Ft. Sumter in April of 1861.

¹¹ John W. Brinsfield, "The Chaplain As Professor at West Point," 74.

¹² John W. Brinsfield, "The Military Ethics of General William T. Sherman," *Military Chaplains' Review*, Spring 1982, 48.

¹³ John W. Brinsfield, "The Chaplain As Professor at West Point," 75. Thomas Sherman became a Roman Catholic priest, much against his father's wishes, and served as a U.S. Army chaplain in Puerto Rico during The Spanish-American War.

¹⁴ Ibid. 74.

¹⁵ War Department, *Revised U.S. Army Regulations of 1861* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1863) 507.

¹⁶ The Ulysses S. Grant Association, "Grant and His Chaplain," website: <http://twister.lib.siu.edu/projects/usgrant/hist/chaplain.html>.

¹⁷ Interview with Chaplain Art Weber, US Military Academy, 1983.

Brinsfield is the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps historian.

Moving Soldiers to the Moral High Ground

By Chaplain (COL) Jack Van Dyken

(Editor's Note: This and the following manuscripts were adapted from transcripts of oral presentations at the 2007 Ethics Consultation at the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School, Fort Jackson, South Carolina. They are not intended as footnoted formal articles, but as faithful representations of the speakers' thoughts.)

It was exciting coming to Fort Lewis (Washington) and having the opportunity to work for General Dubik (Major General James M. Dubik, then I Corps Commander). He is probably one of the smartest men I've ever known. He talks in what, at first, seems like circles. Hopefully, sometimes you can get into that circle and understand what he's saying. An example of the last time he and I got together, he said, "Jack, this is what I would like for you to do." And I said, "Yes sir, I fully understand." Actually, uh, just a great man.

What I realized is that oftentimes as chaplains, when we feel led to do something, not all of those around us feel equally led. There are times I suspect many of you here, when you've had a great program in mind and you've brought it to a commander, you've found the door was not open. Many times we have to beat down the door in order to present what we feel called to present. That was not the case at Fort Lewis. When I came in, General Dubik called me in and said, "Jack, I've got something I want you to do. I have begun work with your predecessor, Clarke McGriff (Chaplain (Colonel) Clarke McGriff)." It is interesting how providentially Clarke moved from I Corps to the Chaplain school and that part of the piece of the puzzle fit together beautifully.

I don't believe in happenstance or coincidence, I truly believe God placed Clarke here at the Chaplain School to be able to facilitate the continuing of this program. As fate would have it, or as God's plan would have it, I sat on a board in Washington, D.C. and had an opportunity to talk to the then Army Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain Hicks (Chaplain (Major General) David M. Hicks), and the current Army Chief of Chaplains, Doug Carver (Chaplain (Major General) Douglas Carver). I told them, "You know, we have an opportunity here." I truly believe that if we don't take the bull by the horns when we have a senior leader in the U.S. Army who is inviting us in...if we don't take advantage of that, I truly believe it's a sin. And they agreed, they put money behind it. They put their efforts behind it. Chaplain (Major) Matt Goff from the chief's office, Chaplain (Major) Steve Austin and Sergeant First Class Charles Heard came out to Fort Lewis. We talked at length about what General Dubik's philosophy was, what his intent was, and we developed a course of action on the direction we wanted to go at Fort Lewis. The Chief agreed that he would support a pilot program at Fort Lewis, looking at battlefield ethics and in particular, keeping the moral high ground in a, in a battlefield scenario.

Fort Lewis has a Stryker Symposium. They videotape Soldiers coming back from Iraq. Their own stories are recorded in their own words. What we wanted to do was to capture some interviews from Soldiers but we wanted to focus the discussion so that we could create scenarios that then would be part of our training. The 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team had just returned to Fort Wainwright, Alaska from Iraq. We sent a team up to video tape Soldiers. Our concern was that, in the past, most of the taping had been done of majors, sergeants major and colonels. We didn't feel that would be the people that would relate to the young Soldiers that were in our target audience. So we gave the Stryker Symposium six questions we wanted them to ask and to get E-5s and below and to get their responses.

Historically, the Army has trained ethics in a lecture-type environment. Back in 1947 when the Character Guidance program first came about, it was basically four one-hour lectures at initial entry training where new

Soldiers would get character guidance. Everybody else got one hour a month lectures. Again, they were lectures from chaplains, produced by the Chief of Chaplains Office on different forms of ethical decisions. Many times it was nothing more than a sermon. In fact, as I was talking about this program with commanders, many times they said, "Look chaplain, if I want a sermon I will go to church on Sunday. I don't need a sermon." And, that's really what had happened many times with the Character Guidance program. It later became Our Moral Heritage and then Human Self Development. It lasted from 1947 until 1970, when it basically died. And, there were some reasons why it died. Originally, the Character Guidance program, like what we're doing now, was the brainchild, not of chaplains, but of commanders. Over a period of time, commanders lost faith in that program, but not only commanders but chaplains as well. Chaplains were the ones teaching it and many of the chaplains really didn't believe in the program. And it died kind of a painful death because there really wasn't the support from commanders.

What happened often was, and as you read the history of Character Guidance and Our Moral Heritage and so forth, it really amounted to a religious class for many people as opposed to dealing with moral/ethical decision-making and problems. So many times the person or the problem was not in the material itself, but in the people who were presenting it and in the command support of that program.

Upfront, we have an opportunity, a target of opportunity right now and I'm excited to see that we're having this conference. I'm excited to see that the Chief of Chaplains is behind it. I'm excited to see that command is behind it. General (David H.) Petraeus, back in May 2007 said, "Look, we've got to take a look at ethical decision making in-country." It's interesting some of the things that he had to say in his remarks. He said, "You know we, we've got a situation now where there's a brotherhood of the close fight." That's the terminology he used, a brotherhood of the close fight, and he said, "The problem is atrocities happen but because of that close-knit family that you have in warfare, things happen and you don't want to narc on your buddy. And he said we can't have that kind of thing happening.

General Cody (General Richard Cody - Vice Chief of Staff Army), in August, said, "Look, we have this community of excellence at West Point. I want our army to be much more ethically based," and we have talked about it and talked about it over the last 20 years but there has not been a real concerted effort to really teach ethics. Now, as I have gone across Fort Lewis and have talked to commanders, commanders who have said, "Jack, you know you are talking about a three-hour block of instruction that you do. What do you hope to accomplish in that three-hour time frame?" One said, "You know, you look at the culture that our Soldiers are coming out of, and many of them are coming from the inner city," and he added, "You know, you can take, you know that expression, you can take them out of the hood . . . and, "Many times, the kinds of problems we have are a direct result of the culture that our Soldiers are coming out of." And, "You certainly don't believe you're going to change these Soldiers in that three hours of Sergeants' Time that you have?" And I said, "No, you're right. If all I have is three hours, I'm not going to change those people. I'm not going to change 18, 19, 20 years of upbringing in three hours."

My target audience at Fort Lewis right now is those 20% who come from a really good background. My idea is to encourage them to do the right thing when the time comes. Certainly I would like to change behavior, I would like for our program to be able to change people but it is going to take much more than that what we have available, what's available to us right now to do that. In the Taguba Report, about what happened at Abu Ghraib, one of the things it said was this: "If just one of the people had said stop, that might have been able to make a difference." Haditha, was the same thing. If one of those Soldiers would have said, "Hey, what we're doing is wrong, we can't do this." That is my target audience. It is encouraging Soldiers to make the right decision. Empowering them to say, "Stop! What we're doing is wrong. This is not what we should do." And so that's our target audience, not the leadership so much, but that certainly is part of it.

The program we have at Fort Lewis takes a three-pronged approach. We have an OPD (Officer

Professional Development) where we talk with the junior officers and we run through the entire program with them because we want them to see what their Soldiers are going to go through. Then we do an NCOPD where it's a combination professional development but also train the trainer. But the primary focus of our training at Fort Lewis is the E-5 and below. The idea is that these Soldiers who are going out on patrol, we want them to talk with one another about moral ethical issues. In times past, when chaplains have done character guidance, our moral heritage, human self-development, it's been in a lecture format, probably the worst environment to try to teach ethical action.

We're working with small groups, 10 or less, a squad, optimally, with a squad leader...people who they respect, who they know, many of which are combat veterans who have already earned the right to speak. As a chaplain, what right do I have to speak to them about warfare? Certainly not as much as a combat veteran and someone who is in their chain of command. And so what we want to do is to have the squad leader, the platoon leader, and the platoon sergeant, talk with his Soldiers and the fact is this, Soldiers talk about these things. This is nothing, this is not new. This is not rocket science. But what we are trying to do is channel what it is that Soldiers are talking about. In TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) we talk about terminal learning objectives. We want to ensure that what comes out of this discussion is the right thing. We want to challenge them to do the right thing. To think about it before they ever go into combat so that they're challenged with moral ethical dilemmas and the first time they experience is not when they're out there on patrol, but that they'll have already thought about it and it will be instinctive.

You know, they found in World War II that only one in every 10 people actually fired their weapon. And, subsequent to that, in training in combat arms by having pop-up targets and teaching Soldiers in basic training to automatically fire their weapons, they found by the time they went to Vietnam and so forth, that seven or eight of 10 actually fired their weapons. Now the problem is being discriminative or discriminatory about what they're firing at. And that's where the whole ethical decision-making comes in. At Fort Lewis the difficulty was not in having the leadership agree that this is what we need to do but then implementing it with other commanders. Bottom line is we had to sell the program to the leadership. I went out to every one of our 12 separate brigade commanders and talked with them, and it's interesting as I wrote Eric (Chaplain Eric Keller) back, it's exciting to see some have totally embraced the program and others marginally. For some, it's a matter of, well, it's leadership. As long as the senior leaders have got their act together, everybody else will fall in line. Bottom line is that senior leadership is not out on patrol. And certainly a senior commander can create a positive command environment, but it's that junior enlisted soldier that is the one who has the make that critical decision.

We talk about a strategic corporal, where having Soldiers understand that what they do impacts not simply on them but has ramifications way beyond the tactical operational to strategic level. We have a three-hour block of instruction, the first hour deals with the evil of war or the horror of war. We talk about what is involved in that struggle. We've taken scenarios that we, we've gotten individuals from the 172nd that we videotaped. They explained real life things that have happened to them in Iraq.

The training starts out in a large group and then we give them three questions. They go back into their groups and discuss what took place in those scenarios. Again, this is not rocket science. But, what it does is force Soldiers to look at particular incidents that have happened, that are real life, that are not made up and are asked to respond, how they would operate in that environment and what would be the decision that they would make. The second block of instruction deals with the whole question of revenge. It talks about moral responsibilities and deals with the second and third order effects of the ethical decisions that you make.

When General Dubik was at Fort Lewis, one of the things we did was a Senior Leaders' Wellness Seminar. He brought in a Dr. Larry Dewey as a trainer. I'm not sure if any of you have read his book, "*War and Redemption*." One of the chapters in his book is entitled "Violating the Geneva Convention of Your Soul." Think about that phrase for a minute: Violating the Geneva Convention of your soul. In that second

block of instruction, what we tell Soldiers is that we want them to go over into the country healthy and we want them to return healthy. But health is more than just simply physically coming back with all your limbs intact. Dewey has worked with PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) for more than 20 years. He's a Harvard graduate and he had a difficult time with religion and psychology and seeing how they fit together. He told us, "You know, I saw religion as kind of voodoo out here and I didn't really want to accept the rule that religion played in therapy, in particular dealing with PTSD." And he said, "But you know what I found out after 20, 25 years? It is that those who came from a faith background made it through much better than those who didn't." And the reason was this: We have a Geneva Convention of our soul that is a moral consciousness.

In war, we have to kind of hold back from that, recognize in warfare that we can do things that violate who we are as people, but it's okay. But, what happens when there is that individual who is a noncombatant who you accidentally kill? We use a nice term: collateral damage. Now, some people can just slough it off but the majority of people have a really hard time dealing with that because it violates who they are as a person. Psychologists say, "Oh, deal with it, you'll get over it," and "give them time" and whatnot. Bottomline, what Mr. Dewey said was this: "The only way they really deal with that is through forgiveness." And psychology doesn't bring forgiveness. It's a pastor who helps people understand God's forgiveness. And so, that is one of the things we deal with here, is the second and third order effects of ethical decisions that you make and recognizing that it will affect you not simply in-country, but when you get back.

The whole question of revenge is one of the things we take a deep look at. I don't know, how many of you have seen *Saving Private Ryan*? I expect almost everybody here has. Remember that scene where they go up this radar hill and their corpsman is shot and dies. Subsequent to that, they capture a German who had been part of that unit that had him pinned down and shot him. And remember, they wanted to kill him right off the bat. I had a conference at Pacific Beach, where the night before I spoke we showed that movie and I had about 100 Soldiers in there and when that happened what do you think the Soldiers said? Unanimously, kill him, kill him, off him, whatever, and I thought "holy mackerel, this is scary." The next day, when I taught the block of instruction, we went over that. They were adamant...kill them! That's what he should have done. He should have killed him. And as we talked about it, it was amazing all the anger that was there and the feeling. I had one person walk out because she was so angry because we would say he did the right thing, which was not to kill him. But the majority of the Soldiers that we talked to responded, "Well, I owed it to his family to kill him. If I had to go back and tell his family that I let him go, I couldn't live with myself." Or we had Soldiers say, "Well you know, my commander would have backed me up if I would have killed him. Doesn't the Bible say, "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth?" And, you know it is amazing, that's the kind of discussion that we got into and it was awesome. Because that's what I wanted to happen, was for the kids to talk about it but ultimately then the role of the chaplain was not to be the preacher up front but to guide the discussion and at the end to talk about what is the right decision and what are the implications of that decision. It was phenomenal. I mean, it was fun. It was a little bit scary because you know it's, it's one of those where it could have gone either direction. But talking about the whole question of revenge and personal responsibility as it applies to your moral ethical decisions. That was the second block.

The third block of instruction dealt with what resources do you have as an individual and how do you do the right thing when those around you opt for the wrong? General Dubik used the term the dark side. There is a dark side to command. There's a dark side of being a person of authority. And it's not that difficult to go to the dark side. Now most of us here stand here and say well, "I wouldn't go to the dark side. I wouldn't be tempted." Let me tell you, when your best friend is shot and killed, it's a very fine distinction between stepping over that line and not.

One of the issues we deal with is how do you maintain the moral high ground? How do you do what's

right when those you're fighting don't abide by the same rules? What resources do you have individually, collectively, to be able to do the right thing? Now, in times past when chaplains taught things, many times it was strictly, this is it. Then, when we went into our moral heritage and our human self-development, it was, well there is no right answer. We're saying there is a right answer. There is a right and wrong. And in times past, we felt that we will let Soldiers decide what is right and wrong. Wrong answer. There is a right and wrong. There is a moral right. I truly believe that 35 years ago, we as chaplains bowed out of an area where we should have stayed. Commanders today are saying, "Chaplains you need to be there." When you look at the ethics that are being taught today, the standard one-hour block of instruction, what is it? It's a one-hour block, where you have to sign in and you sleep for an hour when you have the SJA tell you about the rules of engagement and how not to go to jail. And that's what ethics is today in the U.S. Army as far as what is being taught. When I went to the last ethics conference for instructors, one of the concerns across TRADOC was the lack of hours that our ethics instructors have in the programs of instruction at our schools. I hope that the Army leadership understands how important it is that our Soldiers go to war healthy and that they return healthy. And realize how important ethics is in their mental, spiritual, and emotional health.

Now, at Fort Lewis, we've learned a lot of things in the course of our time that we've done this. We've had, as I said, we have 12 separate brigades at Fort Lewis. We currently have three brigades, in Iraq. In one of them, we had an opportunity to do some of this training. Their commander called it "battlefield inoculation." One of the things I learned too, is you've gotta be adaptive to the type of unit that you have. What works with one is not necessarily going to work for all. For example, Soldiers that are out on patrol routinely, the scenarios that we build for them are going to be different from those who are your combat support. For example, we have the 62nd Medical Brigade that is primarily on a FOB (Forward Operating Base). The difficulties they have compared to a unit that is in contact each day are very different. What they suffer from is impotence and what I mean by that is this: they sit on the FOB all day long and they have rounds lobbed in on them periodically. They have to wake up in the middle of the night because they've got incoming rounds or they may even have someone they know who is killed by an unknown, unseen enemy. So there is that feeling of impotence. When do they have an opportunity to get back at the bad guy? Well the only time they have that is when they get tagged to be a door gunner on a mail run, or a chow run, or some place else and now they have an opportunity to get back for all those nights they couldn't sleep or all those incoming rounds and they'll end up and indiscriminately shoot an Iraqi.

What we've got to look at is that each individual is different. Each unit has "uniquenesses." We need to adapt our program to that. I don't think one size fits all, at least that's what we've learned at Fort Lewis is you've got to be creative in the scenarios and how we talk about them. I think if we can direct it so that we come up with some good viable alternatives to where they're going with many of these discussions, then I think we are worlds ahead.

As I said with the character guidance program, it failed, I believe, for three reasons: One, commanders' support. Initially on it was about 66 percent of commanders who were actually in favor of the program. By the time it died, it was at a level of 10 percent. The same is true with chaplains. Chaplains initially were very gung-ho with the whole concept of character guidance, but as time wore on and Soldiers got bored with it and so forth, chaplains really weren't behind it. But more importantly, culture changed. Back in the 1945-1950 timeframe, people were concerned that the military was going to adversely affect their children. They heard about venereal disease and all that kind of stuff that happened to their kids that went away to military. So they wanted the chaplains to protect their kids. And, religion was very important at that time to many people. It was okay to talk about religion. In fact, it was expected, but as you got into the 60s and 70s and the concern with separation of church and state, it was no longer politically astute. It wasn't politically proper to talk about religion, at least in the way that we had in the past. Society essentially killed that

program as well. And so now, I think we have an opportunity, but there are a lot of lessons we need to learn. One, it's not a time to preach, and so the program we have, the chaplains' time is very limited. It's, in summarizing a bit, perhaps doing some introduction but the key to our program is that it's not a chaplain led, it's not a lecture. It's the Soldiers talking with one another, having people they respect, that is their company chain of command, and in particular their platoon sergeants and squad leaders, that are actually doing the teaching. We're there to simply monitor and ensure that the terminal learning objectives are met, and I think that is working thus far. As far as Fort Lewis, what is our status at this point in time? Of the 12 separate brigades that we've got, I've been able to talk with nine of the brigade commanders and every one of them has bought into it. It's on the training schedule. On Thursday mornings we have Sergeants' Time, three hours of time, and they've got it now in the training schedule. We've trained all our chaplains at Fort Lewis in the program. Again we've had to be adaptable so sometimes it is three one-hour blocks of instruction, for others it's one three-hour block of instruction. But I'm excited to see that commanders have bought off on it. The chaplains, for the most part, are in agreement that it's important and have done their job of doing OPD and NCO PD and are monitoring the rest of the training. So that part, I believe, is a success. But again, selling it to the commanders has been a difficult time. As I said, I've had commanders who have said, "Chaplain, I don't know what you hope to accomplish by this because I'm not sure that you're really going to do anything of value." We have other commanders who say, "Chaplain, this is the exact thing we've been looking for and we are excited to see you." So, a lot depends on your ability to sell the program. A lot of it will have to do with how much from on high this comes down and says this has got to be done. As you know, by what the 16th or 18th of October, the chain teaching for PTSD has to be done. I don't know if that's one of the things we are looking at on down the road. Have it top-driven. That, again, is one of the things we are going to have to discuss. How this is all going to be implemented or whether it is on a case-by-case basis. My concern is for the future with this program. Right now, we're looking primarily in pre-deployment. Soldiers I've talked to have said, "Chaplain we really needed something like this in-country." So, I am hoping as we develop this that we work up a block of instruction where we will work with Soldiers in-country.

At Fort Lewis, we have a program called SWAP: Soldier Wellness Assessment Program. It's done pre-deployment and post-deployment and it takes a look at the Soldiers' mental and physical well being, pre-deployment and post deployment. What I'd like for us to do is to put together a program also where we can do an assessment of Soldiers when they come back, as far as how are they in dealing with what has taken place. Now, the medical model would say, "Well, we're already doing that and that is not an issue. But, I believe that there are people who are being missed because it's strictly looked at from a clinical perspective as opposed to what we have to bring to the table. And again, certainly that is my opinion, but I think it is shared by others and I think it is something that we need to take a look at as part of this as well. For me, it is exciting that we've got commanders who recognize that we bring something to the table and they recognize how important it is. Ethical decision-making should not be seen simply in terms of UCMJ (Uniform Code of Military Justice) and that, I think, is where it had been in the past. But I think now people recognize that the individual person, and their ability to survive and live normal lives after they come back from war, is equally important and that's really the focus of this program.

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Ethics and the Human Development of the Soldier Spirit

By Dr. Don M. Snider

(Adapted from a presentation at the 2007 Ethics Consultation at the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School, Fort Jackson, South Carolina.)

Scholars don't often get the opportunity, except in the classroom, to influence a transition of scholarly thought into the level of doctrine and implementation in an institution. And, that's what I'm here to do today and I want to change the subject a little bit. We've been using the terms and I've heard the terms used this morning, of education and training. Up front, I want to make you aware that we approach, in the projects I've been working on and studying the Army profession, we approach professions in their quintessential human nature from the point of view that humans develop. The verb we use is "to develop." It is training, it is education and it is inspiration. There is more to developing Soldiers than education and training. And the Army has been in an immense false dichotomy for decades.

We finally broke out of that at the U.S. Military Academy about 10 years ago. Almost everything we're publishing now, in terms of leader development, focuses on development wholeistically, and on the person more wholeistically than we did in the past. So, that's one change that I want stated upfront. The other thing I'd like to state upfront is that I'm not the subject matter expert on this subject. I am a policy scientist, that's what my doctorate is in. I study national security policy, but primarily I study military institutions and professions. And with the help of Dr. Andrew Abbott at the University of Chicago, we have been able to renew, in the Army, at least, the study of Army as profession, not as bureaucracy. By structure, you are a bureaucracy. By the choice of your strategic leaders, you might be a profession. Only they can determine that. Or else, you and all of your units will be conformed into the behavior of a bureaucracy.

I want to cover a little bit of that today to help you understand that you have an opportunity in this consultation to help the whole Army change how it thinks about itself, not just the subject of the ethical behavior and the individual character of the Soldiers. So, that's the second point I'd like to make. I'm a research director, because I've learned over the years, and Professor Abbott was very helpful in helping all of us understand, that when we did the first book in 2002 (*The Future of the Army Profession*, McGraw-Hill College, you can't study the military in one discipline. I'm a political scientist, a policy scientist. It takes a social psychologist, it takes a cognitive psychologist, it takes an anthropologist, it takes historians, it takes a political scientist. Only then, can you look at enough facets of a military institution in kind of a Clausewitzian sense between the state, the army and the people. And ...don't forget...we're talking about a democratic army here that serves a secular democratic state. Highly pluralistic. We can't think about this subject in our own little world. We are a profession serving a very demanding client and that client's the American people. And that relationship, whether you read Clausewitz or read the sociologist of professions, that relationship, folks, is just one relationship. They either trust you or they don't. This is not about your pay, this is not about your benefits...they didn't hire you. In professions, the relationship between the profession and the client is one of trust. And so you're talking about a precious commodity here today, one of those precious currencies that military professions can have. Does our behavior induce trust in our client? I served in the Army when we got the back of the hand from our client. I was with Denny Reimer (General Dennis J. Reimer) that night at a hotel in Boston when the news of the sex scandal at Aberdeen Proving Ground came out. I will never forget what Denny's answer was to the first reporter that got to him. Denny's a classmate, a good friend. He said, "That was an egregious failure of officer leadership."

That was a one sentence response to the whole sex scandal at Aberdeen, and that was absolutely accurate. Leaders count. Commissioned leaders count a little bit more, because they have a different set of responsibilities and a different rule as a professional. So, I don't see any difference, and I'm going to show in my presentation. . . I don't see any difference between ethical development of Soldiers and leader development. It's all one subject. How can you divide it? We'll be right back in the false dichotomies that took the Army in the cul-de-sacs for the last few decades. Education or training? Well, how about both and a little bit more if you want to be a profession and not a bureaucracy that's only concerned about confidences. My final introductory caveat: there are people in this room that know a lot more about this subject than I do. So, it's with some trepidation that I'm going to talk about this. But being a research director's always like that. You're always working with a group of people who know more in the small area than you do, but they may not know how to put it together in the larger context. My role, as a professor at West Point, my role in research is to be a "contextualizer," to present a picture and a view and an understanding within which you can apply your expertise. I wouldn't begin to know what you folks know, who have been in theater and in the box. My box was so many years ago. In some senses it's still relevant, but it's very dated.

With some trepidation, my counsel to you in this is, learn from everybody here. I want to commend the Chaplain School, their leadership, this conference, this kind of consultation. The community of best practices is what professions are about. If we can't come and share ideas, learn from each other, gee, we're just a bureaucracy. Got to get beyond that -- got to get way beyond it. Now, to introduce of subject, when we did this book in 2005 , the second edition, we organized the book, we commissioned the essays, everyone in here by a Ph.D. scholar, but almost half of them were in uniforms. We organized the book around fields of expert knowledge in the army. Because by the second book, we were far enough into the study, we could begin to map the expert knowledge. We went to U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) headquarters and said, "Give us the map of the Army's expert knowledge" and guess what we got? A bunch of quizzical looks. . . nothing. Where is the map of the Army's expert knowledge? This is the issue that John (Dr. John Brinsfield) rightly presented to you this morning. What's the jurisdiction of the Chaplaincy? What are the boundaries of your jurisdiction? What is your practice? Well, I'm not in the business of prescribing that, but I am, as a scholar, in the business of trying to map the knowledge and hand it to TRADOC and so we did.

In chapter nine of this book, Richard Lakemont, now the chief of plans for United States Forces Korea, and I worked on this chapter on "Let's map the expert Knowledge," and we got down to the moral ethical expert knowledge of the Army. We said there are four sub-fields in that: military ethics, character development, the legal aspects of the expert knowledge and lastly, Soldier spirituality. Soldier spirituality. Now, you came. . . think you came here to talk about military ethics. Well some of you, and some of the people we serve think that's an oxymoron to start with.

And in some senses it is, because Soldiers are humans just like other humans and ethics applies to interpersonal relationships between humans. So, let's don't make this too complicated. But we put in the field of Soldier spirituality for a number of reasons. And one of the reasons we put in that, even though we knew there was very little written about it, and we couldn't find very much on it, except the old *Chaplain's Pamphlet on Soldier Fitness*, which was last written in '74, I think, was all we could find. But here's how people used to think about this subject. Now, what happened? Where did that ideation go? How many combat leaders in the Army today believe. . . understand this, or believe it? I would say the more that experience combat, the more are starting to believe it. Because a lot of professional knowledge, the tacit knowledge, is experientially learned. It doesn't come from books. This is only one example. Let me give you another example. There's a new World War II memorial on the mall in Washington. If you haven't been there, I urge you to go. This is on the Pacific side. This is a statement about what happened at the Battle of

Midway. Notice what he says: “There’s something in the human spirit. A magic blend of . . .” and he decided it was skill, faith and valor. But the issue is, Soldier spirituality is something that should be expert knowledge in our profession, if we’re going to have Soldiers who are going to prevail against the worst of circumstances successfully. Didn’t I just describe the mission of the Army? And yet I’ll tell you folks, you’re plowing new ground for the Army right now. Because in our research we could find practically nothing documented and written on Soldier spirituality that is accepted in the profession. There are a lot of little niche places that people are working on this. Well, we were facing the same problem at West Point. I’ve been teaching at West Point since 1995, when I went back in ’95. I graduated from there back in the dark ages. They honestly pumped sunlight into the place while I was there. Well at least my cadets believe that, because they look at me and say, how could someone that old ever have gone to this institution?

But . . . and then I went back and taught after Vietnam. And then I went back in ’95 and joined the civilian faculty and I’ve been there ever since. And we redesigned, that’s the story I want to tell you today, we redesigned, after the end of the Cold War, our thinking about how we develop officers. Now, I will admit that I’m going to talk about leader development and I’m going to talk about leader development in the context of higher education. Because incidentally, it’s an amazingly fast moving field of research right now. The intersection between the development of the individual spirituality and higher education, the Higher Education Research Institute, out at Southern California, UCLA . . . not Berkeley, at UCLA. Go to their website. Rolling out . . . 236 colleges participating in a five-year longitudinal study. Rolling out the information. Folks, the military is well behind the times. The President of Wellesley College speaks to this in convocations routinely now. A number of small liberal arts colleges are moving well out into this area of, we would call it, Soldier spirituality. They talk about it . . . about human development of the spirit. And for Generation Y, this is not an uncomfortable subject. It’s probably more uncomfortable for the military than it is for them. I’m going to talk at the level of divergent knowledge. Those of us who come here to meetings like this, those scholars come to tell you what we’re thinking about and determining in scholarship and in research, but we understand that you have to take that knowledge, as professions do, take it from the abstract to the concrete. You’ve got to make it converge and then you have to assimilate it and put it in doctrine so it can be used. I only want to point out to you that I understand, and I’m going to be pitching at an abstract level that’s a little bit above where you have been thinking in the past. That’s good. That’s very useful. Because I don’t know enough, folks, to come down to your level and tell you how to write it in doctrine, and I shouldn’t be doing that and neither should the folks that I’ve been working with.

We did two major studies on the Army as profession. Went out to the field, qualitative interviews, not quantitative, not surveys . . . sit down for 4 or 5 minutes . . . 45 minutes, symbolologic research. We told those we were surveying to bring with you to the interviewer a symbol of professionalism, and then the dialogue, and from that a qualitative evaluation. We have majors in the Army who could not bring a symbol of professionalism. Two majors brought Smokey Bear hats. They saw more professionalism in the NCO Corps than they did in themselves. One major stated in the qualitative interview, “I don’t serve in a profession. I’m a transportation management planner. I’m no different than someone who has a master’s degree, working at Wal-Mart. In fact, when I leave the Army next year, I’m going to go work for Wal-Mart.” Absolutely no identity. Remember John’s briefing to you this morning. Chaplains have identity. Soldiers have identity. We have an identity-based leader development system at the Academy. And what I’m about to explain to you is how we remodeled it after the end of the Cold War and changed that identity-based system. But this was the chief finding: They looked around them and said I can’t be a professional because there is no profession.

Folks, the leadership manual in the Army, written before the current one, the leadership manual for the Army before the new one that came out last year that was on the shelf for seven years did not have the noun “profession” in it. So how did the Army think about itself? It was an organization. Every chapter was filled

with jargon about organizations. Organization this, organization that. If you think like an organization, you'll behave like an organization. So, we're kind of fighting an uphill battle here and fortunately, we're making some progress. How to think about the profession: Societies can organize the work that they want armies to do any number of ways.

Here are the three principal ways that societies have organized the work of the military. All a profession is, folks, is a sociological phenomenon about how societies arrange for expert work to be done. Not regular work, but expert work. The kind of work that takes years of development and training and must be done very carefully, in a very trusted environment: The law, theology, medicine and war, traditionally. There are others. Accountancy achieved that status for a while and then we had the big scandal. Accountancy went over the line and got into the consulting business and started cooking the books and they got the back of the hand from the client, and now they're going to scramble for years to get back into the esteemed status and the laws recognizing that status that they had before. So, there's three ways you can organize, but the key to you...when you think about what you want to do about the moral and ethical development of leaders...is what kind of environment in which you want to do that. And I'm arguing to you, you need to develop leaders to serve in a profession, not a bureaucracy and they need the ethics that fit a profession and not a bureaucracy. And we can talk later about what some of those differences might be. Just to remind you, here are the essential differences between profession and bureaucracy: The ones that are in blue are the most important ones.

Every time a company commander in Iraq or a platoon leader or a squad leader, goes out on patrol, it is a new application of abstract expert knowledge. There are no formulas. There are no books. In most cases, there are no computers open. He is going to go out and operate on discretionary judgment, the same way a doctor in a clinic does when a new patient comes in and has a different blood set, a different set of medications, "I've never seen this kind of specific condition before." So, this is just a reminder. Is this a calling, or is this a job? Is there an ethic and is it self-policed? Or like bureaucracies, do we just impose our ethics from the top and penalize people who don't adhere. That's a bureaucracy. Now if that's what we're doing folks, you're living in a bureaucracy. You have the opportunity to come here and build this from the bottom-up, as Jack already briefed us, this is occurring at Fort Lewis.

I'm not surprised. I've worked with Jim Dubeck on several occasions over the years, and he's exactly the kind of enlightened leader who would induce that kind of change into the institution. The practice of a profession is done by humans. We happen to use technology. Now I know the Navy and the Air Force may have a slightly different view of this, but I think even in their case, quintessentially, professions are human institutions. Now why do we care? Why do we care if the Army's a profession or a bureaucracy? Incidentally, I'll give you the answer right now: You're both. You can't change it. You've got a hierarchical structure, that is a hierarchal bureaucracy and so all you can do, as strategic leaders, is determine which way the behavior is flowing. Are we more bureaucratic or more professional? Are we going to be formed into a bureaucratic mold in our leader behavior? Or are we going to lead in ways that allow majors and noncommissioned officers to actualize as professionals, to have some autonomy to exercise discretionary judgment. So, the big difference between profession and bureaucracy: Their method of social control. And that's what you're here to discuss. How do you control professions? Through their Ethics. You are working on the...to me...to Don Snider, the core issue for the Army. We now have solved our competency problem. It was immensely embarrassing for the Army profession to find itself in Iraq in 2003, and the client said, "Do counter insurgency." And what did the Army say? We don't know how to do that. Sorry, we've lost the expertise. We have no expert knowledge.

I talked to General Wallace about this and what his reaction was after, you know, the thunder runs in Baghdad and the capital fell, what do you do next? I'll just say it was a very interesting private discussion. But my take from it is that he, like all the rest of the strategic leaders in the Army, was ill-prepared. And I'm

not faulting them for that. That's the fault of strategic leaders 10 years ago. You develop professions in six and 10 year increments by developing expert knowledge and then taking that knowledge and developing it in humans, so humans can go practice it. And when the humans on the ground around in Baghdad in 2003 needed to practice counterinsurgency, there was no practice because there was no expert knowledge.

We shouldn't be surprised. The Army had been behaving, in that field of expert knowledge, in an immensely bureaucratic mode. Because we'd had two wars to tell us what was coming. But bureaucratic cultures are immensely difficult. So, why do we care if the Army's profession or bureaucratic? Well, if you're going to have expert knowledge, the Army's going to have to develop it. Just as we did for counterinsurgency. And we want the ethic for social control to be their own internalized ethic. Here's how to think about the Army and its jurisdictions, the new language from Andrew Abbott about how to think about professions. A jurisdiction is a place that your client says, "I want you to go practice your art."

The Army now has four jurisdictions in which to practice: major combat, stability ops, strategic deterrence and homeland security. They have been recently renegotiated in the joint RETA and promulgated in 2006 in joint operational doctrine 3.0. We don't get to decide our jurisdictions like lawyers and doctors and theologians. As a public sector profession, our jurisdictions are negotiated jurisdictions. That's how our civil military relations work and our strategic leaders have to be acute enough that they can work in civil military relations at that level and negotiate well. Now, professions are never resourced to cover all their jurisdictions. Big problem, particularly in the public sector. So, one of things that you want to come out of these jurisdictions is every now and then, you want to get rid of a jurisdiction. You don't want to have to go there. I don't want to have to put any resources in practicing that. And that's exactly where the Army was in the 1990s, and that's why, in 2003, we could not practice counterinsurgency. Because we decided that this was not necessary to prepare for. Now, that's the Army's external jurisdictions. That's where you practice your art.

Now every profession...law, theology, medicine, and the military have the same two internal jurisdictions. The two jurisdictions in the bottom never change. Every profession has to develop their expert knowledge and then they have to take that knowledge and embed it in humans, so humans can go practice it. That's what you're here to discuss today. The expert knowledge I will assert to you is the knowledge of Soldier spirituality and how it's developed. And what you're trying to think about is, how do we and what is the expert knowledge of Soldier spirituality and more importantly, how do we take that and develop it in humans at multiple levels within a hierarchical...depending on which it is. Now, of the Military Academy, when we were going through our reevaluation at the end of the Cold War of what officers were going to face in the next 20 years, we said that there are at least four fields of knowledge that are going to be important in the next 20 years. We added the political cultural, that had not been part before, and we added the human development. Now, human development, in some sense, has always been important to the Army, but the Army has kind of sloughed it off and said, "Well, we'll just train them." Well, we have an all volunteer force now, so we don't have to train them quite as much, etc., etc. One of the great failures of the Army is to undervalue the preciousness of the human resources that American family has given. You can't buy that anywhere. Not in a volunteer Army. It comes from people who are willing to commit. So, four fields of expert knowledge and to each of those fields of expert knowledge, there is an associated identity for the development of officers. We are developing warriors. We are developing members of profession, who are quintessentially human.

The first three years we taught this to cadets at the Academy, particularly to the people who did not come in as plebes under this developmental system. You should have heard the blowback on this. Go into to a classroom and talk to some cadets and say, let's consider the concept of servanthood. What does it mean to be a servant? Remember where these kids were raised. This was right after the 90s...and the big boom of the 90s and the boomers were getting theirs before it got bad. We had kids come in and say, I didn't sign

up to be a servant. We had a few kids resign. Because finally they understood what the concept of officership meant. I am, in fact, a servant and servants sacrifice for their master. And, when you start talking in terms of servanthood and sacrifice, now we're getting into the moral meaning that we wanted in their identities.

Incidentally the word warrior was introduced at the end of the Cold War, up until that time it was war fighter, and there's still some debate about whether we should've changed or not. But remember, we were going into the Balkans, we were not fighting wars, we were convincing ourselves that we had to do humanitarian interventions, however reluctantly. And so, we went with the flow and said we'll call them warriors. It's still a contentious issue, and you may want to discuss it today, but I think... you know... General Schoomaker pretty well resolved that now with the warrior ethos and all the other things that have been built into that identity in our leader development. So, we're developing at the Academy, officers, who think of themselves in four interrelated identities. You may not pick and choose. Football players want to come in and say, I'm a warrior! Hoo-Ah! And we say, talk to me about your political cultural savvy. How many cultures, other than the one you're in, are you comfortable in? How many languages can you speak? What do you know about the Air Force, etc.? So, political cultural savvy just means getting outside of the organizational culture you're in. That can be right here in The United States. You don't have to go overseas to have cultural leadership problems. The strategic leaders of the Army have cultural leadership problems on Capitol Hill all the time. Immensely difficult environment.

So this is kind of the new model that we're developing folks under, and here's the simple statement of it. The model is officership. Now, understand that I'm talking to folks who are going to be developing doctrine for the development of leaders at all levels. So anywhere you see a slide with the word "officer" on it, just write "leader." It's equally applicable. And my focus to you today is leaders, and your work can benefit from what we have done at West Point over the last few years

Incidentally, when the Simon Center was formed at West Point, I was there I was on the Selection Committee for the first director. I understand what we attempted to do, and let me be very frank with you, the Simon Center did not develop the way it was intended to develop. In the design of the Simon Center, there were supposed to be four academic disciplines represented in the center, by scholars who were resident there, doing exactly what you're doing. Writing the material, designing the pedagogy and preparing other people to develop cadets through academic settings and through mentoring relationships. There was to be a historian, a social psychologist, a theologian and a philosopher; the four disciplines that it takes to talk reasonably about ethics. Those positions were never filled until the Chief of Staff decided to designate, with a superintendent's request, designate two weeks ago, that the Army is the center of excellence for military ethics. Now, all of a sudden, scholars are flowing into the Simon Center and it will be resourced at a level that it should be resourced. Now, don't get me wrong, I'm not... I'm not speaking poorly of the Simon Center. Given the resources they've had, they have done wonderful things in terms of education on honor in academic settings and putting the Academy and it's honor system out to the rest of the American society and other small liberal arts colleges about how does this process of honor and honor development occur in an academic setting?

But they have not been able to get up to the higher level of the institution's ethic where they're going now. So this is what we're about. Now I want to stop talking about leader development broadly and I want to focus on one thing: Character. Confidence is not a problem for the Army, in my judgment. Incidentally, here's a summary of what I mentioned earlier about, if officership, and that definition I just gave you, is a practice, what is that practice? It's defined here: Somehow, in your pedagogy, this is what you want your young leaders to have to do. You want them presented with situations which will cause them, off of the battlefield, to do all of the discretionary, judgmental decision-making, they will do on the battlefield. That is the core of their expert practice. See why I say professions are quintessentially human? You may do that

with a lot of technology, but the moral analysis, sensitivity, decision-making, is quintessentially human. The repetitive exercise of discretionary judgments. So, what have we focused on then in development? This is the old Army leadership model: Be, Know, Do. What do we know about Know and Do? Know is about competencies, skill. And what is Do? It's taking actions and doing things in a certain wartime environment. I would submit to you that knowing and doing is exceptionally perishable. And it's perishable for two reasons: number one, we live in a very fast-moving, high-tech environment in which the technology of knowing and applying and doing is rapidly changing, and secondly because we're fighting adaptive enemies. This is not nation/state warfare. This is not global power competition. We do not know about Al-Qaeda or it's associates a tenth of what we knew about the Soviet Military. So, if knowing and doing is perishable and you're given a few of TRADOCs precious hours, I'm suggesting to you, you focus on their character. Focus on being. We redesigned the developmental system at West Point intentionally to focus on being. Who are you? What do you stand for? What do you believe? That is not perishable. What we know from social psychologists is that develops over a lifetime.

Incidentally folks, all these folks are developing in the Army, one of your greatest contributions to the republic is, they are going to be citizens after they are in the Army. I think it's horribly short-sighted for the Army to understand the development of its Soldiers in an instrumental way that says, well, we just need them to be good Soldiers. No we don't! We need them to be good citizens! We need 'em to be better citizens than they were before they came into the Army. And through what you're developing you have the opportunity to leverage in that direction. And I would argue that you should and I would argue that your focus should be on the "being" on their character. So, at the Academy, to help us address this, since we had no language and no models...folks, this is embarrassing, I go back to the Academy in '95 and listen to the command briefing one more time after having been through the process, taught there earlier and I asked myself the question, how do we develop future officers morally and ethically? And I listened to the command briefing and there was all sorts of detail on the physical development program, all sorts of detail and great research documenting it. The Dean had intellectual program, great research and data. The Director of Military Instruction: everything you needed to know about summer training and everything they did. And where was moral/ethical? It was cloudy penumbra on the chart. And the answer was, "Well, we do all this in the other programs."

And I said, "How? Tell me how." I am a policy analyst. I want to understand how this works." I'm not a social psychologist, I didn't study cognitive psychology. I want to know how the process of learning and moral development occurs. And what I found out at West Point is we had no language, no model, and nothing documented. Now, there were little pockets of places that people knew in immense amount, over in Behavioral Science and Leadership, but we did not have an integrated whole. I would submit to you, you are working in an area of the Army where there is no integrated whole. Practically very little, let me just leave it that way. Not much. So we said, okay, character. Certainly there is an ethical domain, but let's add two more domains because we want to dig into these domains and understand how does moral learning and development occur for the individual? And we'll call that the domain of the human spirit. And then we want to know how that occurs in interpersonal leadership environment, leader/follower, all leadership is done in social context.

So, that's the social domain. Now, of course everybody looks at this chart and says, "Oh, you're talking about white gloves and etiquette and don't drink too much." No we're not. We're talking about can you relate to other human beings, as a human being? Can you lead other human beings? Can you combine a sect of human beings and their aspirations into a functioning unit with an expertise? So we added two domains. Now, I'm simplifying, but stick with me. And then we put out a very strict definition for each of the identities that we wanted an officer to assume. The only one I'm concerned about here is leader of character, which comes from the domain of moral and ethical knowledge. And this is how we defined it. Notice the last one

and notice the verbs: “Seeks to discover, decides, and demonstrates, always.” Those of you familiar with theories of moral development, this is James Rest’s model. Moral sensitivity, moral evaluation, reasoning, decision-making, moral courage, to act consistently. So, how do we take this idea of what a leader of character is and help future leaders understand...” Well, what are you talking about? You got a lot of words on paper, but what does this mean?” Well, we do it this way. Truth, right and action. And we talk about it this way, in very small groups, sometimes with officer mentors, quite often with cadet mentors. Cadets will get together and they’ll talk about this aspect of their development. And let’s start in the middle, because that’s what you’re here to discuss. The middle is what the institution says is right. The institution, we have a professional military ethic. Now, we have a difficulty with our professional military ethic, it’s not codified. The officer’s ethic has never been codified. There is nothing more than a commissioning oath. But several times, the Army has come very close to writing an officer’s creed.

I was on the study group four years ago that brought this issue up one more time. And we finally went to the vice and to the chief, after we went through the Chief of Accessions Command and the answer was, “No code for officers.” Why no code for officers? Fundamentally because I believe, rightly, the more codes you have, the more legalistic behavior you have. We want it written on their heart. We don’t want to rule to be followed. Now, we have a lot of rules and we need a lot of rules and I’m not knocking rules of engagement, that’s not my point. I’m talking about the larger moral content of the officer’s ethic. The concept of duty, that which binds him to the profession, or her, and keeps them there. So, there is a professional military ethic, I’ll break that down a little bit more and then there’s... over here there’s actions and obviously, in leader development, you got to walk the talk. We have to prepare people to walk the talk. Soldiers inscrutably will discern, you walking the talk or not. And what happens the minute they see a leader, I don’t care what their rank is, the minute they see a leader who is not walking the talk, what’s a Soldier’s reaction? You dismiss the leader. That’s a person who’s not worth... you know... I don’t listen to them anymore, I don’t follow them. They’re just there. They may have an institutional position, but their not of importance to me. I simply dismiss them. They have discredited their role and their identity. So that’s walking the talk and we can have some great conversations of that because we have some officers at West Point that don’t walk the talk and cadets spot them just like that. So it’s easy to have a discussion on this.

Now let’s go to the other side. Under the definition of leader of character, I talked about, “seeks to discover the truth.” And notice the truth did not have a capital T for you... those theologians here. Well, what is the truth? How do we think about that individual, moral set of beliefs? Well here’s how we refined it in our developmental doctrine. In the spiritual domain, we’re interested in understanding, “What is the essence of the individual? What do they value? Why?” And generally, that comes in terms of a world view. In just a minute I’ll show you something that social psychologists have put together. They claim that there are, in fact, five psychological states or processes that make up this human spirituality. Things that we can’t understand and things that we have written in a new book, which was issued to all of the cadets this year forging the warriors character and their 276 mentors, for one on one personal development discussions about individual spirituality. Now, admittedly, we’re into a touchy area for a lot of people. Not so much for the cadets. Let me assure you, Generation Y does not at all have any difficulty with this issue. It’s the mid-level people in the Army, in particular the senior-level people in the Army, that have immense difficulty with human spirituality, like this is just a little too touchy feely. Besides, don’t we have church-states things, and we can’t go there. I’ll come back to that in just a minute. But it’s basically about the development of the world... the individual’s world view, the constant construction of moral meaning in their mind. Let me give you an example of how we do this at the Academy where we found that we got very fast results. We use a lot of terms in the military that are immensely abstract. Duty, loyalty, sacrifice. How do you get out of the abstract into the concrete? We have a wonderful cemetery at West Point. A lot of famous and not so famous Soldiers are buried there. We dug up the obituaries from them, take the obituary, hand it to a cadet.

Whether it's raining, snowing, shining or whatever, hike down to the cemetery, go to this gravesite, read the citation at the gravesite. Some of them with nothing but three entries that the Veteran's Administration allows. The cadet doesn't know that before they go. Read that, think about what happened, read the obituary, and come back and write a one page essay that answers this question: Did this leader die in vain? There's no coaching, there's no class, there's no nothing. But they do come back later to a mentor because we understand that the construction of moral development...listen carefully...the construction of moral development happens best in structured reflection with informed mentors...in structured reflexion with informed mentors. All we're doing is mandating that the cadets will reflect. Now, we got an immense problem with this at West Point. I get in big, hot water with my students because I say don't tell me how overworked you are. You're not overworked. You're overscheduled. You're not overworked, you're just overscheduled, and I'll help you solve that problem if you want me to, but I think you can solve it so get with it, drop a few of these activities, focus more on what you really should be doing and then turn off all the music, shut off the television, and sit down and think. Do it with a friend. Structured reflection, in which the process of the reflection is processed with a mentor who knows something. We got some essays back on the cemetery walk that would bring tears to your eyes. All of a sudden, people were starting to relate sacrifices they knew it in their family, to sacrifices they were reading about it and had not experienced it yet at all. That's just one example. The book is full a lot of such examples. So anyway, that's the spiritual part.

Here's the ethical part. The institution does have something to say about what's right and it comes in two flavors; generally there is the legal component and then the institution does say a few things about the moral component...not too many, but it does say some. Incidentally, if you've never read the rules of exemplary conduct, the statute of exemplary conduct in title 10, I certainly suggest that you do. Thanks to Professor Rick Swain this has become kind of a standard at West Point in the last five years. Our Congress has mandated, they probably wouldn't claim it today, but they have made some very clear statements about what exemplary conduct is. And officers are accountable for their own and all of their Soldiers' exemplary conduct. And then there is the social part, the interpersonal leadership. So this is a framework, this is a typology. There are professors at West Point who disagree with this chart. This is a work in progress. This is how we think now about developing the human spirit. There is an individual spiritual component where the individual in their own essence is trying to find out what is truth, meaning what is right. And to model with that, their world view and it's development...we went to human psychology and we went to the new literature on human spirituality and higher education and we came up with this understanding of what...how to think about development in the spiritual area. It is nothing more than a moral search, that's going to go on in spite of us. And here I want to reinforce what Jack told us this morning in his presentation, of what's happening at Fort Lewis. Soldiers are going to have discussions and teach each other, ruminate with each other over moral issues. This kind of rumination occurs in all institutional settings: gangs, prisons, families, youth groups. It's going to happen folks. It's driven by innate human processes, if you read the social psychology of Maslow and Rogers. They tell us that this moral search for meaning is going to happen. Now, my question to you as military leaders is, and my challenge to the Academy over the last six years has been, are we going to continue to play ostrich and stick our head in the sand, or are we going to say, wait a minute, we have a responsibility...listen carefully...to facilitate the search.

Now, here's where we get into the church-state line and we may well yet hear from the ACLU over this book. Fact is, I rather expect to. But, we've been very explicit in this book. The Army has no interest in whether a Soldier is religious or not. The Army does have an interest if the Soldier can behave ethically. Now between those extremes, we have the challenge of developing the character of Soldiers. So, we have developed a leadership model...a developmental model, which we think abides by the strictures of church-state and yet, allows everybody in the Army to have a language and a model of how to think about the development of the human spirit. It is a moral search. It answers these questions and it doesn't stop when

they leave the army. And this is my last chart. This is what our little model looks like. Now, a lot of this is not new to any of you. Character is seen most clearly in the metacognitive construction of the world view; those values that define your essence, and it changes. The schemas are not fixed. And what this whole literature on the intersection of higher education in human spirituality is about, is that people are rediscovering how rapidly this occurs in a college setting. Now, if that's the kind of the core, notice the top...self awareness. This is a meta-competency in Army leadership doctrine. You should all know what self awareness is, how to talk to Soldiers about it, how to help them understand who they are. And that is not a static concept. It is a constantly developing concept: Their strengths, their weaknesses, how to address them. Similarly, social awareness is not new at the Academy. We've had a respect for other's program at the Academy for a decade. Folks, it was nothing but an indoctrination program and it was nothing but respect, just what it said. Is that what we want in our leaders? Why don't we go to the next level of understanding and say, wait a minute...we want you more than respecting that human, to have empathy for them, to understand their motivations of their beliefs. Not just what they believe, but why they believe it. That is a deeper level of interpersonal interaction. What they're finding in the college studies, as I mentioned earlier, the more people that participate in spiritual activities, the higher they score on ability to be empathetic to other people. The more you are aware of who you are and your own spirituality, the more confident you are in dealing in interactions with other people of different cultures. Doesn't that sound like something the Army needs? And then over here, the sense of urgency. This is the hardest. I mean, we can do...we can be...have wonderful moral intentions.

Moving from moral intentions to moral action is the hardest part. There is a whole chapter in the book. There are several new developments in this area I'm not going to cover them here. But there are developmental programs in which you can move people and their capability to...you can help them increase their capacity to move from intention to action. You can do that in individual settings or you can do that in group settings. And then the last issue is faith. And, oh is this contentious, and is it still contentious at the Academy: Why is there a psychological component called faith to this moral search and human development, moral meaning that we go through in life? We didn't have to call it faith. We could have called it expectations. It is the component that says there is an intertemporal dimension to who we are. We are not only a person today, but we expect to become a person in the future. We believe that if today we act by what is right then things will be "better in the future." Not everybody has all of these expectations, the way I've described them, but they have all have an intertemporal dimension to the development of our human spirituality. We don't just have one set of beliefs that stay with us all of our life. We don't have one set of expectations to stay with us all of our life. So, it is a component that says, in your world view, you're going to inform your world view by some understanding of development over time.

Now, for some people that's religious spirituality and we have a paragraph in the book where we explain, if you want to find your spirituality from a faith-based approach, then you'll probably take your faith-based world view and then that will be your component of faith. And to assist in that process, there are four chapters in the end of the book, written by theologians of different faith that answer a simple question: What does this faith tradition say about moral development...excuse me...moral leadership? Now, we only have four and we've been rightly challenged that we should have more chapters. The reason we only have four, Roman Catholic, Protestant, Jewish and Muslim, is because those are the only four sets of services that are now presented in facilitating this search for cadets at West Point. Of course they have philosophy classes and history classes and military heritage classes.

We're facilitating a search by a whole undergraduate curricula. We also facilitate this moral search by our athletic program. Cadets referee all of their own sports. Gets a little dicey at times particularly when you have a bunch of type A's who have all been exceptional athletes prior to the time they came to the Academy. So the opportunities to facilitate this search in an institutional level, the opportunities abound. But what we

did not have at West Point was a way to think about and talk about, among the faculty and staff and between the mentors and the cadets, their individual, moral development for this search for truth. We're now piloting this program in one regiment this fall. Graduating Firsties will no longer take the regular Profession of Military Ethics class. Like everybody else, we're running out of time. There's not enough time in cadets' lives to do everything we want. So you have to now take out if you want to put in. We're kind of like the Congress on spending laws. If you want to spend more, cut spending here. You want to give the cadets something else to do, take something off their schedule. So the commandant has taken the whole last year of Profession of Military Ethics classes and we have changed it. We're piloting this for one year to a one-to-one mentoring program between a captain and a major a graduating firstie. And they will talk about this model. We've given them a set of questions for each of these psychological things. Cadets will think about developing, creating their own plan for their own developer.

Much as the Army already has done with its website through HRC for the mentoring program and as we're already doing in a number of places, as that process slowly evolves in the Army. So, that's my message to you today. We had neither language, nor model, nor understanding about what we thought were two critical elements in developing Army leaders. And the one that I wanted to present to you today is the one on how to think about soldier spirituality. My summary is straightforward, four points. As you work in your workshops, think about an ethic for a profession. Not an ethic for a bureaucracy. Not an ethic is top-down driven and imposed. That's a bureaucratic approach. Think about an ethic that can be developed at leader...in leaders at all levels. It will inhere in who they are and therefore, in their actions. That will be a professional ethic. That is the method of social control that professions use. Not the method that bureaucracies use. Secondly, don't fall in the trap of making ethical development something distinct from leader development. There's only one human there folks. There's only one human in the leader. And I think one of the great things that we do have correct at West Point is that we're finally back to...we may partition the human a little bit to simplify and think about it, but the focus is on the leader and the humanness of the leader. I'm...I'm...the third goal is my own judgment. The Army is not weak in competency. The Army is weak in individual character. I told you that the development from the Army is about confidence in character, don't worry about the confidence...top part. Yes, every now then we get caught short, as we did in 2003. But by and large, we do this part quite well. I mean, just look at what's happened. We wrote a doctrine from scratch, implemented it, and by and large, it's not all that bad. Nobody knows what the outcome is yet, but so far the results are strikingly positive. So, the issue for the Army, the challenge for the Army is exactly what you're doing here today. Now, I understand that General Wallace may say, well Snider's taking an awful lot of liberties there. I've got a whole command that's responsible for the competencies of the Army. Well yeah, and my answer would be, "General, you're doing fine in competencies now. Much better.

I don't see much progress at all in understanding and talking about and being able to do the human side." Lastly, I think at the level of divergent accomplished, what we have created in this book, is the first cut, the first step, the first integration in about 40 or 50 years of how to rethink about Soldier spirituality, to renew that discussion and dialogue, and I'm certainly not here to tell you that this is "the" answer. Scholars will never have the answer. If we do...we...you know, we betray our own profession. Incidentally, when I left the military profession, it took me a year to be recertified in a new profession. A year before the Academic Board would accept my credentials and certify me as a professor. Professions still do certifications. One of your major issues is, how are we certifying our leaders today? Particularly, how are we certifying after we have helped them develop their own individual character.

Snider is Professor of Political Science, teaching seminars in military innovation/adaptation and civil-military relations in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. He has been a member of the civilian faculty of the U.S. Military Academy since 1998, having previously held the Olin Chair in National Security Studies, 1995-1998. Earlier, he completed a military career which included three combat tours in Vietnam and, much later, service on the staff of the National Security Council, at the White House. He retired from the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 1990. Snider's current research and publications focus on military culture and ethics, the gap between the military and American society, officership, and U.S. security policy towards Europe.

Twelve Ethical or Moral Dilemmas in Military Affairs

By Dr. Pauletta Otis

(Adapted from a presentation at the 2007 Ethics Consultation at the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School, Fort Jackson, South Carolina.)

When I was asked to come down here and speak at the Ethics Conference, I said, “You’ve got to be kidding,” because, as I usually say, I’ve never worn the uniform, I’ve never worn the collar, now I can say I’ve never had any training in ethics and [yet] I’ve still been invited -- which means you guys must have a sense of humor too. I asked my son, who has a philosophy major, and who is a Marine, “Dale, what do you think they want me to talk about?” And he said, “Well Mom, let’s go through some of the issues.” We went through them, and we went on and on and on and on [until] I said, “Well, it sounds like everything has an ethical or moral dilemma.” He said, “You got it.” Okay, I said, “Well, that really narrows the topic, son, thanks a lot.”

So, starting off, I decided to have 12 short points, which only proves I am not a Baptist. You may have heard of all of them, but it will provide an overview of things that I think that the Army and the Marine Corps are struggling with right now as far as their ethical and moral dilemmas [are concerned] -- how to do the right thing and face the world in a better way.

The first one is to do a play on words. You’ve heard of “shop ‘til you drop.” One of the problems that has been identified within the current strategic situation is the idea of dropping and shopping. Our men and women in Iraq and Afghanistan are dropping, they are being killed, they are killing other people while the United States community, [the] United States citizens, are shopping, without necessarily with regard to mortgages, we have maxed out [our] credit cards. It is not a nation at war, it’s an Army at war. Does that make us the military mercenaries in the American interest, or is this a country that is struggling to do the right thing at the right time? A difficult, difficult thing for the Army, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, etc. to be able to comprehend is whether or not the people in this country are all interested in what they are doing. To me that is the most critical of all the dilemmas that we face.

The second one, is that something that General Peter Chiarelli came up with -- his comment was in the *Military Review*, and I have to read this -- I apologize. He lost 160 men two years ago in Iraq and came back, they said, disquieted [and] disturbed. I am like, no kidding! But he was quoted in this *Military Review* article this month as saying, “If we are unable to do a better job than our enemies in influencing the world’s perception, then even the most brilliant campaign will be unlikely to succeed.” Then take a deep breath at this one: “Further damage has been caused by some military leaders and service members who have not internalized the moral and ethical codes [that] define who we are as a service and as a nation.” Now this seems to me a clarion call for national regeneration and reassessment of the ethical nature of our nation and our service corps. That’s why you’re here. That’s General Peter Chiarelli.

If we are unable to do a better job than our enemies of influencing the world’s perception, then even the most brilliant campaign will be unlikely to succeed. Think this morning of the Capitol. All right? Further damage has been caused by some military leaders and service members who have not internalized the moral and ethical codes that define who we are as an armed force and nation. And my comment is, this is a clarion call for national regeneration and a reassessment of the ethical nature of who we are as a nation and our armed forces. If we don’t get this right it will be more than strategic mission failure. It will be the failure of a

country to do the right thing in this generation and [for] the future generation. That's pretty heavy duty stuff.

Third, I am never the bearer of good news, you know. This is kind of, it is the "what is" and the "what should be," which means both of them require the faith, hope, justice, mercy, and forgiveness that the chaplains bring to this particular fight. So, please do not be despondent or discouraged until the end and then we will just kind of wrap it up and say, "Okay then, where do we go from here?" It's like okay, you paint, I learned, when I was first doing lectures for the military, if you paint a bad picture with no answers, at the end they say, "Well, why did we bring you in, we knew that?" So, we will try and get to this in a little bit. The third one is General Conway. General Conway, U.S. Marine Corps. Honor, courage and commitment is supposed to be the code for the Marine Corps and if you ask any Marine, he'll say ethics is doing the right thing all the time and yet you know, how do you do the right thing all the time?

By the statistics, half of the Marine Corps service people in Iraq said that if someone killed a civilian they would not tell on them. They would not report it. Over half said they would not report the killing of civilians, and 60 percent said that they did not think that civilians deserved dignity and respect. Sixty percent. That's *New York Times* reporting. So we are not doing something that is just theoretical out here, we are talking with real men, real women, real service personnel that have these attitudes that need to be addressed specifically. Of the 12 weeks of boot camp, Marine trainees get 38 hours of values training, the Army gets 24, the Air Force 7.5, and the Navy receive five.

Now, two things may pertain. Maybe the ethics and values and religious training basically come from the home in the country, and we just frost the cake. If you remember the person who blew the whistle at Abu Ghraib was a young man who just simply said, "My family didn't teach me to do that. My family had a different set of values." He didn't say that the code of the military taught him differently, or the Rules of Armed Conflict he read, or the Geneva Convention. He said, "My family told me that was wrong." So between building on what we have or do not have in our families and our society and then adding the frosting on the cake that you folks are participating in, you certainly have more than a difficult challenge. Okay, number five, the operational rules. I have mentioned this in a number of forums so we will give it short shrift here: The Rules of Armed Conflict say that men need to wear uniforms. They need to be the official representatives of their country and yet we have organizations, some of the agencies with three letter words, carrying guns. We have professional military enterprises which match the number of people in uniform as far as total numbers: contractors with guns and weapons of all sorts, and equipment provided to them by the U.S. government as well as organizations like MARSOC, where there is a very difficult conversation on whether the Marines can go into an operational area without a uniform. We have special forces guys wearing beards and going native. Does that keep them under the Rules of Armed Conflict and, if not, how do you treat them as prisoners of war or expect prisoner of war treatment under the Geneva Conventions? It is a difficult problem, it is a serious problem and the nation refuses to deal with it. The United Nations and the United Kingdom both have, and the European Union (OICE) have white papers on this. The U.S. Government does not. We do not want to deal with people like Executive Outcomes and Blackwater and some of the other organizations that we have to deal with. If you don't call it, who will? I mean if you are the truth tellers in the U.S. military, who is going to tell the American public that this is going on and the young men and women who are getting paid \$30,000 to \$40,000 a year, compared to the contractors who are getting something like \$350,000 a year, why they are giving their lives and why are these [ununiformed] people putting them at risk?

In one movie that we have at the Marine Corps which we use for teaching and training, there is a group of folks going through in a Stryker, going through and doing random shooting at civilians out of the car windows. All right. Then the Marines were supposed to go into that area and make friendly, make nice to the people. I don't think so. How are the people in that area of operations going to tell the difference between men in uniform and men not in uniform, when sometimes the men in uniform are not in uniform and

vice versa. How are they supposed to desegregate that kind of information? I mean, it's a real serious thing and your guys are coming home and they are thinking about these things and saying, "Why am I doing this? Why shouldn't I be getting \$350,000 if the only thing we are interested in is killing?" If they do not see it as irregular warfare, if they do not see it as in the nation's interest, if they do not see this as a Just War, then they are entitled to do the mercurial and the mercenary kind of thinking about it. I think that is probably not what we want to be about.

All right, number six. See, I am moving at a pace here, you know, and I can count, and that's pretty cool, even after being with the Marine Corps for a year. Number five was the operational Rules of Armed Conflict. Okay, number six, corruption. You understand of course about the piles of money that have been given out in Iraq and the lack of accountability sometimes with some of those budgets? But we also have corruption in our own military services, etc. in the procurement and the policy arenas at headquarters, and sometimes we think that is none of our business, it is business as usual, and you know the Pentagon wastes money anyway... ad infinitum. Add justification-rationalization for not calling it like it is. I am not a budget analyst, therefore I can't know what really is happening and yet you know it when you see it. It smells. And if we are going to call Afghanistan a corrupt country run by opium money and drugs and warlords, then we have to make sure that when we have our own country run by warlords at the Pentagon that we pay attention to what they are doing with this country's money. Because if it is corruption and we see it [and do nothing], it undermines young men and women's ability to say we are doing the right thing.

We need to make sure there is no lack of money in the U.S. military budget. [But] there is lack of prioritization. So, if your guys don't have equipment, if they don't have the right kind of weaponry, if they don't have the right kind of ammunition, if you can't get what you need to be able to serve them well, you cannot blame the lack of budget on that. You can blame the lack of prioritization. Now there is all sorts of places where you can say, uh, this is wrong, this is wrong, this is wrong and your working groups can take that kind of thing on. I am only trying to point out one of the targets that we don't like to think about because it seems to be above our pay grade and because, who can kick against a pillow sometimes and it doesn't seem like something you can have an effect on, and yet it is an ethical and moral challenge to say it exists, and you have to take it on.

With regard to Afghanistan, I've had guys in my office who said, "I was sent out there to eradicate opium and yet I know that the Afghani government is run on the profits of the opium trade." We support the opium trade by keeping people out of the area. So I said, "Why have I been told to go up there and offer my life to burn out poppy fields and to collect the money out there when the U.S. government is supporting the government in Kabul because it is basically inoperable without the opium profits?" So you know we can't send people out to do one thing and then undercut it another way in an area of operation.

Number seven, and this one is something that you can effect pretty easily in the way you explain things to people, and that is the use of children in warfare. This sounds like a real easy one. It is not a real easy one. In any kind of war zone, particularly in any kind of ethnic conflict or any war that goes to the people, the people will fight as a group and as a society. Now when you get two armies meeting each other you assume an age differential, 18 and above, right? Ages 18 to 35, the disposables of society? The people that we send out to do external wars and offensive wars. When you take a war to a people, or when there is a civil war, engagement in a civil war, the entire society, men, women, and children will fight. They will do so in an order which means the young men usually first, the older men usually second, the women, some of the women of before childbearing age or after childbearing age, and then the children. Right now what we're finding in Iraq, particularly, is that there are more children fighting and more [child] suicide bombers and more couriers, etc. than foreign fighters. We are not talking about it, there are more [children] than foreign fighters. There are more people under the age of 16 in American detention camps that are children, than there are foreign fighters.

Now, two kinds of comments on that: The first is there is a tendency to say, "Well, it is because they are Islamic and they don't have a value on human life." That is nonsense. That is absolute bunk. In the first place, everyone has a value on their children's life, children are children and they are loved in every society, it is a function of war. War does that to people and, since you are living in a Civil War zone between here and Pennsylvania, you know that we use children up 9 to 11, 15 years old in the wars that we have fought when they have been on our soil. We also use women. We use whatever is possible. When you are in a defensive war, you use everyone. It is not a matter of religious principles, it is a matter of war principles.

Secondly, there is a tendency to blame Bin Laden and the foreign fighters that they use. They are the ones that use the children. Well that's not quite true either because Bin Laden doesn't have a membership list and a guest book. We do not know the extent and, according to many of the estimates, there are fewer than 2000 Al Qaeda members in Iraq and they are not linked together in a meaningful way. It is sort of like public policy, public goods. People can say, say you're one to wear the T-shirt but they have no responsibility and they can defect at any time. So you get people who wear the T-shirt simply because they don't like us, and other people who wear the T-shirt simply because they want to be identified with something cool, and some people wear the T-shirt because they really are believers. You know that kind of belief fragility in human networks and human organizations. What the U.S. government has done about this, this is the good news part, is they have set up a school at Camp Cropper to be able to teach and train these young people in literacy, to be able to work with them and get them off the streets and out of the prison detention camps, to feed them, give them good meals, and clothes, etc. So some pretty smart guys said, "Okay if we've got them, let's do something with them rather than spank them and send them home." That's one of the good things. On the other hand, when you are talking to your folks about why the Iraqis use children, try not to default to the cultural or the religious part. Obviously we found this in the World War I, World War II, Russia, Chechnya, regardless of where we find war, we find the use of children, if it is on their territory.

I think the best message is the setup for religion and diplomacy which Doug Johnson uses, and he uses an "in your face" religious agenda. What Doug Johnson did was say to the people, "Okay we know you love your children, what kind of books would you like?" He ended up with a C-5 full of textbooks, English books, math books, science books, history books, revolutionary war books, okay, and in Arabic. So there are multiple streams on this. Now many of our textbooks are a little "anti-them" so if they have textbooks which are anti-"us," Japan still has textbooks that are anti-Korea, Korea still has textbooks that are anti-China. This is a historical legacy when we write our own mythology and call it history. That is something that an anthropologist will say we choose in history to bring forth those things that we want to identify ourselves with now. So no history is complete. The Information Ops people will say it's not their message, it is our message that needs to be tidied up a little bit, and that would go back to General Conway's and General Chiarelli's statements.

[The] next [point concerns] the wounded warriors. I am leaving tonight and it is probably a good thing, because somebody is going to take a shot at me on some of these. The wounded warriors. Out of the approximately 3000 (now 4000) guys who have been killed, if you multiply that by at least 7, and some people say 11, for people who have been wounded in action, you've got a lot more folks to worry about. Now the good news is, yes, we are getting them off the battlefield sooner. The bad news is we have head trauma problems that are very serious, that go unnoticed because if the head still looks the same but the trauma is such that the ability to think through problems is very much constrained.

I had the privilege of taking a bike ride between Gettysburg and Johns Hopkins [University] which was about 120 miles. What we did with the wounded warriors project was, guys who had been amputated in various parts of the body, rode this ride as an effort to reestablish their ability, their courage, [and] their physical capabilities. And, you know, I am a female, for whatever good reasons God decided that, a female, and what I was seeing was [because the wounds were seeping], it was difficult to understand how guys

without legs would be on these little tiny things. Then I started seeing other things -- everyone of the wounded warriors had a Marine assigned to them, a full bodied Marine assigned to them [so] that, when they came up [to hills], you know some of those Gettysburg hills are pretty tough for even those of us who are pretty able, but they would come up behind them and only when they started to slide back, would they push them a little bit forward. They never said what a chick would say, which is, "Oh I am so sorry, are you okay? Can I help you out here?" Never said anything like that. They said things like, well some of them I will not repeat in the chaplaincy, but what they said was an encouragement to get with the program. Not just the "you can do it" but we are here to show you how to do it and this is one more step, and when you get to the end line you have taken, you've taken the ridge line. And where a woman would be saying, "Oh you know, poor thing," and defeating the purpose of it, these men were out there doing it.

Now, the bottom line here was [that] there were two Marine Corps generals there, both at the stop and at the start, men who had other things to do I'm sure. And there were some colonels who rode part of the way but maybe not have been in good shape, doughy, you know, whatever, there were a little mixed messages, that is kind of a long ride, okay, but they were there, they were supportive, they were helping out and they organized it in such a way that it was respectful. Now, if you know, with people with who have been amputeed, we have a little problem with bathrooms because there is little issue about privacy, getting off the cycle and into a port-a-potty is just not something that does not happen.

Right, so there was an issue of personal dignity, personal respect, physical capabilities, etc. There was not a single chaplain there. Now you can't be every place at one time. These guys needed your presence. Not necessarily your biking ability, but at least a prayer to start out, or a prayer at the end, and that's the kind of thing where the ministry of presence means you go to wherever they are, and these wounded warriors need you. Because they will have a very long ramp up, not just their physical capabilities, but their mental and emotional and spiritual capabilities to say, "Why did God let this happen to me when the nation doesn't even care about me? When my minister isn't here, my preacher isn't here, my chaplain isn't here, I'm alone." No, that is not an indictment of any single individual, it is saying in those kinds of events, be they athletic, musical, whatever it is, you are desperately needed. Just desperately needed.

I probably should self-identify as sort of a militant pacifist Quaker. And what I am saying at some level is that the programs are great, but it still comes down to looking some young man in the eye and saying, "How you doing?" It is just, it is not the programs. It is your presence, your personal presence, being there because, and what I am saying is, you would have said different things than I'd say. And what you say is what they need, not what I said. I'll never do that bike ride again. I embarrassed them by being there, as a woman, as an academic, as a professor, whatever I am. I embarrassed them. You wouldn't. You know the kinds of things to say that are supportive, and helpful, and encouraging, and building, when I didn't, and I felt unable to be of help in that time and in that position. So that's, that's my encouragement and, anyway, that these are the kind of places that you need to be, they will not come to you. They are angry. They are upset. Combat stressed. We used to call PTSD, combat stress is something that affects the entire being and it sometimes may be physical and may be a bad thing to you. I have met chaplains and talked to chaplains who felt the chaplaincy let them down in their combat stress. And, if that's true, then that means there is also a need within the organization when guys come back, after what they've seen, after what they've been responsible for, after the demands that they have on their jobs, you cannot escape back into a place of worship. The place of worship is where they are. And being able to give them physical, mental, moral, family support within the chaplaincy. Now why would they tell me that? Why would they tell each other? I don't know what's going on, that's not my, I am not a chaplain. I'm not an institutionalized person here. And it may be just slippage. May be people who don't ask for help. Nobody asks for help with combat stress. If they ask for help, they don't have it.

All right, once you recognize you have it, then you get the help you need. But the idea is when you come

back you say, “Oh I can handle things, I am a man, I’m good.” You know it is a spiritual, it is not a spiritual problem, it is a spiritual solution but it is not a spiritual problem. Combat stress is a physical, mental, moral, exhaustion of the human spirit that may have a spiritual answer. That may be part of it, but it is also all the other problems that come between, coming back from that war zone and seeing boys that have been blown up, having to go search for heads in the desert. Those kinds of experiences that chaplains have to face when they’re out there, need support when they get home to an extent greater than maybe being, being dealt with.

You know, one of the arguments is, “Well you know, you are just one person and it is a spiritual job and your denominations don’t train you for this kind of thing, and what are you going to do, and whatever,” and I am thinking, you’re better trained than everybody else in the military, for goodness sake, to deal with these kinds of things. You’re a little bit older, just by nature. You’ve had experience in counseling and negotiation and teaching and training and dealing with individuals’ pain and hurt. You understand the difference between what is and what could be in God’s sight. So, there is nobody better to deal with this in the military. I haven’t met any generals that have the skills that you have in that respect. Now, some are some pretty good guys out there and then there are some complete, hmm, that are not. But basically you have the edge on all of this advice to commanders. I was asked, this is the next point actually, this business of, should the chaplaincy take on to advice to commanders, and I have two kind of points for that: One is, they may not take it anyway, I mean how many people take your advice? I mean does your wife, and your kids, whatever so, you know, okay. So I wouldn’t worry too much and give yourselves too much, you know credit for giving advice and having it taken, because my advice just usually goes right out the window with my kids, so whatever. But also you do have 95 percent of what you need and the other kind of things is tooling up for specific kinds of situations. And you’re not uneducated. You are educated professional men that can take this on. If you’re working in a Jewish, a Muslim, a Hindu, a Buddhist, a Christian context, most of the problems that you will be dealing with in warfare, you have seen in your churches. All right? You’ve had to deal with boards, disperse decision-making, and negotiation and personal counseling. This isn’t new. You’ve got all the skills simply because of where you are, where you’ve been. So giving advice to commanders is okay. First of all, one of many advisors and, secondly, using the skills that you have without sort of backing out of that kind of obligation. Because if you are in that sphere and you have a cup of water, that’s your responsibility. So, that comes from my religious background too, as you could probably tell. Okay, next point, and that is religious relativism and cultural relativism. And since I hear this a lot I want to address it rather directly. There are two kinds of people in the world it seems to me, those people who are very inclusive and those people who draw lines. I want to see good, bad, black, white. I want to be able to identify the enemy and identify the friend and automatically when you, any academic will tell you, when you do dichotomous analysis you have us, them, good, bad. Because we always end up rationalizing our good and their bad. Just whenever you do that you come up with yes and no. Generally speaking, when I teach cultural or religious stuff, I have three or more cases, rather than just two, so it doesn’t look like that in the human mind. The human mind conceptualizes it that way. Basic bottom line is, if you know what you believe and you’re strong in your own personal beliefs, then don’t worry about cultural and religious relativism. You know where you stand. You know where you stand before God and you stand before men and none of other kinds of fluff are going to make much difference. Tell me the religious basis for women’s clothing. Religious, women’s clothing. Is the burqa for nuns or for Islamic women? I’ve never been to a church in a pair of slacks. Is that in Thessalonians? Okay, I mean seriously. Does that, is that one of the core principles of your belief system? So when we talk about cultural and religious differences, that’s the kind of fluff that we don’t need to be dealing with on a daily basis. The core principle is modesty. Okay. We can agree with that. Modesty, respect, humility before God. So in, with cultural religious relativism, there is a lot of stuff made of it which actually is not. If there is a core set of beliefs, you can work on those core sets of beliefs and differences and distinctions, not give up an inch of your own belief system.

On the other hand deal with John 3:16 which says, "God so loved with world." Which means you deal with other people, love and respect. Not in, well you're different than I am, shall we do this theological disputation on which verse means what. I'm sorry, that gets you so far but it doesn't help solve the problems of the U.S. military and warfare that are so much more critical sometimes than some of the stuff we are much more comfortable with in talking about it for long periods of time. What number am I on?

Number ten, rules of warfare. The rules of law, the rule of law, is a phrase that is being dropped a lot. The State Department, the Defense Department, we have to have the rule of law. Tell me, whose law? What law? If you are going to do an international idea about law, you've got three basic kinds of law. One is the traditional law that cultures and societies have, it's a basic kind of thing. Things that you and I just do, not because it is written down but because we think it's right or not right. You know passing somebody on the street corner and not hitting their shoulder, or saying "excuse me" when you walk in front of a group of people. There is no law about it, it is just good social mannerisms and we do it and it makes life softer and better and we work through most of our things that way. We don't come into a room and move everybody's stuff. There is no law against it, we just don't do it. When it comes to young men and women flirting in other cultures, there is no law against it. It's done surreptitiously. Like my grandmother said, who was a very religious person, that only the second one takes nine months.

We understand. We understand a lot of the rules about them, they are just there. Now the second kind of rules are religious rules, and we adhere to those. Those religious rules be they shari'ah, Old Testament, Tanach rules, whatever we do we have a set of religious rules that we think provides the principles before God that we need to obey. And then there are state rules that codified rules with the country that we put into writing and say, um, the difference between the 10 commandments and the 10 amendments, that sort of thing. We write them down. And when the State Department talks about the rule of law in Iraq, which rule of law are they going to deal with? The only one you can deal with is the one that is enforceable. Sometimes that will be a religious rule, which is where we get the participation of sheikhs and rulers and religious personages in the area, because the codified state law isn't enforceable if you don't have judges and prisons and due process, you can't enforce a rule of law. Going back to the religious law, are these all bad just because they're religious laws? Mine aren't. I like my religious laws. I like that idea of the 10 commandments, you know it kind of keeps me thinking about what's right and wrong. What about my traditional laws? Well they also provide a system of making us accountable for each other. Making teenagers pay attention to adults, most of the time. Okay? So we work through those systems of law. What I have found in the conversations at the Department of Defense and in the State Department, is not the rule of law but the rule of revenge. And that people are using law to get even. And at the end of a warfare, who gets killed first? Who gets held responsible first? Who can we go after? Who did what to whom? And it provides a distraction from the building and rebuilding of a society. Now I understand justice and reconciliation. I understand forgiveness. I do not understand religious people with revenge. That's where I am going to draw the line on that one, at the revenge mode. And we have a lot of folks in a war situation, particularly, that say, "You hate me, I hate you. You did this to me, I am going to do double to you." That kind of thinking is not good deterrence, it is not good long term planning, it is not strategically viable policy and program for this country except when I can add all the academic words to it. The rules of revenge I cannot find in any of our religious codes. I can find them in our state codes, but not in our religious codes.

I don't understand is the attitude of revenge for religious people. When things are done, just according to a system of agreed upon public transparent and accountable system, such as in Mozambique, South Africa, Rwanda and Burundi, those kinds of situations where there was a process put in place and it took the temper out of it. And one of the things I noticed after 09/11/2001, was I got two kinds of e-mails. There were e-mails who said "they want to touch us with that stuff, let's go get 'em." Their face got puckered up. Even on the e-mail you could see the puckering up. "Go get 'em, kill 'em all." "Get every rag head" and

vile pornography kind of things. I did not get that from military people. I got those from civilians. From the military people I got much more of an “Oh my God, what are we going to do now? Will this set off another world war? Will we try to take out everything and miss the perpetrators?” Well how do we go back and think about this stuff because military people in uniform understood the consequences of action and overreaction. They understood the difference between revenge and war theory and what would escalate conflict rather than bring conflict back, and I’m always afraid of the people who say “let’s get even.” The ones who get, that’s, my, my position for the way I am talking to these young Marines, it’s, pull back from the revenge and do what’s right and do it according to a system of law. Now if you don’t have enforceable civil law, then you can’t have a revenge system because it will be the personal going after them.

Number 11 was the take care of your own. I got that one mixed up, thank you, as far as my numbers are concerned. And then the advice to commanders was number 12, but then I want to stop with something that I have to say, my favorite writer of all time, I think, or almost all time, present time excluded of course. Marc Gopin. And Mark wrote some of the most difficult, dense, understanding on Israel, Palestine and negotiation over there. And I have to wade through that one page at a time. Takes me a long time to get through some of that stuff. But his last book was none of that. It was just straight forward and said eight steps to making peace with yourselves and others.

Marc Gopin is a rabbi who teaches at George Mason University, and has been an explainer of Israel and Palestine. Very conservative. Incredible human being. As someone who will pull people close to talk to, and his, his eight steps, and I won’t go through them specifically, have to do with forgiveness and forgiveness of the country, forgiveness to the service, forgiveness of Iraq, forgiveness of Iraqis, prayer for others, etc. are kind of encapsulated in his number 1, which is know who you are. Number 2, feel, understand and love the other person or the other group. Number 3, understand, which is knowledge of the conflict, know war. It is not enough to know theology. You have to know war, you’re in uniform. Number 4, hear what the other party is saying, the art of listening. Number 5, see with your eyes and observe what’s going on quietly. Number 6, imagine visions of the future. Number 7, do transformational power of deeds and gestures, and then he says you may have a right to speak. Which number 8, after 7, after reading all the other stuff, then ability to speak and, number 8, the only one that requires speaking but by that time the power of the word, Word, as used in John 1:1. You have that Word which you should be able to use in a transformational way in a war zone.

I have heard this in the Department of Defense. There are a few Power Point™ [slides] that are going around that have nasty pictures of Islam right on the front of it which is not an engagement strategy, it is a distant strategy, and the information on the inside may be good, may be bad, but the perception is that we are identifying an enemy to be killed and that is what the power points are on and those went out into the G-2 and they had to be pulled back and some kind of nasty ways.

People talk out of both sides of their mouth all the time. It just drives me crazy. If you go back and read the Federalist Papers and the constitutional stuff and the writings in the 1500s and 1600s. I got to do this bottom line thing, and I have lived on five different continents and been in a number of war zones. I have never met a man who said anything but, “I have a right to make a decision for myself and my family. I have a right to make a decision with my relatives in my community.” That’s democracy. That’s grassroots respect for human beings. Any place that I have been in the Arab world, I’ve heard men and women say, “We have a right to decide for ourselves.” So, so what is democracy? It is presidential parliamentary, parliamentary presidential? Does it have to be French style, does it have to be Dutch style? Does it have to be American style? If you put institutions on top of ideas, you have to make sure they match. I keep, I’ve got, one of my best friends is in intelligence in Baghdad. I get these e-mails, “Dr. Otis we have to get rid of tribalism.” I say, “No, embrace it!” You can’t get rid of tribalism, so deal with it. Don’t do this ethnic cleansing and put walls in the city. You’re dividing people who may or may not wish to be divided. There are other ways of handling

security but putting a wall up is not going to help. That'll just give them a place to fight. Check Cyprus and the green lines in the rest of the world and that defines the place to fight. Say, "Well what do we do?" I said, "Well what did the United States do?" We didn't, you know, James Madison and John Adams didn't like the idea of factionalism, but we have pluralism. We call it pluralism. We have the real estate lobby, we have the religious lobby, we have the tax lobbies, we have the property lobbies, we have a cattleman's lobby and what do we do? We let them all lobby. Right? This is fine. Let the tribes lobby. You know this is not a Sunni issue, this isn't a theological debate in Iraq, this is a tribal, we can survive if you don't survive, competition kind of thing. It is not a matter of just getting them in one room. Give them a place to talk. And one of the things that the community, the military community, has done, is in some areas like Anbar Province, has found what the British would call those speaker's podiums, public places where a guy can get up on a podium and talk. Say anything he wants to, as loud he wants to. Incidentally you notice Jesus must have had a very loud voice, otherwise he couldn't have been heard by 5000 people, even in a Roman auditorium kind of thing and those things. You had to have a voice. These guys, you can't confuse danger with noise. So these guys are getting up on these podiums in Anbar Province and screaming, right? It's a noise, it's not danger. And, you listen to who's listening. Look at who's listening to them and what they are doing about them. Because you also know in your troops, sometimes the people are in a synagogue or mosque, sometimes the people who are talking the most are doing the least. All right, so you got to look for the people who are having an action agenda. You look for the people who are inciting violence, not necessarily the ones who say the world isn't right. We know the world isn't right. You guys know the world isn't right more than anybody else. That's what you preach on a daily basis. The world is not the way God wants it to be. There is injustice in the world. There is sin in the world. There is corruption in the world. Fix it. Behave yourselves, right? So this guy gets up, 23 years old, and he says there is injustice in the world, there is corruption in the world, we are to blame, the other tribes are to blame, we need to have moral regeneration, we need to get back to God. Clap, 'cause they are right. Yeah, so it's working with democracy and the forces of democracy at the grassroots level, the tribes, the Panchayats in India, the tribal councils in Afghanistan, the camp fires in Nicaragua, in Belize, Guatemala, the people in Colombia and Venezuela that have tribal and local interests. They know what they want. They know how to participate. They are basically democratic because they have respect for each other. We can only keep that dam down. It's going to bubble up anyway so let's kind of keep encouraging it. And particularly in Anbar, this has been reasonably successful lately. I don't know how long things take to say, "Okay we are going to have a president and, listen, you have two years to complete your job." Forgets that in 1776 we had a revolution, 1783 we had a constitution it was ratified in 1793. It actually went into force in about 1804 when we found *Marbury vs. Madison*, the British came back in 1812, then we had a civil war in 1863. When did we get this country kind of packaged? We did not have an easy start.

Then if you want to talk about religious involvement more, check out the Civil War. And the camp meetings at the time of the Civil War. And how much religious participation was there on both the South[ern] and the North[ern] side. Whose side was God on? We pulled this together. My issue with the chaplaincy is, take on more of the subject. You are good theologians. You know what your belief structure is. You've got counseling capabilities. You are with the troops on a daily basis. They come to you and you go to them. But the issues of how war affects religion, how war affects culture, how war affects human beings, is something that needs to be really kind of tidied up and focused on a little bit.

As we consider ourselves a nation, or an ethnic group or Irish or Swedish or whatever, we have an idea of who we are in a Venn diagram kind of system. We believe that, as individuals, we are responsible for God. That is also Koranic, it is also the *Sadith*, the *Hadith*, and one of the problems Islam has, is people leaving the tradition, leaving the tribes and going off on their own, and the democratization of Islam, where I can do what I want to do because I'm only responsible to God. Most Muslims I know, I know just on a

personal level and the scholarship I've read, says, you know, Muslims basically think the same thing we do. They are responsible to God and that's going to be the judgment, and that is going to be the penalty, and the list of good and the list of bad, grace is a difficult concept but the idea of responsibility is still God created each individual, you're responsible to each individual. How you go to mosque, you go to church, you go to synagogue. You have extended families in a tribal nature, that does not mean individual penalty.

Let's get the mote out of our own eye first. We are the most religious country in the world by the number of people who say they believe in God, participate in a religious service, say they believe in life after death, and responsibility to it. The Pew Forum has specific statistical backing for that statement. If you look at the numbers of people who said that in Iraq in 2001, it was like 15 to 20 percent. If you find out the number of people in Iran during the Khomeini Revolution it was 15 to 20 percent, and the women weren't included because the women worshiped separately from the men in Iraq. So if we say we have separation of church and state, it is only the big C and the big S. Right? We are a religious public. Every one of the framers of the constitution said we needed a religiously valued people but we wanted to separate the money and the power of the church and the state. We are not a secular country. We have had religious power in everything and in every decade that we have had. We don't talk about it very well because those framers of the constitution sort of set some stuff up for us for success and for failure. We don't have a formalized religion, why? First of all, they said, "Separation of church and state." No money 'cause they came out of the wars of Europe at the time where the church and the state were, you know Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth, a little bit of a bloody situation there, as was in Germany, as was in Switzerland, as was in France with the Huguenots and the church and the class system, and in Italy later on. The second reason is, "What would have been our religion?"

Okay which church shall we have now? The framers of the Constitution were not just ideologically theoretically kind of cool, but they were pretty practical guys. And they were saying we do not want to have one church because they couldn't have gotten anybody to sign that thing, and they had a hard time with George Mason anyway. You know, given the slavery kind of thing. So you know, it's a matter of trying to understand who we are in the eyes of other people. When Islamic countries see us, they see the crusaders, they see the masons, they see the 85 percent of our NGO's that are faith-based that provide all of our food. They see the 5000 missionaries that followed the troops in, in 2001. What do they see that we're not seeing? Because we talk to ourselves in a different way than the rest of the world sees us.

I go to different countries and I'm seen as an American female, therefore I do, and, therefore I can, and why not them? And I want to go "shew," you know, this is difficult. On the other hand, most folks in the world aren't quite as naive as they claim to be. And you know, you go to most countries in the world and they will have seen missionaries, they'll see business people, they've seen some of our teenagers, they've seen the tourists. Many of their friends and families have been to the United States, they may not have gone to a church in the United States because they weren't invited, but they've been here. They understand a little bit more about us. Don't fall for the smoke and mirrors in vocabularies. Sometimes, sometimes this is rhetorical stuff. What do you want to argue about today? But secondly they know we're religious. They know that, any foreigner that comes to this country and turns on television Sunday morning knows about us. Secondly, we have stories of success of military people, military chaplains, military cultural folks ad infinitum. We don't have them collected very well, but we have them, and they come across my e-mail all the time. This is, one case in Afghanistan, they were having, one of the villages was having trouble, the military was having trouble with one of the villages. They kept getting shelled. Every single night someone was shelling the camp, the tents, and it was not a good situation. The chaplain says, "Well, why don't we go over and talk to them?" The commander said, "Well I don't know whether that is going to do any good, you know, these are people that I'm probably going to aggravate. . . so the chaplain said, "Well, let's just go talk to them." So four of the guys walked down the road to the village, talked to the local folks there and they said, they just asked

“What can we do to keep the shelling from happening?” They said, “Oh, we’re so glad you showed up! We want to have just a few of your guys stationed here every night because we have these strangers that come into town and they’re disrupting things, they’re flirting with our daughters, etc. and if you were just here, they wouldn’t be here. Plus would you mind giving us a volleyball net?” Two simple requests. It ended the shelling. Probably saved peoples lives. There are lots of stories like this but they’re kind of not told very often or very well. And the chaplains, as modest and humble as you are, don’t collect them either. And you know, it’s not just Center for Lessons Learned stuff, it’s actually your stories on the ground, not in a bragging sense but in a lessons learned, how can you engage, get in the face, you can’t talk to your enemy at a distance, it’s got to be right there. And you, you’re good at doing it in other venues, why not this one too? Just ‘cause they don’t speak good English, right?

I have to recommend this book and maybe it would provide a, a prototype for what you’re doing. It’s called *Operation Homecoming*. And it’s put out by the National Council of the Arts. But the interesting part about this is that they say that they had never done this before, and that they were guilty of some sort of cultural, let’s see, it’s an unexamined cultural snobbism. I like that part. But it is the stories of guys coming back from Afghanistan and Iraq, poetry, letters home, experiences. Some of them, one of the writings is on the port-a-potty in one of the Provinces. A variety of things. And they are short, they are one or two pages, and just collected. This was supported by Boeing Corporation. I’m sure that there are corporations that would support the chaplaincy for putting out a similar volume. I don’t know whether it’s free or not. I asked one of the vice presidents of Boeing who is a good friend of mine. I was thinking, “I want a few dozen of those.”

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How Do We Understand the Evil that is Terrorism?

By Dr. Jean Bethke Elshtain

(Adapted from a presentation at the 2007 Ethics Consultation at the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School, Fort Jackson, South Carolina.)

The question is, how do we understand the evil that is terrorism? A question that is entirely appropriate on this sixth anniversary of 9/11. Terrorism is by no means a neutral term. That is, it's a term that condemns by defining a phenomenon that warrants such condemnation. A second example of such a word would be genocide. No one uses the word genocide to praise something. It's a term that embeds an ethical evaluation when we use it. Terrorism similarly, which is one reason many terrorists prefer it to have a different designation if they can, because they know it's not a neutral term. Terrorists are those who kill unarmed people they consider their objective enemies, no matter what those people may or may not have done.

Now terrorism and terror entered the language in the West as ordinary language to designate a very specific phenomenon, and that is killing directed against all ideological enemies indiscriminately, most often outside the context of a legal war between combatants fighting under the legitimate authority of a state. Not all the time of course, but often that's the case. Now, according to the logic of terrorism, those designated enemies can be murdered no matter what they are doing, where they are, whether they are young or old, male or female, healthy or infirm. It suffices for them to be Jews or Americans or infidels which is some of Bin Laden's favorite list. Just as it sufficed under 20th Century totalitarian terror to be a Jew, a Slav, an untermenchen if you're in the Nazi camp, or a class enemy if you're in the communist camp.

So, this is one key characteristic of terrorism, whether state-sponsored or undertaken by non or substate actors. The enemy is depicted without nuance and includes all members of a condemned category, no matter what they are doing, where they are, or whether indeed they do or do not bear arms, or can in any way resist. Now terrorists sew terror, that's the objective, to subject victims or would-be victims to paralyzing fear, that's the central goal. In the words of a political theorist some of you may know for his work on Just War, Michael Walzer, terrorism, and I'm quoting, "Terrorism's purpose is to destroy the morale of a nation or a class, to undercut its solidarity. Its method is the random murder of innocent people. Randomness is a crucial feature of terrorist activity. If one wishes to spread fear, to spread and intensify over time, it is not desirable to target specific people identified in some particular way, whether regime, a party, or a policy. Death must come by chance. Now terrorism is then the random murder of the innocent because of who they are rather than anything they have done, because they are in some way associated with or members of an enemy that the terrorist would destroy utterly if he could." Now the reference to innocence, I don't need to tell you this, but some people do need to hear it, the reference to innocence is not to moral innocence, for no one can claim that, but to a person's inability to defend herself, or himself, from murderous attack as the person goes to work or takes a trip, or shops, or eats a meal in a restaurant, or flies in an airplane, or rides a bus. Terrorists who engage in the random slaughter of innocents, random because each and every person to be murdered is not chosen for any particular reason, save for being part of this class or category, they are not interested in the subtleties of diplomacy. They are not interested in compromise solutions to political questions.

Now at times targets, pizza parlors, restaurants, buses, are random too. They're targets of convenience. This is an easy one to get on today. Sometimes the targets are selected like the World Trade Center towers, but who is within them at a particular moment is a matter of indifference. The terrorist just wants to kill as many people as possible, so ideally there are lots of people in there at the time of the attack. Now, I need to add that it is

sometimes the case that elements of movements that resort to terrorism like, for example, the Irish Republican Army, historically also develop a political arm and begin to negotiate a political settlement but you will have noticed that before that full political settlement was written, you had to disarm. You don't come to the table with your weapons, you have to disarm and then we can finally get to a political solution. No political solution is possible when there is destruction of innocent civilians and some fantastic notion of the restoration of the classical caliphate is the professed aim. That's not a political goal, that's a kind of crazy utopian delusion. Now Bin Laden's claim is that to kill all Americans anywhere is "A duty for every Muslim. God willing, America's end is near." Now I needn't tell you he doesn't speak for all Muslims so, you know, you know that and I know that, but that's his claim. Now given the fact that terrorism involves the murder of noncombatants, murder being unjust killing, culpable killing, intentional killing, it might strike one that fighting terrorism is a relatively noncontroversial matter. Well you know and I know that that's not the case, that contestations rage around whether terrorism should be confronted with the use of force. If so, what kind of force, when, where, how? The United States National Strategy for Combating Terrorism issued in February 2003, states, in just a few sentences here: "The enemy is not one person, it is not a single political regime, certainly it is not a religion. The enemy is terrorism, premeditated, politically motivated violence, perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. Those who employ terrorism regardless of their specific secular or religious objectives strive to subvert the rule of law and to effect change through violence and fear. These terrorists share the misguided belief that killing, kidnapping, extorting, robbing, wreaking havoc to terrorize people are legitimate forms of action." That's the end of the quote.

Now, before turning to the context of ethical evaluation and restraint, within which Just War thinkers such as myself insist that terrorism in measures to combatants should be located, it may be worth taking a look very briefly at some analyses of terrorism that constitute a kind of exculpatory explanation for it, thereby removing the onus of moral criticism and condemnation from those committed to terrorist deeds. For there are those who insist now, as they have in the past, I've heard this said out loud as a matter of fact, that the victims of terror somehow had it coming. Or those who resort to terror have no other option as they are in a state of rage as well as helplessness so they must do whatever they can. Then there is, and I've heard this one articulated as well, the "everybody does the same thing" claim. That we cannot criticize terrorists because American Soldiers behave in an identical fashion. This is not an uncommon view, by the way, in some circles. Now this line of argument, the everybody does it, that they don't have a choice, it strips away the moral vocabulary we require in order to make crucial ethical distinctions between the rule-governed use of force, rule-governed war making, I mean that's what we've been hearing about. You know there are rules. What happens when they are violated? You couldn't talk like that if there weren't any rules to govern combat operations, between that and terrorism. These rationales for terrorists acts also wind up patronizing those who resort to terrorism, which is of course an irony lost on those who do this sort of thing. As theologian, David Yeagle writes, and I'm quoting "To suppose that the Islamic faith or Arab culture or poverty and the expression of oppression somehow caused young men directly of themselves to be capable of flying an airliner full of passengers into a building crowded with unsuspecting civilians is deeply denigrating to Muslims, to Arabs, and to the poor and oppressed. It requires us to suppose that Muslims or Arabs or the poor lie almost beyond the borders of a shared humanity. That however much we pity and excuse them we cannot rely on them, simply because they are Muslims, Arabs, or oppressed to behave in morally intelligible ways. I would suggest that this is a dangerous line of thought, however, humanely motivated it initially may be, it's profoundly demeaning, in other words, to think that people lack moral agency."

Now unsurprisingly these sorts of arguments have resurfaced with Islamist fanaticism and terror and I use Islamist to designate this ideological construction that fuels terrorism in our world today and it is not to be equated, obviously, with the faith that is Islam. . . . Islamist. Now thus far no one has made a convincing case that would or sometimes called structural causes like poverty or desperation, lie behind the resort to terrorism. There are actually some pretty good studies along these lines now. It is therefore clear that we must look at terrorism not as

epiphenomenal to some other problem, but as itself the problem. Poverty does not breed terrorism. The vast majority of the poor never resort to terrorism. The attackers of 9/11 were middle class, reasonably well-educated and traveled. Now by falsely connecting terrorism to poverty, as some suggest we should do, policymakers, analysts and commentators only deflect attention from the real roots of terrorism which are ideological and religious. There is a huge gap between claiming, for example, that poverty causes terrorism and acknowledging the ways in which terrorist entities exploit certain conditions, to try to recruit people into their ideology. Those are not identical to one another. The key lies in the word "exploit." Terrorists exploit certain conditions, conditions are the matrix out of which it may grow. Although we know from the terrorists that have emerged in western Europe, ah, who are in some, many cases, third generation immigrants, that what they're reacting to is not so much poverty, although in France that's a problem, but is their reaction to ah, western culture, a culture that was insufficiently attentive of ways to integrate this population and simply left them alone to simmer in a kind of discontent. There's a real responsibility on government in that case, on the cultures that failed to do that. Here in the States we actually do a better job of bringing people in, than they do in western Europe for a variety of reasons that I can't get into. But it does not follow that terrorism is caused by certain conditions that people don't have agency in these matters any more than it holds that murderous deeds are caused entirely by circumstances external to himself.

Now, in light of the enormous varieties of circumstances, middle class neighborhoods, refugee camps, so on and so forth, that may yield a terrorist, those combating terrorism must in their response, first and foremost, concentrate on the behavior itself, on terrorism itself. When the police are confronted with a serial killer, the first thing they seek to do is to stop him. Don't let this happen again. Attempting to discern what particular concatenation of circumstances led to this particular person taking up serial killing comes later. But the urgency is to protect people. It follows from what has been said, that for an analyst to collapse soldier and terrorist into one another, to say just the same thing, different names, effaces the distance between those who plant bombs in cafes or fly civilian aircraft into office buildings, fight other combatants, taking the risks attendant upon military forms of fighting. So the distinction, just to sum this little bit up, between terrorism, domestic criminality and normal or legitimate war fighting is vital to observe, it helps us to assess what is happening when force is being used. This distinction between terrorism and rules of engagement, legitimate war fighting, ah, has been marked in historic moral and political discourse and the norms of international law. And it is clearly lost on many and perpetuates a distinction erosion that undermines our ability to think politically and ethically if we cannot distinguish the intended targeting and killing of noncombatants and the deliberate sewing of terror among civilians from fighting under certain restraints that would precisely call those sorts of actions illegitimate. If we can't do that, we live in a world which reduces to the same shade of gray and we lose the distinctions that help us to take our moral and our political bearings. Now, let me move on to another section. How do we think about and analyze the evil that is terrorism having characterized it? How do we think about what kind of entity it is? What kind of threat it is? And how best to respond? I'm going to suggest to you, there are probably more than I am offering, but for my purposes here this afternoon, three possible analyses of what Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda like entities represent. What that threat represents. One analysis is that Islamist terrorists are always allied with and dependent upon state sponsors and it follows therefore that to oppose Islamism is to oppose a particular state or states. So you tie Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda like activities to the state. That's one view that's out there. A second view is that Islamist terrorists comprise a tiny cohort of criminals in a vertically organized criminal syndicate with Osama Bin Laden at the top. It follows that the most appropriate response is a criminal law approach that seeks to apprehend and arrest a finite number of criminals.

So you analogize the threat to domestic criminality and proceed along that line. And then there is a third alternative: Islamist terrorism poses a particularly challenging threat because it is horizontally structured consisting of many cells that have functioned largely independently of one another because it makes use of modern technologies that are inherently difficult to control or interrupt. Because it makes use of premodern technologies that are similarly difficult to intercept and interrupt like informal prebanking, premodern banking and money

exchanges and finally because it makes use of nearly any available state structure. Although it flourishes best under failed state or rogue state auspices either a very nasty rouge state, Taliban type state, or a very weak state, a failed state. It seems to me that the third option is the correct approach. It is the only one that accounts for all the distinctive features of Islamism in action. And this means that some version of a military, not only a legal criminal response, is not only appropriate but may be necessary although our responses need not be and surely will not be, and are not now, exclusively military. Although my specific focus is the contemporary threat from fanatical Islamism, the argument I will unpack, applies with equal force to other forms of international terrorism. Now let's plug in the Just War tradition here at this point. Once a state embarks on the use of organized force, that state certainly the state called the United States, encounters the tenants of the Just or Justified War tradition. Now you all know about that tradition. Most of the colleges and universities I go to, people don't know anything about it. But the Just War tradition is an outgrowth, as you know, of western history. It emerged in the centuries known collectively as the period of Christendom in the west, but by the time Christendom is anything like a coherent entity it ceased to exist, Just War norms had been absorbed within the nascent forms of international law, rules governing warfare, and so forth. Over the centuries Just War has been debated, argued with, amended and absorbed within the structure of international society to really rather extraordinary extent.

Now there are some versions of the Just War tradition that, at least at first blush, was seen to place terrorism somewhat outside its purview. I refer to those accounts that define Just War as exclusively what states do. It's exclusively stuff between states. And the rules pertain to the use of force between combatants fighting under the flags of specific states. The implication here would be that should a war against terrorists be waged, it should only take the form of an attack on a particular state that sponsors or permits terrorist organizations in its midst. Obviously this becomes tricky, if one is confronted by shadowy entities that lie outside a state structure although they may be parasitic upon a state or take advantage of it. The most common post 9/11 argument along these lines held that because Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda are by definition nonstate actors, we can't really fight a war against them. Because we can't go to war against them, we cannot deploy, legitimately deploy organized coercive force to fight terrorism. So it follows that a state whose citizens have been the victims of terrorism become unjust aggressors, should they go to war against nonstate actors. Because you can't by definition legitimately fight a war against such entities. In this perspective, you see over time a kind of reversal of where the moral onus should be... it's put on the victims rather than the perpetrators. This approach also leads to such naïve recommendations as that the United States should, after 9/11, have deputized a posse to arrest Bin Laden and bring him to the United States for trial. If the U.S. Military has found it so, with all it's resources, found it difficult to find the guy, how is some deputized posse supposed to march over there and bring the... I mean this has appeared in print, I'm not making this stuff up, you know, about what we should have done. Now let us suppose we have opted for the characterization number 3 that I offered of the threat that we face. It means that we recognize that contemporary Islamist terrorists may function with or without state sponsors. They're equally deadly in either case. So we face many challenges. On the ad bellum, that's the justifiability of embarking on the use of force side of the ledger, there's the challenge of fighting nonstate actors. Now let's think about the criteria. I don't have time to go over all of them and, as I said, I'm pretty certain that you know them. Ah, the criteria for Just Cause: A war must be openly authorized, declared, doesn't mean you have to have a war resolution but you have to have authorization. A war must be a response to an act of aggression or the imminent threat of such. A war must begin with the right intention. A war might be waged in behalf of a third party facing certain or the very high probability of destruction. A war should be a last resort, and the prudential consideration. There should be a probability of success. You don't want to make a bad situation worse. So you see the complexities that the just play here when we are thinking about how best to respond. This complexity requires a flexible nuanced response: The ability to use criminal law when appropriate, to attack a rogue state sponsor as in Afghanistan, and to pursue terrorist networks and other countries using a variety of methods perhaps including, under certain circumstances, armed combatants. So you have to have that flexibility to deal with this particular threat, this particular evil. Now many, as you know,

have criticized the current administration for declaring a War on Terror. They don't like the word "war" for one thing and they also don't like the word "terror." They don't like any of it as a matter of fact. They, as if this meant that the U.S. would try to extirpate all terrorism everywhere which is a clear impossibility. And there's little doubt that greater precision would have been desirable in the language deployed by the administration. Now the administration attempted to meet this by speaking of terrorists of international reach as you know, thus incorporating not only Al-Qaeda but other transnational and transstate terrorist entities like Hezbollah. Because Afghanistan, under the Taliban harbored Al-Qaeda, they became an appropriate target as well. The war authorization was clear about this but their clarity really ends and I see no easy way around this given the murkiness and the lack of transparency in international terrorist operations. Terrorists function outside the law, in the swamps. There is a, it's as if there is a kind of shadow world, a sort of vicious twin, if you will, of the world of states and legitimate authorities and the rule-governed use of force. They make use of those entities, they are not that, and as I said they are functioning in the swamps in the shadows, moving over the landscape in a variety of ways. It's terribly difficult to deal with. Still one must do one's very best, this recognized, to abide by the requirements of justifiability. I want to just talk a little bit more about one of those, that's the prudential consideration, the likelihood of success, which is another very difficult thing to conjure with when you're thinking about terrorism. How do you measure success when there's no nation to surrender? There's not going to be a ceremony where some papers of surrender get signed here. We have the scenarios, remember the surrenders from World War II and so, and that's what we think... we think that's how a war ends. But that's not how fighting against terrorism will end. How can you tell if you have achieved success? If there is no way to stipulate terms of peace and all the other standard repertoire of war-making between states? Terrorism has no terminus. It's open ended. At one point it may fade away but by definition it does not surrender officially. It cannot in the case of Islamism, because the war against the infidel is perpetual. It never ceases. There may be a temporary truce but it doesn't stop. Within this ideology, until all of the world has this sort of virulent ideology, until all of the world is under the house of Islam, dar al-Islam it is a state of war. You may not be fighting at a given moment but you're in a state of war, what is called the "House of War," dar al-Harb. Now this totalist ideological view permits no peace by definition. As I said, there might be a truce but it's not the ideal. And the view is that we'll, you know we may have to settle with this for now, but we won't settle with this forever. Given the fact that there is no way to end such a war, and the standard scenarios we're used to working with, and nevertheless remains the case that one must articulate what reasonable success looks like or consists in. And the irony here is that we measure success when nothing happens, when there have been no further attacks on innocent civilians. This isn't very satisfying, you know when you think about how our image in our heads of what victories look like on the battlefield. When nothing happens, that's a very good thing.

Now it means that maybe we have undermined the terrorists entity's ability to plan and execute these kinds of attacks. But you can't let your guard down. You can't demobilize, certainly not for the foreseeable future. You might stand down for major military operations in a particular theater but a war is going to continue. If, as Clausewitz insisted, war is politics by other means, politics at times is also war by other means. You can reverse the saying. The war against terrorism must be fought on many fronts. That being the case, let's move quickly to the in bello norms. Do they continue to have salience and to be relevant to the fight against terrorism? And you know what those are. A standard charge against Just War in bello restraints against ruthless foes who recognize no limits is that what is, in effect, fighting with ones hands tied behind ones back. We heard about the frustration of some of the Soldiers in Iraq who clearly seem to believe that their rules of engagement precisely yield the outcome. Whatever merit there may be in such a concern and we can certainly understand it, one cannot back down and throw restraint out the window. I have some more, but in the interest of time I'll skip it, and we can get back to if it you have questions. We know there is no such limitation on the terrorist's part, that everyone is fair game, and that a Holy war of extermination has been called for against all infidels including, by the way, infidels in Muslim majority countries who are not that kind of Muslim. They are enemies too. And there are no geographical restrictions on

who the enemy is. And because terrorism isn't bound by the laws of armed conflict nor the many protocols and treaties now in place to regulate and terminate wars, it follows that in bello restraints in the Just War tradition refined for hundreds of years find no analog in the annals of Islamism. Here's what an ethicist named Michael Bower writes: "For the terrorist there are, in principle, no contexts, no conditions, no times or places, and no persons that fall under the basic rules of armed conflict. Accordingly, the terrorists may target anyone at any time. But the terrorist's refusal to recognize any rules of armed conflict also means something deeper than this. It means that the terrorist in principle refuses to recognize any rules that govern the party's conduct during the time of conflict. Because of this, the terrorist is implicitly committed to a perpetual state of war." That's the end of the quote. Now Just War fighters, as you know, by contrast are constrained under two broad norms and then more specifications get added. One is proportionality the other is discrimination. Ah, proportionality, I think you have a sense of what that is. Let me mention discrimination because that's really key when you're thinking about terrorists who do not discriminate. Discrimination lays down, as you know, the requirement that one is not permitted to intentionally target noncombatants, one must refrain. Knowing that noncombatants sooner or later will come into harms way in any war, the Just War fighter nevertheless recognizes that his or her cause will in some palpable way be undermined if the army in which he or she fights begins to indiscriminately kill unarmed men, women and children. Now that's in a way the easy part. Far more difficult is figuring out how to recognize a combatant in a war against terrorism. Terrorists do not identify themselves with uniforms or other standard insignia. They fight by not doing so, so that they can blend in with the general population and commit their heinous deeds by stealth. They do not care how many of their own civilians die. In fact, the more the better. As a result there is more fear than if only a small number of civilians come to grief. Now out of a recognition of the common humanity of those one was fighting. This was an early point made by St. Augustine in the 4th and 5th Century: They are also human beings. It mattered not, Augustine argued, whether those one was fighting were Christians or adherents to some other faith. All human persons must be accorded some respect and some immunity from war's horrors. Now terrorism blurs the distinction, as we know, between in bello norms that we assume and underscore. As I said they're quite prepared to see any number of their own people die. They're even prepared to mislead those fighting them so that civilians are mistaken for combatants, so that the death toll of their own rises and then they can proclaim in their propaganda, "Look at what these folks are doing to us." Clearly fighting terrorism within Just War restraints is a multipronged affair. There may be occasions for ordinary warfare as if in Afghanistan, occasions for infiltrating terrorists groups if possible in order to determine what they are planning. One must attack networks of communication and funding. It will be necessary to put pressure on states that may not be harboring terrorists directly but are in other ways providing them support. And the frustration of much of this for the ordinary American citizen is that much of it is hidden from the public. We don't know everything that's going on and, on principle, not everything can be revealed. Because in fact to reveal everything might jeopardize that very public. That's a serious frustration. And I think it helps to account for why people get frustrated when they think about this problem. You measure success when nothing happens, what is that? There are other complicating dimensions. Now one worry for those of us who live in a democratic society is the possible pressure that counterterrorism efforts may put on democratic institutions themselves. That has, of course, become a huge debate. Ah, and a reader might agree or a listener might agree with this claim but wonder, "What does this have to do with the Just War tradition?" Seems like you'd move to another topic. I'm not so sure. Let me, let me get to where I want to go this way: Just War thinking emerged and remained nestled within Christian theology and statecraft for centuries. And medieval theology and political philosophy made explicit and careful distinctions between legitimate rule and unjust rule which counted as no rule at all. Now I'm not saying that there were these flourishing little democracies in medieval Europe but you had the good king or you had this other guy, the tyrant, the tyrant. A tyrant was a king who had unkinged himself. He was no longer governing legitimately. The category of tyranny. So, although the Just War tradition underwrites no particular regime form, it opposes or cannot endorse tyranny. The reasons for this are rather obvious. Tyrannical regimes are those that know no restraint. They are lawless. They violate the

laws of God and man alike. They usurp power and govern with an eye to private interests, as St. Thomas Aquinas argued, rather than the common good. So the distinctions concerning legitimate versus illegitimate rule are central to the wider framework of Just War as it emerged in the west. Just War isn't just about war. It's a way of thinking about politics that locates justice centrally. And tyrannous regimes by definition are unjust, just as terrorism by definition is unjust. So when you fight Islamist terrorism in today's world you are fighting tyranny. We have seen what radical Islamism in control of a state apparatus means and it's not a pretty sight.

Now, this means it is there for all the more important, to keep alive the characteristics of a politics of decency that terrorism would destroy. Many have pointed out that terrorism, if endemic, instills an atmosphere in a society that's under attack of systematic fear and mistrust. This is the worry. That people grow to mistrust one another. They may come to mistrust their own government, it can't protect them. They don't like what the government does to try to protect them and when it doesn't protect them they get even angrier with the government. They fear their fellow citizens and foreigners alike. But if trust breaks down, it is much more difficult for citizens to comply with the undeniable inconveniences of anti-terrorist measures. When trust in government collapses it is easier for tyranny to gain a stronghold or for terrorists to gain an advantage. Because generalized and paralyzing fear, that's not the stuff out of which just and decent societies are made. And in a worst case scenario, as citizens become isolated and mistrustful, governments have to work even harder to combat terrorism and become ever more tempted to violate the norms of the constitutional order in doing so. This is a very worst case scenario. Ah, but it is something that I think all citizens of a democratic polity have to think about. How can a democratic society protect itself against those who want to destroy that society; including those internal to the society who would use its norms in order to gain power, in order to destroy the very norms that made it possible for them to come to power? So you know you've got these kinds of issues that have haunted democratic thinkers for many years. There are those who say it was a real mistake that the Weimar Republic let Adolph Hitler out of jail. They should have just kept the guy locked up. Make up some charges. You know, keep him in there. You know, you look at Mein Kampf. He's dangerous, keep him there. But you know they were abiding by certain norms of the rule of law that we understand and said, "We can't do that." These are just dilemmas. There is no easy way out of them. Terrorism puts civil society in a difficult bind. It challenges the society to defend itself. But since the modern terrorists cannot be deterred by more traditional, less extreme methods, a society's war against terrorism may at times resort to invasions of privacy and to preemptive force that are the kinds of techniques that pose the threat of undermining trust. And that's just what the terrorist also aims at doing. So you're in a real bind here. It's a very fine line that has to be walked and I don't envy our political leaders who have to try to do that. It's a harrowing task. Now to avoid the worst-case scenario, moral restraint and tragic recognitions of our fallibility, our shortcomings, means we can never protect ourselves perfectly. That's more exigent than ever. So Just Politics and Just War go together. Not perfect justice but societies that respect the dignity of persons, that offer religious freedom and substantial individual freedom, regularly hold elections or otherwise involve citizens in the tasks of governing and accountability and that above all do not place whole categories of persons in a subordinate status by virtue of birth or race or gender or religious faith. And the ethics that yielded Just War restraints also put into place then concern about justice and injustice more generally. So to the extent that we embrace that common humanity that St. Augustine talked about, to the extent we embrace that, it helps to yield to politics of decency and fairness, even when we are called, as we have been called upon, to combat the political evil that is terrorism.

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The Relevance of Virtue Ethics and Application to the Formation of Character Development in Warriors

By Chaplain (MAJ) Daniel S. Oh

The most significant contribution of natural law¹ to the sphere of ethical theory is its application to the formation of virtue ethics, especially in the thoughts of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. In this sense, natural law and virtue ethics are simultaneously complementary and inseparable. Although the theory of ethics of virtues was neglected in the period of modernity, it has seen a significant resurgence in the contemporary ethical terrain.² This phenomenon is encouraging because virtue ethics can serve as a viable antidote to disintegrating moralities in the United States military. One clear example of this disintegration is the moral debacle in Abu Ghraib, Iraq, where U.S. Soldiers grossly mistreated detainees.

My major objectives for this paper are three fold. First, focusing on Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, I will briefly examine virtue ethics from a secular and a Christian perspective in order to sketch what virtue ethics is all about. Second, taking a cue from Alasdair MacIntyre's *After Virtue*, I will examine the relevance of virtue ethics to the contemporary world in general and to the military context in particular. Third, I will apply virtue ethics, specifically a neo-Aristotelian virtue framework to the character development of warriors in a military context, this again in light of the prison scandal at Abu Ghraib.

Virtue Ethics from an Aristotelian-Thomistic Perspective

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), much more sophisticated than the other Greeks, left a perennial legacy in the system of Western thought. Particularly his contribution to the thought of the medieval theologian, Thomas Aquinas, is immeasurable. As a commonsense philosopher and as a biologist par excellence, Aristotle, after careful observation of diverse groups of cultures and political organizations, not only developed a moral theory in which an idea of the virtues is intrinsically embedded as the core of human excellence, but also characterized the good person in the context of community to be an individual who cultivates his/her virtues and leads a life of excellence (i.e. human flourishing). His masterpiece, *Nicomachean Ethics*, opens its first chapter in describing the object of life: "Every art and every investigation, and similarly every action and pursuit is considered to aim at some good."³ Distinctively teleological (goal or purpose oriented) in its theory, Aristotle, therefore, focuses on a moral agent whose virtuous character would lead him/her to happiness (flourishing). His main question in *Nicomachean Ethics* is to discover what is good. "Are we not more likely to achieve our aim if we have a target? If this is so, we must try to describe at least in outline what the good really is, and by which of the sciences of faculties it is studied."⁴ For Aristotle, this good is a virtuous life that aims for *eudaimonia* (happiness). But this life of happiness, since it is living and doing well, is not static; rather, it is a life of dynamics that goes after a point of excellent human activity that lies between two extremes: excess and deficiency. The concept of choosing a mean between two vices, therefore, is extremely important in Aristotelian moral theory.

In Book II, Aristotle delves into investigating what virtue really is. Virtue (*arête*) for Aristotle is, "a purposive disposition, lying in a mean that is relative to us and determined by a rational principle, and by that which a prudent man would use to determine it."⁵ This is a classic definition of Aristotelian virtue and, unlike the Stoics; it is closely kneaded with feelings (or passions) as well as actions. So Aristotle says: "If the virtues are concerned with actions and feelings, and every feeling and every action is always accompanied with pleasures and pain, on this ground too virtue will be concerned with pleasures and pains."⁶

Nevertheless, the fundamental question about Aristotelian virtue is, “how we can acquire virtues?” For Aristotle, the answer is profoundly simple. Whereas intellectual virtue requires some time and experience in its cultivation in one’s character, moral goodness is a result of habituation, not something one is naturally born with.⁷ “This fact makes it obvious that none of the moral virtues are engendered in us by nature, since nothing that is what it is by nature can be made to behave differently by habituation.”⁸ Though he used the analogy of art in acquiring the virtues through habituation,⁹ Aristotle accentuates the notion that acquiring the virtues is much more than a mastering of artistic skill. Focusing on a moral agent himself/herself and how he/she ought to perform a virtuous act as a virtuous person, Aristotle developed a distinct moral theory called virtue ethics, which is in direct contrast with modern deontological or utilitarian theories of ethics.

“Acts, to be sure, are called just and temperate when they are such as a just or temperate man would do; but what makes *the agent just or temperate is not merely the fact that he does such things, but the fact that he does them in the way just and temperate men do.*”¹⁰ Subsequently, an Aristotelian virtuous person is not satisfied with acquiring a simple knowledge of “know-how;” instead, he/she demonstrates it excellently because it is a distinctively human capacity. Therefore, in dealing with feelings and actions, Aristotle aims for what he calls “the mark of virtue,” that is “a mean condition” between “the two extremes.”

So, with what sort of virtues is the Aristotelian moral agent concerned? They are revolving around the cardinal virtues that are further divided into intellectual (prudence) and moral virtues (temperance, courage, and justice). Beside the intellectual virtue of prudence or wisdom (because it is precisely concerned with a moral agent), other moral virtues are determined by employing a doctrine of mean between two extremes (vices). Nonetheless, we must note that the prudent person knows how to exercise moral virtues because moral conduct implies choice that employs prudence. In other words, in the Aristotelian scheme of virtue ethics, prudence and other moral virtues are inherently intertwined. Therefore, Aristotle succinctly explains, “The full performance of man’s function depends upon a combination of prudence and moral virtue; virtue ensures the correctness of the end at which we aim, and prudence that of the means towards it.”¹¹

For Aristotle, since practical wisdom (or prudence) already presupposes moral virtues, it concerns more than excellence in intellectual activities like coming up with strategic or instrumental thinking. Rather, it is mostly concerned with the genuine actions (i.e. praxis). Considering the fact that Aristotle put so much emphasis on passions, feelings, and emotions, the practically wise person can determine what is an appropriate degree of emotions (or feelings) in a given emotional context in order to determine what are appropriate actions in response to them. This is only possible because he/she possesses the necessary virtues to carry out this particular moral task. On the contrary, it also suggests that those intelligent people who lack moral virtues, despite their cleverness, cannot formulate the proper means of directing at some end (i.e. the good). In Aristotle’s own words, “if that aim is a noble one, the cleverness is praiseworthy; but if the aim is ignoble, the cleverness is unscrupulousness (which is why we call both prudent and unscrupulousness clever).”¹²

This is a striking characteristic of Aristotelian virtue ethics. The practically wise person pursues the virtues (temperance, courage, magnificence, justice, etc) for their own sake because he/she knows that this virtuous activity is, what Aristotle calls, “conducive to the good life generally.” Consequently, it is not surprising that it has a tremendous application for maturing young adults. Aristotle himself suggests that the student of virtue ethics should have some general knowledge and experience of life in order to be trained in his school of Ethics. So, what is the starting point? Aristotle holds that, “Presumably we must start from what is known. So if anyone wants to make a serious study of ethics, or of political science generally, he must have been well trained in his habits.”¹³ We also recall that, in the Aristotelian ethical scheme, moral virtue is concerned with feelings and actions and these involve excess, deficiency, and a mean. Young people who are already habituated in moral virtues (courage, justice, temperance, etc.) will most definitely acquire practical wisdom because they are well established in the starting point. By reflecting on the various virtues and their mutual relationship in the big picture of aiming toward the good life, these young people will acquire a practical

wisdom of pursuing an even more excellent human life. In short, these virtues (distinctive human excellence) will be internalized in these young people so that they ultimately become the state of their own character. In other words, they aim at the “great-souled” person who chooses actions in accordance with the right mean and they enjoy their noble activities.

What is intriguing about Aristotle’s ethics is that they are chiefly concerned with an excellence of character that is closely related to achieving it through human rationality and voluntary will (choice) as well as associating with other people through developing friendships. This is why Aristotle considered ethics a branch of politics. For Aristotle, human beings are not only social (or rational) beings, but moral beings as well. Martha Nussbaum explains, “In the politics he (Aristotle) insists that only human beings, and not either animals or gods, will have our basic ethical terms and concepts (such as just and unjust, noble and base, good and bad), because the beasts are unable to form the concepts, and gods lack the experiences of limit and finitude to give a concept such as justice its point.”¹⁴ Moreover, what is useful about Aristotle’s virtue ethics is, as Nussbaum reiterates, its retainability of virtue’s moralities immersed attention to actual human experiences across the board of human cultures. So she says again that, “what is given in experience across groups is only the ground of virtuous action, the circumstances of life to which virtuous action is an appropriate response.”¹⁵ Therefore, building from Aristotle’s common experiences, we can also apply the Aristotelian virtues to different cultures and societies. It is true that, “We do not have a bedrock of completely uninterrupted “given” data, but we do have a nuclei of experience around which the construction of different societies proceed.”¹⁶ So long as we view human beings as capable of functioning cognitively and of exercising practical reason, Aristotelian virtue ethics can be applied across the board of differing cultures and societies. This precisely echoes what Aristotle said about human relationships: “One can see also in one’s travels how near and dear a thing every man is to every other.”¹⁷

Next, natural law reached its pinnacle in the thought of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 A.D.) who synthesized Greek philosophy with Christian theology in order to obtain rapprochement between those two. Considering his prodigious works in theology and philosophy, it is not surprising that this brilliant Dominican monk is regarded as one of the greatest philosophers and theologians in the Western tradition. His understanding of the natural law theory as a form of virtue theory became the standard ethical view of medieval Christianity and his influence continues to the present day. Though heavily indebted to his secular and Christian mentors, Aquinas differs from both Aristotle and Augustine in his approach to the virtue theory. First, Thomistic virtue theory is distinguished from Aristotelian virtue theory in that Aquinas synthesizes naturally acquired virtues (i.e. cardinal virtues) with divinely infused virtues (i.e. theological virtues). Second, in contrast to Augustine, what makes Thomistic virtue theory unique is that Aquinas implicitly agrees that even non-believers can have naturally acquired virtues. How does Aquinas deal with this difficulty? He asserts that human beings can acquire moral virtues through human efforts in order to aim at happiness (*eudaimonia*) in ordinary human society. “It is possible by means of human works to acquire moral virtues, in so far as they produce good works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of man.”¹⁸ Because these virtues are mostly useful in human social/political interactions, Aquinas does not hesitate to name them as political virtues. “Since man by his nature is a political animal, these virtues are called political virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the conduct of human affairs.”¹⁹

Although Aquinas seems to follow an Aristotelian vein, he radically distances himself from Aristotle when he introduces infused virtues. In fact, Aquinas argues that Aristotelian virtue theory is seriously flawed because it does not consider the biblical God. Naturally, acquired moral virtues, in order for them to be rightly positioned as true virtues, must be understood in light of infused virtues (faith, hope, and charity), which are given to humans through God’s grace.²⁰ It is true that, for Aquinas, both acquired virtues²¹ and theological virtues aim independently at different ends: the former for human happiness in this world and the latter for the union with God (thus, supernatural happiness). However, Aquinas suggests that one can

acquire moral virtues “truly and perfectly” as long as they are infused by a divinely originated theological virtue of charity.²² This is possible, because charity being “the architectonic virtue” that has God as its object, supports not only faith and hope but other moral virtues as well. “All the moral virtues are infused together with charity. The reason for this is that God operates no less perfectly in works of grace than in works of nature.”²³ In short, in Thomistic virtue theory, charity perfects all virtues.

How then was Aquinas able to develop a Christian version of virtue ethics? The short answer is because Aquinas, taking a cue from Aristotle, was able to find a parallel between the *telos* of Aristotelian virtues and the New Testament’s account of virtues. On this Alasdair MacIntyre explains: “The good for man is of course a supernatural and not only a natural good, but super nature redeems and completes nature. Moreover, the relationship of virtues as means to the end which is human incorporation in the divine kingdom of the age to come is internal and not external, just as it is in Aristotle. It is of course this parallelism which allows Aquinas to synthesize Aristotle and the New Testament.”²⁴

But the question still lingers. What made Aquinas’ position differ from that of Augustine? I believe that it was because, embracing the Aristotelian method of philosophy, Thomas’s theological methodology deviated from that of Augustine. Or put another way, whereas Augustine held on to “the religious *a priori*,” Aquinas clung to *a posteriori* of sense experiences. Augustine upheld total depravity as the effects of sin, thus relying on God’s grace for moral guidance. This was not the case for Aquinas. He still believed that, despite the crippling effect of original sin, there remained in human nature some positive elements (i.e. goodness), not enough to have saving power on its own, but enough to pursue virtue (such as Aristotle’s cardinal virtues) according to its reasonable inclination. By basing his theory on overlapping Aristotelian and biblical perspectives, Aquinas created a subtle, but formidable theory of ethics, especially the natural law moral theory. His optimistic view on human nature, however, does not indicate that he categorically denied the effect of original sin. He did believe in a sort of devastating effect of the original sin, but his notion of original sin was not as devastating as that of Augustine.

The Relevance of Virtue Ethics

MacIntyre, in his monumental work *After Virtue*, rightly criticized the contemporary world for having lost the context for moral discourse. Cleverly playing word games with after virtue,²⁵ MacIntyre delineates how people in an era of the postmodern world live their (moral) lives in an age of “*after virtue*” as autonomous individuals. He insists that what emerged over time in the realm of ethics in the Western World then gave way to the individual (autonomous) emotivism with no context of community to which that individual belongs. This grossly violates the presupposition of moral philosophy: a sociology.²⁶ This sort of ethics without community is a purely arbitrary one because it is based on individual choice and it has been no doubt plagued by Nietzsche and his postmodern successors.

In order to debug postmodern morality, MacIntyre suggests that we should live our lives “*after virtue*,” pursuing the virtues (*arête*, excellence of any kind)²⁷ practiced by premodern communities, but forgotten by postmodern autonomous individuals. Living “*after virtue*,” for MacIntyre, therefore, means to restore the community to which we belong and from which living traditions flow with live narratives. For instance, classical cultures almost always pictured social structures in which the heroes courageously played their roles. How can one think of Odysseus, Hector, Achilles, and hosts of other Homeric heroes without the communities with which they intermingled? MacIntyre holds that “Every individual has a *given role and status* within a well-defined and highly determinate system of roles and statuses.”²⁸ Contra radical individualism, in heroic societies, there is no way one can possess the virtues unless he/she is part of his/her tradition. Virtue is inter-related to other virtues and it operates in the context of social structure. As to how courage and other virtues are intertwined in Homeric society, MacIntyre writes: “To be courageous is to be someone on whom reliance can be placed. Hence courage is an important ingredient in friendship. The bonds of friendship in heroic societies are modeled on those of kinship. Sometimes friendship is formally

vowed, so that by the vow the duties of brothers are mutually incurred. Who my friends and who my enemies are, is as clearly defined as who my kinsmen are. The other ingredient of friendship is fidelity. My friend's courage assures me of his power to aid me and my fidelity is the basic guarantee of its unity. So, in women, who constitute the crucial relationships within the household, fidelity is the key virtue. Andromache and Hector, Penelope and Odysseus are friends (*philos*) as much as are Achilles and Patroclus."

The legacy of the heroic virtues that accentuate the community continues, with slight variation, with Aristotle. For Aristotle, there is no difference between being a good person and at the same time, being a good Athenian citizen. In the Aristotelian scheme, like in the New Testament, humanity plays a key role in determining virtues. Subsequently, the Aristotelian man aims at "the great-souled man" while the New Testament goes after "the saint." They are both person-oriented and both the tradition and the narrative play important roles in shaping one's virtues and values.

However, postmodern individuals are bewildered in a moral vacuum in which no unity of human life and concept of tradition are found. They are hopelessly entrapped in Nietzsche's arbitrary and genealogical morality.²⁹ In this regard, MacIntyre's advice to go *after virtue* is both wise and timely.³⁰ But what is virtue (*arête*)? It is more than its literal meaning of "manly strength (virility from *virtus*)," for MacIntyre, it is certainly not a kind of skill that is applicable (even professionally) in an isolated situation, "for a virtue is not a disposition that makes for success only in some one particular type of situation."³¹ A virtuous person is not the one who does good in one specialized area; instead, MacIntyre asserts that it is "someone who genuinely possess a virtue (i.e. a virtuous person) can be expected to manifest it in very different types of situations, many of them situations where the practice of a virtue cannot be expected to be effective in the way that we expect a professional skill to be."³² Most importantly, virtue has a close relation with tradition that sustains narrative and practice in the context of households or on a greater political level. MacIntyre elaborates: "The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which will not only sustain practices and enables us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain us in the relative kind of quest for the good, by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we encounter, and which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of good. The catalogue of the virtues will therefore include the virtues required to sustain the kind of households and the kind of political communities in which men and women can seek for the good together and the virtues necessary for philosophical enquiry about the character of the good."³³

In summary, virtue ethics focuses on an ethical agent, but the agent does not act in a vacuum. Rather, the agent's actions are played out in two bigger contexts, the social and the historical. It is because, in these contexts, his/her actions are to be recognized intelligibly. Therefore, the importance of historical narrative is paramount; in fact, "narrative history of a certain kind turns out to be the basic and essential genre for the characterization of human actions."³⁴

In this regard, the military milieu is an ideal setting for virtue ethics to flourish. The military inherits a rich history as well as a rich tradition from the past and its members occupy "*given roles and statuses* within a well-defined and highly determinate system of roles and statuses (i.e. Homeric society)." The military also emphasizes its institutional values. For example, the U.S. Army cherishes its seven (moral) values exemplified in the acronym of LDRSHIP (loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage) and it indoctrinates its members in internalizing those values in their character. Because of the fact that the Army often achieves its goal through using the means of (horrific) violence, it needs to be deeply rooted in firm moral ground. For this very reason, the U.S. Army refuses to be a collection of savages; instead, it strives to be a decisively value driven institution that shapes its own identity. Therefore, the Army reminds its members (moral agents) what sort of persons they should become in order to become true warriors. The failure of proper moral training often times anticipates an utter moral fiasco.

In April 2004, the whole world was shocked when the American news media released the graphic photographs of U.S. Army Soldiers caught in the act of torturing and humiliating Iraqi detainees at the U. S.

run Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.³⁵ This scandal was a tremendous setback for the U.S. government because the U.S. has always insisted that its military play the game by the rules (i.e. Geneva Conventions). The subsequent investigation by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights revealed that the situation was even worse. U.S. officials admitted that there were even more serious and wide spread symptoms of mistreatment of prisoners by U. S. personnel who illegally implemented psychologically and physically coercive interrogation methods not only in Iraq, but also in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, thus grossly violating human rights of those detainees held at U.S. military prisons.³⁶

Infamous images from Abu Ghraib were seen by millions of people around the globe and they immediately sparked anti-American protests in the Middle East and other countries, severely damaging America's moral image and her credibility abroad, as well as inadvertently giving an advantageous edge to the insurgents.³⁷ Soon, people began to question the moral culpability of American Soldiers as well as the moral responsibilities of their leaders (both military and political). "What went wrong?" "Did they receive proper ethical training?" "Were these acts preventable?" We must remember that the Soldiers of today's Army reflect the current moral trends of today's society. It is even more plausible when we consider the fact that those Soldiers involved in the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse incident were citizen Soldiers from the reserve units. In other words, they more or less reflect the moral crisis of their civilian counterparts. Mennonite virtue ethicist Joseph J. Kotva cogently argued that contemporary Western society is on the verge of moral bankruptcy and our institutions are failing to inculcate good character.³⁸ Although we admit that the incident at Abu Ghraib involved more than the isolated wrongful actions of lower ranking enlisted Soldiers,³⁹ we certainly sense, in the wake of this infamous incident, an urgency of reforming the way American troops are trained in the sphere of ethics.

Basic trainees entering the military service are, for the most part, first inculcated with rule-based ethics. They are first and foremost trained to obey their superiors and the orders issued by them, any violation of such orders may lead to punishment by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which prescribes all sorts of military regulations pertaining to the members of the United States Armed Forces. However, this rule based ethical training has limitations since it only imposes threats against those who violate those rules. In other words, rule based ethics are interested in how to control actions regardless of the motive of the moral agent. Mere indoctrination in rule-based ethics does not involve the warrior as a whole person.⁴⁰ On the contrary, virtue ethics focuses on the whole person, the moral agent, and they are keenly interested in developing the virtues of that agent.

Cadets entering the United States Military Academy at West Point must memorize and habitually practice the Cadet Honor Code: "A cadet will not lie, cheat, steal, or tolerate those who do." This code primarily focuses on the moral agent and its purpose, which is to cultivate the character of integrity in each cadet. Considering that these cadets will be the leaders of the Army who will defend the United States from her enemies, the importance of the formation of the right character is enormous. The bottom line is that character defines who a warrior is and how he/she acts according to his/her character, especially in the fog of war. Therefore, virtue ethics not only is a viable option for the formation of a warrior's character, but they must be vigorously taught at every level as well.

The Formation of a Warrior's Character

Who are American Soldiers? What sort of warrior should they become? The popular slogan calling them "lean-mean-fighting machines" serves to dehumanize them, totally ignoring their human side. They are flesh-and-blood human beings with feelings, emotions, passions, and concerns for their loved ones as well as for their enemies. Additionally, the missions they have to accomplish during both combat and peacekeeping military operations frequently place them in complex environments that pose a great threat to consistent moral behavior. In other words, they are encouraged to be moral individuals who must act responsibly in making ultimate moral judgments. As previously noted, the Abu Ghraib incident totally belied the supposed

moral-fortitude of the soldiers involved.⁴¹ In fact, it clearly showed that there was a disconnect between the ethics training and other military skill trainings that these Soldiers received. Not surprisingly, everything boils down to the matter of ethics. Despite their superb fighting skills, without a moral force that can back up their behavior, military operations can easily result in a fiasco on a number of different levels. This depicts the degree of urgency needed to reinforce and reform the moral training of our Soldiers.

Because American Soldiers come from all walks of life with diverse ethnic, social, and religious backgrounds,⁴² insisting one distinctive religious tenet in conducting ethics training is considered to be inappropriate.⁴³ In this pluralistic and multifarious environment, a neo-Aristotelian virtue framework⁴⁴ may serve as a most feasible method at every opportunity in inculcating, through proper training and practice, relevant Army values in Soldiers. An Aristotelian virtue oriented moral training requires the support of the community to which its members are intrinsically linked. In this sense, the military community precisely fits into a scheme in which the community and its members (i.e. warriors) promote the same *telos*. Therefore, in adopting virtue theory, a trainer is able to find a common ground from which he/she is then able to play an important role in shaping the moral outlook and character of 21st Century American warriors.

Since we are concerned with the transition from ‘who we are’ to ‘who could we become,’ by looking into the human nature of warriors, our interests are to find what actions, habits, capacities, and inclinations should be encouraged so that excellent warriors are indeed developed.⁴⁵ In other words, in order for us to understand the warrior, we must understand what constitutes an excellent warrior specifically in relationship to characteristics concerned with particular function, purpose, and role in a military context.⁴⁶ Simply put, a warrior is a fighter in the profession of arms for service of his/her country, with the mission of winning the nation’s wars despite all adversities and oddities. Such service contributes to the common good of the citizenry, but it often requires a warrior to face an ultimate sacrifice for a given cause in war.

What, however, is war? According to the eminent Prussian soldier and theorist Car Von Clausewitz, “War is . . . an act of violence to compel our opponents to fulfill our will.”⁴⁷ Clausewitz continues to unpack the role of violence in its relation to will. “Violence, that is to say, physical force (for there is no moral force without the conception of States and Law), is therefore the means; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object.”⁴⁸ Therefore, American warriors are, as Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale said, “in the business of breaking people’s wills and the most important weapon in breaking people’s wills is not the fire power but to hold the moral high ground.”⁴⁹ According to Clausewitz, Stockdale was convinced, that “War was not an activity governed by scientific laws, but a clash of wills, of moral forces.”⁵⁰ To make the same point in another way, Napoleon’s succinct words are much more vivid: “In war, the moral is to the physical as three to one.”⁵¹

In this regard, it goes without saying that warriors, especially their leaders, should be trained to demonstrate a high standard of moral integrity as well as the skill to execute sound moral judgment that is based on the virtues. Split second decisions in combat situations will often decide either life or death for their subordinates. In the training and development of character education for warriors, the best way to conduct this sort of training is to tie the core values of the Army⁵² with a “Warrior Ethos” embedded in the Army’s enduring traditions and narratives. This is because they form distinctive warrior virtues that challenge warriors to become certain kinds of people with certain characteristics and attitudes for the Army they serve. Hence, the *telos* of warriors and virtues they are to pursue are communal in nature. Consequently, an interest in the individual warrior’s pursuit of both human and soldierly excellence is compatible with the common good of the larger community (the Army) he/she serves.

Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership, stresses the time-honored concept of “Be, Know, Do” as its heart beating principles of an excellent leader/warrior.⁵³ The Aristotelian insight for virtue theory is inherently embedded in this manual as “Be” stresses values and attributes, “Know” skills or prudence, and “Do” leadership/warrior actions. Most importantly, this leadership manual accentuates the character of the warrior.

“Character describes a person’s inner strength, the Be of “Be, Know, Do.” Your character helps you know what is right; more than that, it links that knowledge to action. Character gives you the courage to do what is right regardless of the circumstances or the consequences.”⁵⁴

The final payoff for “Be, Know, Do” is to promote both an individual and a collective excellence of the warrior as an individual and the Army as an organization. However, the point of departure for character development is always how to achieve a *moral excellence* that is shaped by the virtues. As Stephen Ambrose explained, “At the pivotal point in the war, it was always the character of the individuals that made the difference.”⁵⁵ Character – who you are – contributes significantly to how you act. Character helps you know what’s right and do what’s right, all the time and at whatever the cost.”⁵⁶

A virtue oriented moral training, therefore, enables each warrior to retain and to reshape his/her character to uphold the Army’s core values in any circumstance, particularly in ambiguous situations like Abu Ghraib, if those (moral) values were to be internalized as part of his/her identity through proper training and constant practice. Truly, the notions of acts and character are closely intertwined in that *Agere Sequitur Esse* (Action follows being). Consequently, it follows that, to be a competent warrior, being a warrior of character is more important than being a warrior of mere military skill.⁵⁷

In order to understand how American Soldiers should ideally operate in war or other hostile scenarios, we need to know what set of principles they should live with. This is called the “Warrior Ethos,” and it specifies the guiding principles with which each Soldier must abide in any given circumstance. Then U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Peter J. Schoomaker, stressed the importance of living “the Warrior Ethos: We are, have been and will remain a values-based institution. Our values will not change, and they are non-negotiable. Our Soldiers are warriors of character. They exemplify these values every day and are the epitome of our American spirit. They are the heart of the Army.”⁵⁸ What Schoomaker stressed is striking. He understands the warrior as a person of character who should make a right choice even in a most complex arena, thus emphasizing moral virtues. In this sense, warriors should think about the virtues and vices of everyday life because, as Erasmus of Rotterdam warns in his famous *Enchiridion Militis Christiani*, one vice always brings in another: “For always after this wisdom (which is beastly) followeth as a waiting servant or hand maid-mischievous presumption, after presumption followeth blindness of mind, after blindness of mind followeth fervent rage and tyranny of accetions and appetities, after tyranny of affectios followeth the whole heap of all vices.”⁵⁹

So, what is the role of the Warrior Ethos? The Warrior Ethos promotes the ethical behavior of Soldiers by training them to follow the Army Values. Soldiers put the mission first, refuse to accept defeat, never quit, and never leave behind a fellow American.⁶⁰ This requires that Soldiers put tremendous faith in themselves as well as their comrades. The most fundamental part of a warrior’s character, therefore, can be forged through utilizing the Warrior Ethos, which is linked with the Army Values. Character is “who you are” that will shape “what you should do” and it gives a solid footing on which you can stand, even in the most complex of arenas.

A warrior is not a robot, but a person who inculcates his/her own character trait that stems from his/her own humanity. In fact, a warrior was a civilian before he/she became a warrior. Turning a civilian into a warrior requires the training of a mindset⁶¹ that should be aligned to both the Warrior Ethos and the Army Values. The inculcation of the warrior belief system, as we noted earlier, is the careful balance between military task proficiency based on interpersonal, conceptual, technical, and tactical skills and moral proficiency rooted in the Army’s core values. In the Warrior Ethos, we immediately notice virtues like selfless service, personal courage, and loyalty to comrades, integrity, honor, and dedication to duty, etc. That is not to say that acquiring the virtues is an easy task; on the contrary, it requires tremendous efforts from a warrior over the course of his/her life. But its end has many benefits as the *Enchiridion* says, “The way of virtue is hard at the beginning, but after thou hast crept up to the top there remaineth for thee very sure quietness.”⁶² In other words, the *Enchiridion* inculcates “a certain craft of virtuous living and a

discipline”⁶³ in the life of a Christian knight in order that “ignorance must be remedied, the flesh must be tamed, and the weakness must be comforted.”⁶⁴ The end for this is again “human excellence and flourishing.”

A warrior who constantly engages in an inner discipline of improving character displays virtuous behavior. For example, a warrior who puts the mission first by putting his/her life on the line for a bigger cause, has developed certain virtues such as dedication to duty, personal courage, and selfless service. A warrior who puts his/her life on the line for the sake of comrades unintentionally finds himself/herself involved in spectacular moral acts stemming not from the deontological sense, but from the excellence of their character for caring for loyalty to fellow comrades⁶⁵ and even displaying supererogatory virtues like magnanimity. A warrior who stops the maltreatment of prisoners-of-war (POWs) knows when justice and/or respect for humanity is violated and thus displays virtues like personal courage, integrity, or duty to protect that basic human dignity. In this case, personal courage involves not only the physical, but moral fortitude as well. In this sense, consistent moral courage among the Soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison could have prevented such a scandalous incident.⁶⁶

Sergeant Joseph Darby, a 24-year-old member of the 372nd Military Police Company serving at Abu Ghraib military prison in Iraq, was known to have agonized for some time over the grossly unprofessional and improper conduct of his colleagues at Abu Ghraib, specifically their mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners. He was therefore said to have gone through a (moral) psychological crisis and suffered immense emotional distress while trying to determine what course of action he had to take in this plight. As a prison guard, he was both related to and had an obligation to the detainees he had never known before, as well as to his colleagues with whom he was closely associated as fellow Soldiers. On this complex issue involving identity and relations, Jesuit scholar James Keenan adroitly elaborates: “Our identity is relational in three ways: generally, specifically, and uniquely. Each of these relational ways of being demands a cardinal virtue: as relational beings in general, we are called to justice; as relational beings specifically, we are called to fidelity; and as relationally beings uniquely, we are called to self-care.”⁶⁷

Utilizing the virtue of prudence, Keenan urges others to consider these three cardinal virtues simultaneously in order to delineate what “constitutes the just, faithful, and self-caring way of life. However, quoting Stanley Hauerwas, Keenan wisely warns that “we have the task of sorting out “*conflicting loyalties*” through our lives.”⁶⁸

Darby was obviously caught in a dilemma between respect for human dignity⁶⁹ and loyalty (or fidelity) to his colleagues as well as taking care of his own needs; consequently, he was thrown into a situation where questions of justice and courage were quagmired in the question of loyalty.

In the Army, the thickening virtue among its seven values is “loyalty.” Without loyalty, the hierarchy of the Army organization cannot function properly. But this loyalty does not mean blind loyalty, for that does not give justice to it.

Air Force Colonel Michael O. Wheeler comments on the core of loyalty: “Whenever we speak of loyalty, we are speaking of a two-object context: a context in which one gives loyalty and another receives loyalty. Now, given this rather simple conceptual picture, what we might focus our attention on is neither the giving nor the receiving of loyalty, but instead of the *inspiring* of loyalty.”⁷⁰

And this “inspiring of loyalty,” according to Wheeler comes from “trust.” As warriors interact both vertically and horizontally with their superiors and subordinates as well as their peers, the inspiring fact of loyalty must accompany “the theme of trust” that is based on Army values. As a moral individual, the warrior cannot comply mechanically with compelled (or blind) loyalty.⁷¹

After days of agony, Darby blew the whistle, breaking the silence against his own comrades, and he released the horrific pictures of U.S. Soldiers mistreating the prisoners. He later said that “the treatment of prisoners violated everything I personally believed in and all I’d been taught about the rules of war . . . I was concerned that the abuse might start again.”⁷² What was at stake in this case was Darby himself, a moral

agent who acts in accordance with his own character traits. Exercising the discernment of weighing different and conflicting values, in my judgement, this young Soldier acted in accordance with his own character traits in choosing “what the right thing is”⁷³ because he was foremost trained to be a warrior, a man of character. True, the infamous prison scandal at Abu Ghraib could have been hidden from the public arena if Darby had cowardly kept the silence. Then, the cancer of vices could have silently spread like a disease through the body of the Army. Darby’s courageous act stemmed from his own character traits. Despite sensational responses from around the globe, especially from angry Arabs, what ensued was that the U.S. military was forced to look into the possibly of prevalent internal problems in regard to the mistreatment of prisoners and to correct its own mistakes.

The Warrior Ethos, therefore, is the way of a warrior’s life, and is not an option. The development of the Warrior Ethos is an on-going process throughout the career of a warrior; it needs to be reinforced again and again throughout the duration of his career, regardless of his/her rank. This is because character development based on the virtues requires the process of maturation over time. Therefore, it must be inculcated at every turn, permeating every aspect of his/her life, not only in formal military education, but also in personal professional development, in units of assignment, and in informal gatherings of warriors. When properly trained and habitually practiced through the spirit of the Warrior Ethos, a warrior will witness constant movement, growth, and progress toward excellence. However, his/her goal is neither perfection nor attainment of the highest rank; but rather, that of a person of honor at whatever level he/she reaches so that he/she “builds a climate that encourages prudent risk taking and creativity; exercises command that tolerates honest mistakes; promotes learning, and develops leaders who know how to help individual Soldiers become the best they can be.”⁷⁴ Again, in applying the virtue theory to a military context, “who a warrior is (being)” is inherently interlinked to “who a warrior is called to be (doing).” This is a crucial concept because a warrior must display his/her Warrior Ethos at anytime and in any circumstances whether during on duty or off.

Finally, the Warrior Ethos has a distinctive communal nature because warriors ought to serve as models or exemplars for one another. A warrior, therefore, must be reminded that, even though the Army is not a perfect institution, he/she is part of an enduring tradition of excellence and valor.⁷⁵ A lone ranger cannot survive in a military milieu, especially not in combat situations. One warrior’s survival depends on another’s vigilance. Loyalty to his/her comrades is only one example of a communal moral vision. In this sense, what Joseph Kotva calls “moral interdependence” is distinct among warriors in a military context. The notorious incident at Abu Ghraib is again more than the isolated actions of bad apples. Unfortunately, it pictured the whole Army and the nation as bad apples in the eyes of the world. The revelation of the prisoner abuse case from Abu Ghraib was, as Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) characterized it, “the single most significant blow to U.S. prestige in the Arab world over the past decade.”⁷⁶ The Warrior Ethos, therefore, encompasses not only individual warriors but the whole Army (community) as well. It is because the Warrior Ethos portrays what sort of warrior a Soldier is called to be and what kinds of actions a warrior must take. In other words, his/her inner qualities, dispositions, and attitudes that are rooted in his/her being (or character) will eventually come forth through certain kinds of actions. This proper cultivation of “being” and “doing” of each warrior will ultimately bring out the excellence of the institution of the Army as a whole, beyond the isolated excellence of individual warriors.

I have sketched rather briefly virtue ethics from an Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective and tested its applicability in the military milieu. My objective was to highlight two distinctive characteristics: its accentuation on ethical agents as a whole person and its usefulness as a moral antidote to failing moralities in the postmodern world in general and in the United States military in particular. I pointed out that its relevance for our postmodern world is indeed enormous and we demonstrated that it can serve as a viable option for ethics training in the military, which is imperative to the character development of warriors. It inspires a warrior to incorporate Army values as his/her moral ideal so that he/she may become certain kind

of individual with certain kind of enduring character traits. It has proven to be the most feasible option that can accommodate a variety of religious, social, and racial backgrounds of individual warriors. By employing practical wisdom and prudence, warriors can assimilate the required Army values by practicing the Warrior Ethos in order to reshape their own character. This kind of ethics training can certainly not only prevent the plight of military operations from falling into the abyss of moral chaos, but also promote the excellence of moral character in individual warriors as well as the excellence of the Army as “a value-based institution.”

From this observation, I conclude that virtue ethics can play a vital role in the current ethical landscape as we perceive a notion of inadequacy of traditional methods in instilling ethics as they focus more on acts rather than the inner state of the ethical agent.

Endnotes

¹ Coming from Presbyterian and Reformed background, which holds a high view of Scripture (*Sola Scriptura*), I dispute with those who believe that natural law is conducive to its own normativity. I hold a view that natural law is subservient to the authority of Scripture. At the same time, I also disagree with those who reject the natural law theory all together (i.e. Karl Barth). Scripture certainly endorses the natural law through God’s common grace. My own view on the close appraisal of natural law from a biblical perspective is beyond the scope of this paper.

² See an article by Justin Oakley, *Varieties of Virtue Ethics*. Oakley says that “the first sign of this revival appeared in 1958, when Elizabeth Anscombe called for the restoration of Aristotelian notions of goodness, character, and virtue as central concerns of moral philosophy. While initial reactions to Anscombe’s call were modest, interest in the virtues gathered momentum during the 1980s, largely due to the work of philosophers such as Philippa Foot, Bernard Williams, and Alasdair MacIntyre.” p.128.

³ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1094a 1-3

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1094a 24-27

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1107a 1-3

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1104b 14-16

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1103a 14-18

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1103a 18-21

⁹ See *Ibid.*, 1103a 32-1103b 7

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1105b 6-10, emphasis mine

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1144a 6-9

¹² *Ibid.*, 1144b 26-29

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1095b 5-7

¹⁴ Nussbaum, Martha, *Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach*, *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, XIII (1988), p.37.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.40.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.49.

¹⁷ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1155a21-22

¹⁸ *Summa Theologiae*, Ia, IIae, Question 65, Article 2

¹⁹ *Summa Theologiae*, Ia, IIae, Question 61, Article 5

²⁰ *Summa Theologiae*, Ia, IIae, Question 62, Article 1

²¹ Keenan’s insight is helpful here. Keenan says that “the four cardinal virtues—prudence, justice,

temperance, and fortitude-perfect four corresponding powers: the practical reason, the will, the concupiscible, and the irascible.” He also further comments that “these virtues inhere in a particular hierarchy. Temperance and fortitude are predominantly at the service of justice. Prudence determines the right choice of means for each of the virtues, but it especially looks to recommend the just action since justice governs all exterior principles. In a manner of speaking, the anthropological identity of the virtuous person is simply the just one.” *Virtual Ethics and Sexual Ethics*, Keenan, James, p.5.

²² *Summa Theologiae*, Ia, IIae, Question 65, Article 2

²³ *Summa Theologiae*, Ia, IIae, Question 65, Article 3

²⁴ MacIntyre, Alasdair, *After Virtue*, (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1984), p.184.

²⁵ I own this analysis to Jesuit scholar James Keenan.

²⁶ MacIntyre, Alasdair, *After Virtue*, p.23.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.122.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ For detailed information about Nietzsche’s idea of morality, see Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Birth of Tragedy & The Genealogy of Morals*, (New York: Anchor Books, 1956)

³⁰ This can create a point of contact or a meeting place between believers and non-believers. Christians can use this occasion for apologetic or evangelistic opportunity, accentuating that morality presupposes the absolute personality (God) and the community created by him (the human world, or the church).

³¹ MacIntyre, Alasdair, *After Virtue*, p.205.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*, p.219.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.208.

³⁵ CBS broadcasted this through 60 minutes on 28 April. An article by Seymour M. Hersch appeared online April 30 and was published in *New Yorker Magazine* on May 10.

³⁶ Latimes.com, *Report: U.S. is Abusing Captives* written by Maggie Farley on February 13, 2006 This article can be found at <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-gitmo13feb13,0,3215042.story?coll=la-home-headlines>

³⁷ Tony Karon in his article titled “*How the Prison Scandal Sabotages the U.S. in Iraq*,” May 04, 2004 appeared in Time Online Edition stroke this point by quoting Anthony Cordesman: “Anthony Cordesman, the widely respected defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies was equally forthright: “Those Americans who mistreated the prisoners may not have realized it, but they acted in the direct interests of al-Qaeda, the insurgents, and the enemies of the U.S.,” he said. The reason is that they came at a point when U.S. standing in the Arab world was already at an all-time low. Says Cordesman, “These negative images validate all other negative images and interact with them.” In other words, they function as a multiplier by providing photographic “proof” of the demonic picture of the U.S. painted by anti-American propagandists.” Refer to <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,632967,00.html>

³⁸ Kotva, Joseph, J., (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1996), p.6. For similar analysis of the sickness of Western civilization, see Kreeft, Peter, *Back to Virtue*, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), pp.19-37

³⁹ There are those who blame the leadership and moral culpability of high-level government officers in the Department of Defense and the State Department.

⁴⁰ David L. Norton’s criticism on rule based ethics is insightful at this point: “... I have termed “rule” ethics, is notable for its relative disregard of the problems pertaining to the development of moral character. This is an important respect in which modern morality is “minimalist” in comparison to classical morality – it makes minimal demands upon the intelligence and developed moral character of moral agents, requiring little or noting of them in the way of wisdom, courage, or integrity.” Elsewhere, he also says that “modern ethics

either disregards, or treats inadequately, “good” or “right” acts that make large demands upon developed moral character in individuals. Norton, David, “*Moral Minimalism and the Development of Moral Character*,” *Midwest Studies*, p.183 & p. 189.

⁴¹ It is ironical that society puts them into (morally) most devastating/ambiguous situations, yet expects them to behave morally, if not as moral superstars.

⁴² In general, the Army religious pie discloses 50 percent Protestant, 25 percent Roman Catholic, 20 percent No preference, and 5 percent other religions like Jews, Moslems, Buddhists, etc. Though we strongly advocate biblical virtue ethics, we settle with Aristotelian theory in order not to violate the soldier’s constitutional right of exercising religious freedom.

⁴³ In a setting where Christian soldiers gather for a common purpose, if non Christian soldiers are present, Christian chaplains must not lose the opportunity of inculcating them with solid biblical ethical teachings. It’s because virtue theory without the concept of God’s grace may have a tendency of developing “works righteousness” that may lead to either self-pride or despair, depending how one progresses or regresses in his/her moral growth.

⁴⁴ One can certainly modify this to a Christian virtue frame so that it can be more feasible to his training purpose as long as it does not display distinctly one religious overtone. A key word is a common ground on which all soldiers can stand, that can serve as an evangelistic and apologetic tool for Christian soldiers.

⁴⁵ See Kotva, Joseph, *op. cit.*, p.17.

⁴⁶ For helpful insight, see *Ibid.*, p.18.

⁴⁷ Clausewitz, Car Von, *On War*, (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), p.101.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Stockdale, James, B., “*Stockdale on Stoicism I: The Stoic Warrior’s Triad*” A lecture to the student body of The Marine Amphibious Warfare School, Quantico, Virginia, Tuesday, 18 April 1995. (Annapolis: The Center for the Study of Professional Military Ethics, 1998), p.1

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p.2

⁵² They are again loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honesty, integrity, and personal courage

⁵³ Every warrior is in a sense a leader.

⁵⁴ Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 31 1999, 1-22

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ FM 22-100, 2-3

⁵⁷ We are not downgrading military skills. They are vital, but without character, a person who possesses superb military skills cannot be called a warrior in a true sense. A warrior is a man of character with superb military skills.

⁵⁸ TRADOC News Service, February 9, 2004

⁵⁹ Erasmus of Rotterdam, *The Manual of a Christian Knight* (1501): The Online Library of Liberty, p.59.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* More precisely, warrior ethos is as follows: “I will always place the mission first. I will never accept defeat. I will never quit. I will never leave a fallen comrade.”

⁶¹ Peter Kreeft takes this point seriously, yet quite simply. He quotes the poet Samuel Smiles: “Sow a thought, reap an act. Sow an act, reap a habit. Sow a habit, reap a character. Sow a character, reap a destiny.” Kreeft, Peter, *op. cit.*, p.169.

⁶² Erasmus of Rotterdam, *op. cit.*, p.71

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p.85.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p.87.

⁶⁵ This could be called Aristotelian concept of noble friendship. “But it is also true to say of the man of good

character that he performs many actions for the sake of his friends and his country, and if necessary even dies for them.” Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1169a 18-20

⁶⁶ Another notorious incident that stemmed from moral failure was the My Lai incident during the Vietnam War. On March 16, 1968, more than 300 Vietnamese civilians (many of them women and children) were massacred by U.S. soldiers, arousing national controversy and disillusionment with an already unpopular war.

⁶⁷ Harrington, Daniel, J., and Keenan, James, F., op., cit, p.123.

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 123-125.

⁶⁹ James Keenan makes an insightful comment on our relationship to the members of the human race: “Our relationship is generally directed by an ordered appreciation for the common good in which we treat all people equally and we are to treat every human being, regardless of any other way of relating to those human beings (that is, as friends or enemies), with a sense of fairness and impartiality, simply because they are human beings” op., cit, pp. 123-124.

⁷⁰ Watkin, Malham, M., *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p.174.

⁷¹ Retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, former chief of U.S. Central Command made an insightful comment during his appearance in April 2, 1996 edition of NBC’s “Meet the Press.”: “You know, integrity and getting on with the mission and doing it right is more important than loyalty. Both are great traits, but integrity, honesty and performance and competence have to outweigh, in this business (i.e. military), loyalty.” Excerpts from Army Times, 17 April, 1996

⁷² BBC Internet News, 6 August 2004, *Whistleblower feared more abuse*. It can be seen at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3542628.stm>

⁷³ How Sergeant arrived at “what he thought was right,” in Aristotelian term, was the result of weighing the mean between two extremes (excess or deficiency) from practical intelligence. He must have felt strong fear for his ambiguous position, anger toward his comrades, pity toward the abused detainees, and a host of other emotions and passions only known to him. In Aristotelian virtue ethics frame, virtues are found between two vices and they are closely related to our feelings, emotions, passions, and to the acts we perform. In the scale of excess, deficiency, and intermediate (or mean), Aristotle contends that virtue is found in the mean. For example, in NE 1106b 16-23, Aristotle says: “I mean moral virtue; for it is that is concerned with passions and actions, and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right object, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue.” However, practical intelligence determines how to weigh all these factors and individual circumstances in order to deliver the right actions.

⁷⁴ FM 22-100, 1-82, A main character who appears in Anton Myrer’s best selling novel, *Once an Eagle*, Sam Damon, truly captures this kind of moral leadership rooted in the ethics of virtue. Once again, in Aristotelian term, this leadership can be called “human flourishing.”

⁷⁵ FM 22-100, 1-80, It must be noted that the Army has countless narratives of moral examples from the Revolutionary War to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

⁷⁶ Quoted in Time Online Edition, Article by Karon, Tony, “*How the Prison Scandal Sabotages the U.S. in Iraq*,” May 04, 2004 It can be read at <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,632967,00.html>

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The Duty of the Selective Conscientious Objector in a Values Based Army

By Chaplain (MAJ) Tim Rietkerk

So, you see, my religion and my experience...told me not to go to war, and the memory of my ancestors...told me to get my gun and go fight. I didn't know what to do. I'm telling you there was a war going on inside me and I didn't know which side to lean to. I was a heap bothered. It is a most awful thing when the wishes of your God and your country...get mixed up and go against each other. One moment I would make up my mind to follow God, and the next I would hesitate and almost make up my mind to follow Uncle Sam. Then, I wouldn't know which to follow or what to do. I wanted to follow both but I couldn't. They were opposite. I wanted to be a good Christian and a good American too.¹

In articulating a troubled conscience, (“I was a heap bothered.”) Private Alvin C. York presented to his battalion commander, Major George E. Buxton, a leadership challenge -- what Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-75, Accommodating Religious Practices, describes when “conflicts can arise between mission accomplishment and a Soldier’s religious practices.”²

York, of Fentress County, Tennessee, belonged to the Church of Christ in Christian Union which advocated pacifism. On his enrollment for the draft, he wrote on the bottom of the card in answer to the question, “Do you claim exemption from draft?” York wrote, “Yes, don’t want to fight.”³ The draftboard went ahead and selected York for the Army, which was undergoing rapid expansion for deployment to Europe. York reported to Company G, 328th Infantry, 82nd Division, still not convinced that taking another man’s life is what God wanted him to do.

Field Manual 6-22, Army Leadership, describes how Buxton handled the troubled conscience of York.

York, a devout Christian, told his commander, Captain E. C. B. Danforth, that he would bear arms against the enemy — but did not believe in killing. Recognizing York as a good Soldier and potential leader but unable to sway him from his convictions, Danforth consulted Buxton, on how to handle the situation. The battalion commander, a religious man with excellent knowledge of the Bible, had Danforth bring York to him. The major and York talked at length about the Scriptures, God’s teachings, about right and wrong, and just wars. Then Buxton sent York home on leave to ponder and pray over the dilemma. The battalion commander had promised to release York from the Army if he decided that he could not serve his country without sacrificing his integrity.

After two weeks of reflection and soul-searching, York returned to his unit. He had reconciled his personal values with those of the Army.⁴

In giving York time to reflect on his decision with the promise to support his choice, Buxton created an ethical climate that allowed room for a troubled conscience. His knowledge of Scripture and Just War helped provide York with further guidance in how to deal with a “heap bothered” conscience. On his leave, “York’s honesty forced him to analyze the major’s ideas even though his mother, Pastor Pile, and the congregation all urged him to accept Buxton’s offer. Finally, he fled again to the mountains where he spent all of one day, that night, and part of the next day praying for divine guidance.”⁵ York came down the mountain

convinced that God wanted him to fight. The vignette goes on to describe York's feats in France for which he received the Medal of Honor and offered this conclusion of how the leadership worked with then Corporal York: "From a simply disciplinary perspective, Danforth and Buxton could easily have ordered York to do his duty under threat of courts martial, or they might even have assigned him a duty away from the fighting. Instead, these two leaders appropriately addressed the Soldier's ethical concerns. Buxton, in particular, established the appropriate ethical climate when he showed that he, too, had wrestled with the very questions that troubled York. The climate the leaders created demonstrated that every person's beliefs were important and would be considered. Buxton established that a Soldier's duties could be consistent with the ethical framework established by his spiritual beliefs.

In offering this conclusion of the role of leadership in building a strong ethical climate, there are those whose spiritual beliefs have historically provided an ethical framework to support a Soldier's duties to his or her country but whose beliefs/religious practices are not currently recognized by the Department of Defense, the selective conscientious objector.

Army Regulation 600-43 describes the administrative process of when a Soldier feels he or she can no longer carry out their duties because of conflict with a moral or spiritual belief that all use of force is wrong and that he or she can no longer serve due to conscience. Selective conscientious objection, the objection against a given war, however, is not included. Much of the regulations and procedures concerning the application for conscientious objection came during the time of conscription by draft, as in the case of Private York. Under current Department of Defense policy, those who would object to a particular war are not recognized.

The Catholic Church has long advocated the recognition of selective conscientious objection. The Catholic Peace Fellowship quotes James Turner Johnson in his assessment of a subject's duty toward service in an unjust war as framed by Suarez and Vitoria: "When the prince's cause is manifestly unjust, subjects may not serve in his war. . . Suarez even pushes the issue back one step: when arguments have been advanced that raise some doubt in the consciences of the subjects, they must inquire into their prince's cause. If they discover that the cause is unjust, they may not serve. . . Suarez and Vitoria offer a clear justification for individual conscientious objection to particular wars. . . It is emphatically the subject's responsibility to dispel any doubt. . . and if doing so results in certainty on his part that the war is unjust, he must in conscience refuse."⁶

In addition to the Catholic Church, several protestant denominations have also requested recognition of selective conscientious objection. A small reformed denomination influenced by John Calvin, the Christian Reformed Church of North America,⁷ sent the following correspondence to President George W. Bush and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates in July 2007 and asked that the DoD "provide a process and establish procedures wherein those who object to selective conflicts on the basis of just-war criteria are honorably discharged."⁸ The letter also conveyed concern about the 2002 National Security Strategy as not reflecting Just War Theory principles.

Preventive military actions, actions initiated by a government against an adversary who may pose a serious threat at some future date, is inconsistent with the moral standards expressed in the just-war criteria of just cause and last resort.

Preemptive military actions, actions initiated by a government against an adversary who will pose a serious threat at some future date, need to be justified under the moral standards expressed in the just-war criterion of the right to resort to force.⁹

Though this correspondence comes during the time of a controversial war, the CRC has been firmly in line with the Just War theory tradition and supports the duty of government to protect its citizens and calls upon its church members to obey the government and serve in its armed forces. In this way the CRC supports the earlier conclusion that "Soldier's duties could be consistent with the ethical framework established by his

spiritual beliefs.”¹⁰

In 1936, the 2nd Englewood CRC of Chicago sent an overture to the deliberative body of the Christian Reformed Church, the Synod, requesting guidance concerning the participation of Christians in war. The 1939 Synod met in Grand Rapids, Michigan and issued a statement addressing the participation of Christians in war.

The Act of Synod articulated first the Christian duty to “promote mutual understanding and peace wherever possible between individuals as well as groups and nations for both citizens and governments.” The Synod warned against the evils of present-day pacifism as the “conviction and attitude of those who condemn every war and hence refuse to bear arms under any conditions. This type of pacifism is incompatible with Christian duty and is becoming alarmingly prevalent in our country.”¹¹

In defining duty for the Christian, the Act states: The solemn duty which the Christian has to exert himself to the utmost in behalf of peace and the peaceful settlement of conflicts and disputes, should at no time be used to cancel his equally solemn duty to defend his country against the attack of the aggressor, to protect the weak in the international family from the wanton assault of the strong, and in general to promote justice and fair dealings between the nations of the world. However, such nations and individuals may and should stand committed to the prevention and suppression of war whenever and wherever possible, in a sinful world sooner or later situations will arise in which one nation resorts to aggression and attack upon another. And, when in such a situation honest efforts to come to a just and peaceful adjustment of differences with the aggressor have failed, the moral right — if not duty — of the assaulted nation to defend itself against the aggressor is beyond dispute.¹²

Therefore, pacifism “is fundamentally to be condemned because it is in irreconcilable conflict with the teaching of Scripture and of our Creed or the duty of the government in the matter of war and the corresponding duty of the Christian citizen.”¹³

Synod further notes that Soldiers refusing “to bear arms at the call of his government not only is disloyal to the country, but in so doing fails to discharge his solemn God-given duty to obey his government and to defend his country. The Church should bear witness against this pacifism, point out its unscriptural character, and warn its members against its subtle, religiously garbed propaganda.”¹⁴ Synod warns against conscientious objectors in that “he who denies the right and the duty of the government to wage war on just occasions is not in harmony but in conflict with the Word of God. His conscience is seriously in error.”¹⁵

If one struggles with determining whether or not the occasion is just in waging war, the Act acknowledges this ethical struggle: “With the frequent complexity of the causes of modern wars and the difficulty of the average citizen to be adequately informed on this complexity of causes at the time the war breaks out,”¹⁶ but warns that “uncertainty as to the justice of the given war can be no justifiable ground for refusing obedience to his government.”¹⁷

In an uncertain situation “the prior duty of each citizen to obey the government must have the right of way. This type of conscientious objector does not face the moral alternative: to fight or to do nothing; but, to fight or to disobey his government.”¹⁸

Therefore, in times of uncertainty, the obligation of the service member is to obey the government because “a state in which the citizen only obeys the government when it pleases him is no state and that government is no government. This is true in days of peace, and the principle gains intensified force in days of war, when the national safety is at stake.”¹⁹

Is this an unconditional obedience or are there limits to the obligation of obeying the government? Synod answers this question: Both Scripture and our Confession place a restriction upon our duty to obey the government. Peter at one time refused to obey the civil authorities and appealed to a higher loyalty, to God in doing so. And our Creed restricts the duty of the citizen to the State to “all things which are not repugnant to the Word of God.” From this it is clear that the Church must not only recognize the right of Christians but

even their duty *under certain definite circumstances* to refuse obedience to the civil magistrate.”²⁰

The only time a service member can refuse obedience “is he who, recognizing his duty to obey his government and to defend his country in response to its call to arms, has intelligent and adequate grounds to be convinced that the given war to which he is summoned is an unjust war. When he is absolutely certain in the light of the principles of the Word of God that his country is fighting for a wrong cause, he cannot morally justify his participation in the given war.²¹ The report concluded by urging prayer, careful reflection of the revealed word, and “to obey all lawfully constituted authorities for God’s sake; and, if a serious conflict of duty should occur, to obey God rather than men.”²²

Though the 1939 Act of Synod did not detail the “intelligent and adequate grounds” necessary to make the determination of participation or refusal in a given war, the Synod of 1977 presented the Guidelines for Justifiable Warfare. The guidelines stated that at any time when one’s nation “has or is about to become involved in war or in any military action against another nation, Christians, as morally responsible citizens of the nation and of God’s kingdom, should evaluate their nation’s involvement by diligently seeking the answers to the following, drawing on the counsel of fellow-members with special qualifications as well as pastors and the assemblies of the church.”²³

The guidelines included the following questions to use in the evaluation:

- a. Is our nation the unjust aggressor?
- b. Is our nation intentionally involved for economic advantage?
- c. Is our nation intentionally involved for imperialistic ends, such as the acquisition of land, natural resources, or political power in international relations?
- d. Has our nation in good faith observed all relevant treaties and other international agreements?
- e. Has our nation exhausted all peaceful means to resolve the matters in dispute?
- f. Is the evil or aggression represented by the opposing force of such overwhelming magnitude and gravity as to warrant the horrors and brutality of military opposition to it?
- g. Has the decision to engage in war been taken legally by a legitimate government?
- h. Are the means of warfare employed or likely to be employed by our nation in fair proportion to the evil or aggression of the opposing forces? Is our nation resolved to employ minimum necessary force?
- i. In the course of the war has our nation been proposing and encouraging negotiations for peace or has it spurned such moves by the opposing forces or by neutral or international organizations?²⁴

The Synod also advised: The members of the church, out of reverence for the righteousness and justice of God, should be willing always to test the policies and practices of all governments by the teachings of Holy Scripture, and never assume a blind and proud nationalistic spirit that regards one’s own nation as always above criticism. Moreover, they should consider it their duty under God to give discreet expression to their conscientious views in whatever manner is open to them.

If one can articulate intelligent and adequate grounds to conclude that a given war is unjust, the Christian should refuse to participate. This refusal “must be within the framework of law. He must expose himself to the due process and even the penalty of the state whose laws he has knowingly, publicly, and conscientiously broken. He should not “go underground” or flee the country except under conditions of extraordinary oppression or intolerably brutal tyranny.”²⁵

The 1977 report also acknowledges the difficulty of coming to an unequivocal decision on the justness of a given war. “The complexity of international politics and economics and the secrecy and deception ordinarily employed in international relations make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the pertinent facts that must be known in order to judge the morality of participation in any given war.”

In summary, the CRC calls upon its members to obey the government unless there are adequate and intelligent grounds, specifically, the Just War Theory principles, which guide in determining the justness of a given war. If the given war because of its complexity cannot be clearly identified as just or unjust, the

Christian must continue to serve. If, however, the given war is unjust, one's duty is to obey God rather than man and submit oneself to the process of law. In calling for a change in the current DoD policy, the CRC calls upon the government to recognize selective conscientious objection and change the current process of law.

Under the current process, anyone who tries to claim selective conscientious objection instead of conscientious objection will experience the court martial process. On Feb. 5, 2007, the court martial proceedings began for First Lieutenant Ehren Watada of Fort Lewis, Washington. His lawyers argued that his refusal to deploy to Iraq stemmed from a war which is illegal under international law. Therefore, the order to deploy to Iraq is an illegal order and he is morally responsible to disobey illegal orders.²⁶

Without examining the specific merits of his argument due to brevity, Watada, as part of his training, was taught that a leader is expected to disobey illegal orders. "There is a risk when a leader disobeys what may be an illegal order, and it may be the most difficult decision that Soldier ever makes. Nonetheless, that is what competent, confident, and ethical leaders should do."²⁷ To guide in this refusal of an order, the Soldier is asked to "make the best judgment possible based on Army Values, personal experience, critical thinking, and previous study and reflection."²⁸

As part of the critical thinking component to assist in this decision making process, Just War Theory and the Law of Land Warfare is taught at all levels of the Officer Education System. Some, like Michael Walzer, have argued that Soldiers are morally responsible for their conduct and actions but not for the decision to go to war. However, Christians in the Just War Theory tradition cannot accept this reasoning. Just War Theory guides in their decision to participate in the given war and the principles provide an ethical framework which the Army espouses. The clear expectation in FM 6-22 is for leaders "to make value-based, ethical choices for the good of the Army and the Nation."²⁹

Captain Danforth is heralded for establishing "that a Soldier's duties could be consistent with the ethical framework established by his spiritual beliefs." He guided the then Private York through his spiritual and moral dilemma in such a way that York resolved his "heap bothered conscience." When York was later given an opportunity to sign paperwork to declare himself as a conscientious objector, he refused to do so because he believed his duty was to serve his nation in war. In describing York as a conscientious objector, a better case could be made for York being a selective conscientious objector.

After returning to his community and starting a school, York, as an advisor to the film made about his life, became concerned about the rearming of Germany and the rise of the Nazi power and in a 1941 Memorial Day address at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier spoke these words: "There are those in this country today who ask me and other veterans of World War I, 'What did it get you?' ... The thing they forget is that liberty and freedom and democracy are so very precious that you do not fight to win them and stop. You do not do that. Liberty and freedom and democracy are prizes awarded only to those who fight to win them and then keep fighting eternally to hold them!"³⁰

York tried to reenlist in the Army after the start of World War II but was turned down due to age and other health issues. Therefore, on two separate occasions, York determined the right thing to do and the Christian duty was to take up arms on behalf of his nation because he was convinced of the just cause. This is the definition of a selective conscientious objector, one who examines the given war and decides on participation based on principles such as Just War Theory.

Major Buxton "promised to release York from the Army if he decided that he could not serve his country without sacrificing his integrity." Under the current DoD policy, the refusal to recognize selective conscientious objectors who use Just War Theory Principles to guide in their decisions requires them to sacrifice their integrity in the sense that the only process available to raise their ethical concerns is that of the court martial, a criminal proceeding.

By building a strong ethical climate which takes into account spiritual beliefs, Soldiers perform their duty

with willing spirit and as in the case of York, with great courage and conviction.

FM 6-22 further highlights the importance of this ethical climate by noting that: It is important for subordinates to have confidence in the organization's ethical environment because much of what is necessary in war goes against the grain of societal values that individuals bring into the Army. A Soldier's conscience may say it is wrong to take human life while the mission calls for exactly that. A strong ethical climate helps Soldiers define their duty, preventing a conflict of values that may sap a Soldier's will to fight at tremendous peril to the entire team.³¹

In defining their duty under Just War Principles, selective conscientious objectors can ably serve their country. If there is a conflict of values and they are called upon to serve in an unjust war, their moral candor needs to be permitted in order to contribute to the Army's ethical environment. If it is not permitted, A.J. Coates notes: "Whatever the military handbooks might say about the Soldier's obligations to disobey 'unlawful orders,' the specific disciplines of military training seem designed to elicit immediate and unquestioning obedience and to suppress the kind of critical reflection that moral assessment and moral conduct entail."³²

The 1986 Army White Paper on values, *The Bedrock of our Profession*, DA Pam 600-68 states: Courage, however, goes beyond the physical dimension. Moral courage, the courage of one's convictions, is equally important. It takes a different kind of courage to stand up for what you believe is right, particularly when it is contrary to what others around you believe. Each of us must persevere in what we know is right and not make it easy for friends, peers, comrades, or superiors to do the wrong thing. Our moral principles must not be compromised because of the situation or circumstances. This does not mean that every order or policy is to be questioned, but if Soldiers or civilians truly believe that something is not right, they have the responsibility to make their views known.

If we truly are to be a values based Army using the framework of Just War Theory principles, the ethical and moral questions raised about war and duty need to be discussed at all levels. The question to be asked is whether or not leaders like Buxton are the exception or the norm for the Army. His leadership supported a young private from the hills of Tennessee during a time of spiritual and moral crisis. Through his support, York served with great distinction and honor. His "heap bothered conscience" became a convicted conscience and he performed his duty to God and Country.

Endnotes

¹ Gladys Williams. Alvin C. York, <http://www.alvincyork.org/Biography.htm>

² Department of the Army. (1993). *DA PAM 600-75 Accommodating Religious Practices*. Washington, D.C

³ Lee, D. D. (1985). *Sergeant York: An American Hero*. Lexington, AL: The University Press of Kentucky.

⁴ Department of the Army. (2006). *FM 6-22 Army Leadership*. Washington, D. C.

⁵ Lee, 19.

⁶ Catholic Peace Fellowship Staff, *Selective Conscientious Objection: History, Theology, and Practice*. (2005). *Sign of Peace*, 4.2 (Spring).

⁷ The author is an ordained minister in the Christian Reformed Church since 1995.

⁸ July 17 letter, complete letter as appendix or use link

⁹ July 17 letter

¹⁰ FM 6-22

¹¹ Act

¹² Testimony 1939

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid

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¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ Ibid

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²² Ibid

²³ Christian Reformed Church (1977) Guidelines for Justifiable Warfare, Grand Rapids, MI

²⁴ Ibid

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²⁷ FM 6-22,

²⁸ Ibid,

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³⁰ Lee, 109.

³¹ FM 6-22,

³² Coates, A. J. (1997). *The Ethics of War*. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 30.

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The Unique, Prophetic Voice of The Army Chaplain

By Chaplain (MAJ) Donald W. Kammer

The U.S. Army chaplain serves side-by-side with American, joint and allied forces around the world. He or she provides religious pastoral care for Soldiers, their families and authorized personnel.¹ Yet, the chaplain also serves in the role of a staff officer for a commander.

This dual relationship as both pastor and staff officer, suggests potential points of tension, particularly as the chaplain functions as a useful asset for mission accomplishment, and as a religious leader endorsed by a civilian religious community.

In the shadow of the Vietnam War, Harvard Professor Harvey Cox once asked the question, “The man of God, and the man of war: what have they to do with one another?”² This suggests a good question and presents a dilemma that every chaplain must encounter. What is the prophetic nature of the chaplain’s contribution to the Army in the context of a military organization that has its own expectations of the chaplain? Will the chaplain speak the truth, though it may be divergent to military leaders when those same leaders determine the chaplain’s career success? Will the chaplain take a place at the commanders’ table and offer contradictory opinion when a policy or a decision is immoral and unjust? Is the chaplain a combat multiplier only or a person of God or both or more of one and less of the other? Such questions may pose an uncomfortable dilemma for the chaplain; but chaplains must wrestle with these questions as they serve in the Army, as well as other services. Let us consider if there is room at the table of war for the chaplain as prophet of God.

Definition: The Prophetic Chaplain

The job of the Army chaplain is a position laden with opportunities for speaking the truth boldly. This may occur through pointing people to spiritually helpful resources, confronting injustice and evil, intervening to help an individual or speaking the words of God to those of low or high position. In a counseling session, a chaplain may advise an individual that fooling around with another woman’s man is immoral. He or she may comment in a staff meeting that gambling is negatively impacting the unit’s families and hurting the morale of junior enlisted soldiers. In a private meeting with a commander, a chaplain might even express his or her view regarding the morality of an aspect of an operation or perhaps note the ill treatment of a subordinate or a captured fighter. The chaplain may speak based upon his or her own religious principals, but must possess skills in relational appropriateness and wisdom to exert a constructive influence. The Army chaplain faces a daunting challenge of being prophetic, that is, being a conscientious representative of one of America’s many diverse denominations, which place their religious leaders within a bureaucratic structure that expects a measure of uniformity.³

When a chaplain enters the Army, he or she does not abandon that distinctive identification with a denomination or its beliefs, virtues and values. The chaplain brings these beliefs, virtues and values into the military to emulate. To be that denominational and prophetic voice, the chaplain may at times diverge from the uniformity the Army cherishes and offer additional perspectives based upon his or her identity as a distinctive religious leader.

The terms “prophet” or “prophetic” are quite broad concepts and should be defined for this paper. To be prophetic, a chaplain must speak the truth when it may be politically and professionally advantageous to remain silent. Secondly, a chaplain must also live and walk in truth and have integrity in order to maintain

credibility with Soldiers and family members. Chaplains who show poor integrity and character violate expectations of others, even if they may speak words prophetically. In his book *The Sociology of Religion*, Max Weber offers a view of the prophet which may be helpful for understanding the role the chaplain performs in the Army. Weber describes two distinct and separate categories of the prophet.⁴ He argues that one kind of prophet has an ethical duty to proclaim the truth; he also argues that another kind of prophet is called to be an exemplar, and live the truth.⁵ For Weber these two kinds of prophets were distinct. But for the Army chaplain, the two concepts must merge. The Army chaplain combines these roles, and speaks out for ethical issues. The chaplain may also speak out as a faithful representative of his or her religious tradition. At the same time, he or she is expected to be an exemplar in day to day association with others. To fail as an exemplar or as a positive role model is to fail to be prophetic. To fail in speaking the truth boldly to leaders is also failure to be prophetic. To fail to be prophetic is failure as a chaplain.

It is in the best interests of the Army, and the nation, for chaplains to speak with a prophetic voice. This may be private, toe-to-toe and face-to-face with a commander, or it may be through an inspirational article in a post newspaper.⁶ In such cases, particularly with commanders, prior trusting relationships are valuable, and have to be earned.

The Army chaplain must also fulfill his or her denominational calling to offer a prophetic voice, as well as a holy life, to people of the Army. The Army chaplain is both commissioned by the President and ordained by an American religious community to be a prophetic religious leader. This means the chaplain must be careful not to lose sight of either obligation. Given this unique relationship, individual chaplains must retain a clear grasp of their prophetic identity and function. The problem of being a prophetic chaplain within a system like the Army is a question worth serious contemplation.

Clear prophetic identity and practice is crucial for the Army chaplaincy as an institution, lest it become known as a uniformly docile set of individuals who avoid conflict, in deference to a serene homogeneity. This kind of chaplain and chaplaincy would quiet the prophetic voice of conscience. Such a chaplaincy scenario, a serene institutional uniformity, would diminish the distinctive contribution of American religious leaders, Pentecostal, Catholic, Jewish, Baptist, Muslim and Buddhist or other distinctive faith groups who wear the uniform and choose to serve. A muted chaplaincy with silenced prophetic engagement would be tragic. The Army benefits from a vitally engaged chaplaincy, willing to be thoughtful, truthful and intrepid in speaking prophetic words to the right people at the right time and for the right cause.

The nation and the Army would be robbed of a perspective and presence representing the diverse humanitarian and religious traditions of the nation if chaplains are ever muted before commanders or even muzzled from a distinctive religious expression. An Army chaplain must appropriately offer a commander an opposition perspective to decisions which may violate the conscience as well as the law. The chaplain must communicate his or her moral and ethical concerns in tactful dialogue with commanders, and at the same time, do so in such a way so as to preserve his or her continued presence for pastoral ministry to people. The chaplain, to be truly effective, must have a pastoral as well as a prophetic voice in the Army.

Is There a Soul of Goodness in Things Evil?

“There is some soul of goodness in things evil, would men observingly distil it out.”⁷ This quote is quite a conclusion to *Chaplains in Conflict: The Role of Army Chaplains since 1914*. Stephen H. Loudon, the principal Roman Catholic Chaplain of The British Army, makes use of the quote.⁸ His application of a Shakespearean quote from *Henry V* illustrated a tension which existed in the British military chaplaincy. It is the same tension the American military chaplaincy faces. The institution is not pristine. There is evil and there is good within. To expect the chaplaincy as an institution to fit a utopian image of spiritual or moral perfection is unrealistic and overly optimistic.⁹ Yet, it is such a utopian expectation that the critics of the chaplaincy require for the chaplaincy to be justified in their eyes. This is the expectation of Harvey Cox, who

argues that the evil is poison to the good. Louden suggests that both can exist beside one another, the person of God with the man of war. But it is not easy, and it must permit a certain degree of accommodation. Wise accommodation is important for the chaplain's effective prophetic presence in the Army. There is a soul of goodness in accommodation. It is in the care of people.

Louden understands that by its very nature the chaplaincy has little to say to those who point to the conundrum of the institution. Is it spiritual or is it military and secular? There are many problems and red blood is on the hands of the chaplain. Yes, it is the blood of identification with an institution of killing, as well as the blood of touching and comforting the dying, injured and those who kill. Refusal to be tainted by association with the institution would mean being absent from ministry to the injured and dying as well as those who do the killing. Indeed, the chaplaincy is a profession that blends the military and worldly as well as the religious. It would be foolish to argue that the work of the chaplaincy is without any compromise or accommodation. Compromise and accommodation are ever present. Is it possible to gain some benefit from such an institution? Is any benefit derived from the presence of an accommodating chaplain in the midst of war?

Some of the critics of the chaplain do not want to see red blood on the hands of the representative of God. The critics view the marriage of the clergyman and the military problematic, leading to an inevitable compromise of principles. They have raised a very high bar indeed if they expect the chaplain to be totally insulated from even a hint of accommodation. The nature of the beast requires a delicate balance between a prophetic voice and accommodation to reality, serving the state. Achieving this balance is a source of tremendous tension and a challenge for chaplains who serve. It is also a challenge for the state, which is obligated to tolerate the prophetic utterance among its servants. If either the state's secular or the chaplain's religious purpose were to gain primacy in this dance, the program would fail.

American sociologist Gordon C. Zahn wanted to eliminate all chaplains from the military.¹⁰ His justification in essence was that they are unable to speak the truth prophetically and have become a part of a corrupt system, silenced by that system itself.¹¹ To Zahn, Judeo-Christian religion anticipates a certain opposition to the world as a requirement for religious ministry.¹² Military chaplains, as part of the evil system, are unable to function without compromise. They will always fail to guide their constituents against the evil values of the worldly military. They can't turn their back on the institution and speak the truth they should, because the power and employment benefits of state are too lucrative. The accusation is that the chaplains can't bite the hand that feeds them, that they are irredeemably compromised by their employer. Zahn cites a World War II era directive from the German High Command which said that the chaplaincy served as a tool "strengthening the fighting power of the troops...like every German, the chaplain must also direct his entire work to the great objective of winning the war."¹³ To Zahn, there is no such thing as a prophetic chaplain. All are compromised spiritually, mere assets of the state and the evil system.

There may even be chaplains or commanders in the U.S. Army today who would concur with the statement of the German High Command, and wish to employ their chaplains as assets of war, primarily. There may be commanders or chaplains who would see no problem with employing chaplains as intelligence assets, gaining information about local religious leaders and local people and their culture. Sending the chaplain to a village and then debriefing them is only one illustration of numerous ways the chaplain might be utilized as an asset of warfare. Would this pose a problem for the chaplain? How far would he or she be willing to go? Would it violate anything in his or her sense of religious mission? Such questions need to be seriously considered, not only among chaplains, but by the denominations that send them to serve within the military.

Zahn would see little difference from this portrayal of the chaplain in Nazi Germany and the prayer offered by the chaplain serving with Colonel George S. Patton III, in Vietnam, when he was asked to pray for a high body count.¹⁴ The chaplain prayed: "Oh Lord, give us the wisdom to find the bastards and the strength to

pile on.”¹⁵ Zahn brutally applies his analysis of the German chaplaincy to the American chaplaincy. Zahn presents a picture of a coldly rationalistic utilization of the chaplain for the sole benefit of the state, for its victory and mission success. Whatever ministry the chaplain does is subservient to the state’s goals. To Zahn, the chaplain can never have a valid prophetic ministry that confronts command; the chaplain’s voice suffers paralysis and is unable to confront power as long as the chaplain serves the system. To Zahn, the chaplain as a military person is a mere cog in the machine of war, who may last only a short time unassimilated, but in the end becomes a useful tool of an evil system. Zahn would not abide Louden’s rationalization, that there is good in the bad, that the devil can be placated. For Zahn, the occasional value of having legitimate ministry to soldiers and their families can never be a justification for the chaplain’s presence and his or her surrender to an evil system which corrupts the essence of what it is to be a person of God.

Cox and many others serve as vivid critics of the chaplaincy, opposing the evil of war and the massive American military industrial complex of the time. He views the chaplain as a compromiser with little believability, a person without integrity. Cox complains that the military has “spread its metallic claws around the globe to hundreds of bases and bivouacs.”¹⁶ The chaplaincy, complicit in this enterprise, confronts us with conflicting claims of God and Caesar.¹⁷ What is to be believed from the testimony of the one who speaks the words of Caesar and the words of God from both sides of the mouth? For Cox it is the “military industrial complex which laps up America’s wealth and at the same time advances Imperial America which is so corrupting.”¹⁸ Who would want to be such a chaplain? How could a person of God serve such a monster? The Army chaplain may be either a naive participant in the matter or complicit, a person without integrity. Either way, the chaplain is painted red with the same blood guilt as the soldier by these critics. These critics would question if a chaplain could ever exert a prophetic voice and challenge any evil, such as a My Lai or an Abu Gharib.

The magazine, *Christian Century*, which often reflects positions sympathetic with the more liberal wing of North American Christianity, articulates a point-of-view which would enrage some anti-chaplaincy activists.¹⁹ The *Christian Century* in the past has expressed affinity more sympathetic to the position of Cox and Zahn, especially in the 1970’s. Yet in June of 2003 the editor of the magazine, John M. Buchanan justified continued advertisement for the military chaplaincy in the *Christian Century*. The Navy regularly places ads in religious magazines designed to encourage pastors to consider the chaplaincy as a feasible option for their ministry. Buchanan responded to certain complaints from anti-war readers, who criticized such advertisements for chaplains in his magazine. He said, “I’ve learned to respect those who minister, even if I disagree with what the military is doing. The actions of the military and the role of chaplains are issues we will continue to address in the content of the magazine. And we’ll continue to run ads for military chaplaincy.”²⁰

The tension is not an internal struggle only for chaplains. It belongs to the broader Christian community; and in this case, the editor of *Christian Century* admits the complexity. In the article, “Congregation in Uniform,” he argues that to abandon those within the military culture by denying military chaplains would be more harmful than to provide the chaplains. For that reason, he acknowledges the need for military chaplains, for the sake of the men and women, the sons and daughters of America.²¹

This statement suggests further reflection upon Louden’s quote of Shakespeare. “There is some soul of goodness in things evil, would men observingly distil it out.” The Army chaplain, even if he or she accommodates in some uncomfortable areas, still has a religious and pastoral worth. Who would provide spiritual sustenance for men and women if not the chaplain? In essence it is beneficial to have the chaplain in the system, even a system alien to the chaplain’s own ideologies. The chaplain performs spiritual work as a prophetic presence, even if toned down, but still as a religious act and with religious value.

For the chaplain, a little accommodation is the price to pay for the joy of ministry to people in need. Who will speak clearly on moral, ethical and spiritual issues, if not the chaplain? Who will give voice to the needs

of the exploited within the military bureaucracy, if not the chaplain? Who will confront commanders and remind them of their obligation to do justice, if not the chaplain? Who will point people to God in the midst of death and tragedy, if not the chaplain? Obviously, others can fulfill some of these tasks, but it is the chaplain who is particularly called and assigned to take on such roles. The chaplains may serve in the Army, yet they also come from a multitude of religious communities in the nation. They are endorsed by them, nurtured by them and accountable to them to be uniquely prophetic. These religious communities have various views on war. Some of the churches in the United States, which may condemn a specific war, are faced with a dilemma if they wish to excise their chaplain from the military bureaucracy. If they were to do so, they would eliminate their own prophetic presence in an institution in which many of their constituents serve faithfully.

So, what if the chaplains' voices are silenced; and what if they are not prophetic when they need to be? What if chaplains are discouraged from exercising the distinctive of their faith? What if the demand for military uniformity attempts to swallow up denominational fidelity to a religious experience, practice or idea, to mute the chaplains' own prophetic gifting? Would the pragmatic uniform expectations of an Army culture then mold the chaplain? Would the religious communities be willing to accommodate the presence of their ministers in an institution of war if those ministers had no avenue to be who they have been called to be?

Where Were the Prophetic Voices of the Chaplains - My Lai?

The Army chaplaincy connection to the My Lai atrocity and massacre of March 16, 1968 is but one example of a failure to provide relevant religious influence and prophetic intervention when it mattered. There were two chaplains involved in the cover-up tragedy, Francis R. Lewis and Carl E. Creswell.²² Lewis was the Americal Division chaplain and Creswell was the Americal Division Artillery Brigade chaplain, who was first told of the atrocity by a helicopter pilot, Chief Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson. To a certain degree, the chaplain contribution to the cover-up simply supports Cox's claim that a chaplain is unable to speak out as a prophet in the military culture because he or she is ensnared by an evil system.

The day after My Lai, March 17, 1968, the Sunday edition of the *News Sheet*, a publication of the Americal Division in Vietnam, reported that 128 enemy fighters were killed and 13 suspects detained from the village of My Lai.²³ What was not stated in this account was that war crimes had been committed, and that the "enemies" turned out to be noncombatant civilians. Indeed, the casualty toll may have been more than 500 civilians.²⁴ For almost a year the information of the event was held within the Americal Division; and no action was taken. This allowed many of the participants enough time to leave the military and become legally unreachable.

The Army's intense investigation began after the cover-up was exposed by Rob Ridenhour, who at the time was a young soldier who collected the information by hearsay. When Ridenhour left the Army, he wrote letters to more than 30 congressmen and senators.²⁵ It was more than a year after the atrocity that Ridenhour's letter made an impact. He wrote the letter in March 1969, and the first news report came out in November, reported by Seymour Hersh.²⁶ Mo Udall was the senator who eventually responded to his letter, and within two weeks the Pentagon initiated an investigation which ultimately resulted in key officers and enlisted soldiers being charged with court-martial offenses. These charges included murder and assault to commit murder. However, only one person was convicted. Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr. was charged with premeditated murder in the killing of more than a 100 men, women and children. At the time, popular opinion supported Calley and many viewed Calley as a scapegoat. In fact, there was photographic and recorded evidence to convict him alone. Other officers were not convicted although careers ended, eventually. Calley was sentenced to life, but was released in 1975 after a long string of appeals. The chaplain involvement in this tragedy was no less than a heartrending failure to speak out and continue to do so until the truth became known. It was a blind eye turned or an intentional reluctance to push aggressively

for the truth concerning the murder of innocent civilians.

A few days after the killings occurred, Thompson, the helicopter pilot who witnessed the atrocity, went to his chaplain with the story, but nothing came of the encounter. No chaplains were on the scene during the atrocity; however, Thompson indicated that innocent civilians had been slaughtered.²⁷ The chaplain covering Thompson's aviation unit, Creswell, "verbally passed the report" to the Americal's Division Chaplain, Lewis.²⁸ At this point, the details are uncertain, because Lewis and others did not remember the precise content of conversations, which by the time of the trials had occurred, was a year and a half in the past. Lewis claimed that he passed the information that Creswell gave to him to four staff officers. He said that he was told that some of the officers were aware of the complaint and were looking into the matter. Lewis then dropped the ball, believing that the issue was being dealt with.

Nearly a year later, during the court-martial testimony, the staff officers did not remember the encounter as described by Lewis. Indeed, two officers denied that Lewis had said anything to them. The failure to report this to the legal authorities by both chaplains contributed to the cover-up. Lewis later said that he didn't think that Creswell's account warranted the attention.

Were the chaplains intentionally involved in a cover-up of the murders of innocent Vietnamese? They may not have intentionally been, but their actions presented a picture of an ineffective response and hinted at a compromised system. When the months passed without any action, the chaplain should have followed-up? The Peers Report points out that the chaplains should have reported the war crimes to the Army's Criminal Investigation Command (CID). *The New York Times* suggested that the silence on the part of the chaplains revived "the old two masters problem concerning chaplains in the armed forces," meaning that it is difficult for a chaplain to serve the state and God at the same time.²⁹ Indeed, this case tarnished the chaplaincy for years and became a case study in officer basic courses Army-wide. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, continues to use My Lai as a case study for its Intermediate Level Education (ILE) of its majors.³⁰

The investigation, headed by General William Peers, produced a blunt document, *The Peers Commission Report*, which recommended court-martial proceedings for both chaplains along with 26 other officers and two enlisted photographers. This included the most senior leaders of the Americal Division.³¹ The silence or failure to follow through on the part of the senior division chaplain and brigade chaplain was deemed an act worthy of courtmartial by Peers. The junior chaplain reported the incident, but the senior chaplain failed to follow through with action.³² Both were obligated to act further according to the report. Harvey Cox's suggestion that the Army chaplain may struggle as a prophetic voice in such an environment seems to be accurate in this case; these chaplains failed to provide prophetic leadership during an atrocity and war crime.

Cox suggested that the Army system and culture corrupted the chaplain's involved, hindering their ability to do what was right. Would a chaplain in the 21st Century be able to resist this corruption? Has the Army chaplaincy adjusted to this My Lai failure so that similar atrocities may be avoided, or at least reported and confronted? If the Army chaplaincy failed to learn from My Lai, what will it do when confronted with contemporary atrocity or criminal activity such as at the Abu Gharib prison in Baghdad or several other places?³³

A few units in Iraq, during the recent war, have had battalion commanders or other senior officers relieved or disciplined.³⁴ For example, an artillery battalion commander chambered a round and placed his weapon to the head of a man.³⁵ Then there is the episode of the commander, popularly known as the "Warrior King," Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Sassaman, whose leadership approach got him in trouble. He eventually left the Army, reprimanded with an official statement in his file saying that his conduct was "wrongful, criminal and will not be tolerated."³⁶

Have any battalion chaplains offered a prophetic presence for a commander helping him or her to avoid these kind of humiliating leadership failures? A trusted and competent chaplain behind closed doors has the

capacity tactfully to help a commander through the stressful clutter of war, to offer perspective or simply listen as an additional resource before things get out of hand. The chaplain in a unit should exude a prophetic presence that reminds others of what is right and encourages others to be good and just.

The chaplain must speak out when it is right to do so. That is the requirement of being truly prophetic. If this is not possible, then perhaps the argument of Cox or Zahn or some contemporary critic of the Army chaplaincy merits consideration. A chaplain unwilling to speak to a commander over an issue of integrity or character or justice is a chaplain that need not exist at all. As a branch, the Army chaplaincy should continue to equip its chaplains with helpful tools for navigating within the system as prophetic voices. An Army chaplain must be more than a compliant servant of a massive bureaucracy; he or she is a servant of distinct religious groups, each with expectations that their chaplain's will minister with fidelity and integrity. Chaplains work within a system needing a prophetic voice to provide effective religious care of people, despite the cost to the chaplain.

Accommodating the Blessing of Cannons

Cox suggests that nearly all key theological voices-post 1945, (Martin Buber, Reinhold Niebuhr, Juergen Moltman, and Johann Metz) all advocate the elimination of the idols of race and state from the religious community.³⁷ To them the concept of the military chaplaincy reflected a bankrupt ideology, more of a crusade mentality -- a relic of a bygone era. Even if there are roots in Western culture justifying the military chaplain, the institution itself violates the essence of what biblical religion is all about, according to the critics. This attitude reflects a popular consensus of the Vietnam era criticism. The critique could not envision the chaplain influencing or transforming the military culture. The fear is much more that the chaplain's employment would be as an asset of state warfare, a corruption of religious ministry.

The critics' portrayal of a military chaplain is that of a clergy person who functions as an apparatus to "bless the cannons." Indeed such behavior may fit the practice of a few chaplains, who would have no problem with the blessing of cannon as a means of identification with the work and person of the soldier. Some chaplains would see no problem with such a tangible and visible symbolic commitment to success in a just war. Other chaplains would have difficulty with such a practice, and would not join in the deed. To the critics, blessings of this nature represent the chaplain as a willing and eager participant in war making. Such actions also create expectations in units that replacement chaplains may not fulfill. It is difficult to fit into the shoes of a tank-blessing chaplain when the battalion commander has the expectation that the chaplain will bless his tanks. It's not easy for a chaplain to say, "No sir, I won't bless your tanks because my theology doesn't allow for that practice." The commander's response could easily be, "Chaplain, just bless the tanks." This is the kind of tension a chaplain may face when arriving into a unit where a commander has such expectations.

In truth, chaplains do refuse to do such things, but that decision is often made with a cost. This is Zahn's concern and he gets to the heart of the matter. What he fears most are perfunctory Enola Gay prayers.³⁸ Can a chaplain pray for an atomic bomb to have a safe flight followed by a blessed impact upon the target? Zahn refuses to accept that a minister of God might be identified with a Hiroshima-like bombing. To Zahn, the chaplain walking side-by-side in prayer with the man of war is problematic and scandalous. No accommodation is possible. Zahn's views have not disappeared from the scene.

The critics of the chaplaincy occasionally portray the chaplain as one engaged in the larding of sermons, "with the kind of fire-eating bombast best calculated to boost the morale of the fighting man and spur him on to the supreme sacrifice of life, if need be."³⁹ Sermons advocating or justifying war (and weapons blessings) are methods of some chaplains; other chaplains would see such polemic harmful to the essence and integrity of their efforts of prophetic ministry. Indeed, partisan and politicized sermon making, diminishes a chaplain's spiritual authority as a unique person of God with a prophetic calling.

Chaplains, may struggle with such behavior, and may be reluctant to pray a prayer as crass as requesting a high body count for a combat operation, but they would pray for safety and divine protection for their troops going out on a patrol. Although the chaplain might not pray for a tank or an atomic bomb, prayer for the soldiers in the tank would be a viable option, an accommodation. Chaplains must find a way to relate to the military culture in constructive ways that don't violate the conscience of either the chaplain or the soldier. To function in the Army system as a spiritual leader is a crucial objective for the chaplain. This means that the chaplain must be able to offer justification for his or her presence. For some chaplains this may be quite simple -- a prayer for the tank. Others may have difficulty and must find a reasoned method of accommodation. The question of how far one goes to connect with soldiers in the military culture is a source of tension for the chaplain.

Occasionally in history chaplains have pushed the limits and even chose to bear arms.⁴⁰ Much of the motivation for this may be to identify with their soldiers as well as self-preservation. In late 2003, former Army Chief of Chaplains, Major General David H. Hicks, sent a letter to all major command chaplains in the United States Army, reemphasizing the noncombatant status of the chaplain.⁴¹ That this had to be done is a clear suggestion that there had been issues related to chaplains bearing arms in the War on Terror. For example, in April 2003 embedded reporter Adam Lusher accompanied a Brigade Combat Team and reported that an Army chaplain took up an M-16 weapon during a ten-hour battle dubbed "The Battle of Moe, Larry and Curly."⁴²

This issue of chaplains bearing arms had been dealt with during the Vietnam War. One such instance can be viewed in the newsmagazine *Time*, which carried a popular photograph of a chaplain bearing arms with grenades attached to crossed ammunition belts.⁴³ The Army chaplaincy confronted this problem because of negative media attention. However, in this long war the issue has appeared once again at the highest levels of the Army. A Chief of Chaplains August 2004 Newsletter rearticulated the policy.⁴⁴ In the document Hicks states that there had been serious consideration at the Department of the Army level to eliminate the noncombatant status for chaplains. He stated, "but in the end, after hard work and prayer, we retained our noncombatant status as chaplains."⁴⁵

If chaplains were to start to bear arms, soldiers and commanders would come to see them as an actual or potential combat asset, however miniscule. This would diminish their unique role as a profession *set apart* for religious work. In order to oppose this pragmatic position, which was probably advocated by some commanders and a few more chaplains, a response was required of the Army chaplaincy. The Chief of Chaplains, representing the chaplaincy as well as American religious communities, spoke up prophetically and argued to maintain the traditional noncombatant status. Such bold leadership at the highest level of the Army, to retain the noncombatant status for chaplains, is one example of prophetic leadership with institutional relevance. Going toe-to-toe with the big bosses requires fortitude. This is an illustration of a prophetic engagement by the Army chaplaincy which contradicted the now elderly scholarly doomsayers who during an earlier war nearly half a century ago, prophesied in a different way.

Accommodating the General with a Prayer

"Chap, I need a weather prayer, now." The results-driven style of leadership, hallmark of the focused commander, expects to employ the chaplain pragmatically. Most chaplains have been asked to give weather prayers, and this becomes a matter of some note when they are in the field and weather conditions are less than perfect. Some chaplains may feel discomfort about such encounters with their results driven commanders, as if they really could command the heavens with a prayer. Then again, there are some chaplains who would feel up to the task. When the sun shines, it is always a good day for a chaplain.

In World War II, during the Battle of the Bulge in the Ardennes, General George S. Patton asked his chaplain for a weather prayer, for dry weather in December of 1944. Chaplain James O'Neill, the 3rd Army

Chaplain told Patton, “May I say, General, that it isn’t a customary thing among men of my profession to pray for clear weather to kill fellow men.”⁴⁶ Patton replied, “Chaplain, are you teaching me theology or are you the Chaplain of the 3rd Army? I want a weather prayer.” He wanted it “Now!” The chaplain went out, drafted it and the prayer was published, printed and sent to the entire army on thousands of note cards. When the weather improved, the chaplain was awarded a Bronze Star and the event went into military folklore. Not only is this part of American folklore, many commanders have heard this story; and they don’t hesitate in expecting the same results from their own chaplain’s weather prayer.

This suggests an apt question: “What harm is there in accommodating the general with a weather prayer?”⁴⁷ The chaplain’s encounter with Patton is a good illustration of a chaplain negotiating a potential conflict through deft and skill, through accommodation. O’Neill’s prayer is directed against the “oppression and wickedness” of the enemy, not toward the taking of life. He followed his conviction and at the same time offered a prayer that pleased the commander. Chaplains encounter such situations often. They come in a multitude of guises, but in every scenario the chaplain needs wisdom. O’Neill confronted a commander (Patton), who might have felt far more comfortable with the prayer his son received from his own chaplain in Vietnam. O’Neill decided to hold onto his conviction that war was at best a necessary evil, and not pray for the death of the enemy. This may be a fine point, but it does illustrate that chaplains are able to exert influence which mitigates the harshness of war, at least to a small degree. It also shows there is no consensus in the chaplaincy in how to approach this subject. One chaplain prays to pile it on the enemy; and one avoids praying for the death of the enemy, only that justice would prevail. Each decides how to pray based upon his or her individual theological and philosophical perspective. Yet, if the military and its chaplaincies were to proscribe a manner of prayer, these diverse forms of prophetic expression would be muted and the unique spirituality of chaplains quenched.

Accommodation of Multiple Masters

The dilemma of serving two masters is not a unique struggle of the chaplain. Multiple roles which conflict occur in other professions too. But the military chaplain is one of the best examples of a profession that by nature has built in tension.⁴⁸ The picture of a clergyperson pledging allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and taking a vow to support and defend that Constitution, and at the same time maintaining commitment to God and a religious tradition, presents a picture of tension. The Apostle Matthew wrote, “No one can be the slave of two masters: he will either hate the first and love the second, or treat the first with respect and the second with scorn.”⁴⁹

This text has often been cited as a portrayal of the work of the military chaplain. This role conflict is a fundamental avenue of criticism for the opponents of the chaplaincy. It unites the Vietnam-era critics. Indeed, even Korean War-era sociologist Waldo W. Burchard argues that it “is impossible for a Christian in military service to reconcile this conflict. If it is done at all it is through rationalization or compartmentalization.”⁵⁰

Former World War II chaplain Robert McAfee Brown debates the policy of making ministers into soldiers, which in his words “legitimizes war. The chaplain constituted as a military officer implies a virtually uncritical sanctioning or condoning of war.”⁵¹ He asks what would happen if the chaplain came “to see that killing, even in warfare, is an evil that must be directly opposed rather than indirectly sanctioned.”⁵² Would the chaplain then resist speaking his or her mind, or would he stay in the system and attempt to work internally, silencing his or her prophetic urge for a greater purpose. Ultimately this is about the freedom to speak truth, to be prophetic about convictions. Brown argues that the chaplain must speak out; but he doesn’t believe the chaplain would resist immoral policies. The silence of the prophet communicates agreement with the evil, according to Brown. Brown served at the end of World War II as a military chaplain and later became an anti-war voice until his death in 2001.⁵³

Today's Uniquely Prophetic Chaplains

Not all who observe the Army chaplaincy today would agree with Cox, Zahn, Burchard or Brown concerning the hypocrisy of the chaplaincy. In the 21st Century, the make-up of the Army chaplaincy is ethnically, religiously and philosophically diverse, reflecting a variety of denominations and levels of acceptance of warfare as a means to resolve conflict. Most chaplains would hold to a just war theory of sorts, but some chaplains may have views reflecting the position of their own anti-war denominations. This diversity of religious and cultural background among chaplains is a healthy reality. The diversity of prophetic perspective and expression among chaplains should be valued and encouraged, because it honors American cherished national values of freedom of religion and freedom of speech.

Today the Army chaplain has excellent media exposure. Scores of books on the market highlight chaplains doing their job as pastors to soldiers. One simply has to attend and observe a few military funerals of American veterans, many of whom served in the last century, to appreciate this; and over 4000 of these veterans have given their lives in the past few years. The chaplains exert a visible and trusted pastoral presence that has gained wide respect from the nation.

Popular culture also reflects positively on the chaplains. Recent films episodically have portrayed chaplains in a more positive fashion. Steven Spielberg's *Saving Private Ryan* shows a chaplain on Omaha Beach praying for wounded and dying soldiers.⁵⁴ In the Home Box Office series *Band of Brothers*, chaplains are portrayed both as paratroopers and in the field recklessly providing pastoral care to soldiers in the midst of combat.⁵⁵ News media attention of chaplains has also been positive. Chaplains are portrayed on the nightly news in ways challenging some of the negative stereotypes from the Vietnam-era.

The nature of the chaplain's role continues to be debated within and outside of the military. The denomination that appoints the chaplain may have rejected the decision of the Bush Administration to go to war in Iraq. Actually, several major U.S. churches opposed the invasion of Iraq based upon their understanding of the concept *just war* and these churches reject U.S. policy and the use of military force. Where does that leave their chaplains who serve? Most of the chaplains reconcile the differences and continue to serve in the military. On occasion, a chaplain will leave the service for such considerations of conscience, but this is not common. Most retain their professional identity as a minister within an institution of war through accommodation. They choose to live with the tension, even if many of their fellow civilian ministers protest and regard them as outcasts. The nation should be thankful for these military prophets of God who willingly embrace a new culture that often causes tension and may even alienate them from the communities from which they came.

The paper explored the idea that American chaplains, if prophetic, will experience tension between the demands of their religious calling and those expectations of the governmental institution they voluntarily serve. A few decades ago, these tensions drew the focused attention of Vietnam era critics of the chaplaincy such as theologian Harvey Cox and sociologist Gordon Zahn, as well as others. They argued that the chaplaincy could not exist as a servant of the state and serve God at the same time.

I have sought to show that although the work of the chaplain does have tension points, each chaplain can creatively employ wise accommodation in order to perform an effective religious care of soldiers. This is not a perfect arrangement. Being a chaplain is not the same as serving as a pastor in a parish or a local religious community. But it is a productive vocation and allows the chaplain to be an instrument of transformation for people and the Army as an institution. This fascinating balancing act would never be successful without the generous blessing of the American churches, mosques, synagogues and other religious communities which endorse their chaplains, nurture them and hold them accountable to their God.

Endnotes

The category "authorized personnel" would include Department of Defense employees, other branches of

joint forces or categories such as contractors, often based upon prior contractual and legal arrangements.

¹ Harvey Cox G., ed. *Military Chaplains: From Religious Military to a Military Religion* (New York: American Report Press, 1973), v.

² *The Random House Webster's College Dictionary* gives seven various definitions for the word prophet. This paper primarily uses the seventh definition: "a person who speaks for some doctrine, cause, or movement." In relationship to the Army chaplain's role as a prophet, the chaplain speaks boldly and truthfully concerning issues that impact matters of conscience and human dignity. This may involve "going toe to toe with the boss," in private; on occasion this may negatively impact a chaplain's career.

³ Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion* (Boston: Beacon, 1922), 46.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 55.

⁵ Sometimes a chaplain may have to raise an issue above a commander, especially if the issue has to do with the care or health of another person.

⁶ *Henry V*, Act 4, scene 1, quoted in Stephen H. Loudon, *Chaplains in Conflict: The Role of Army Chaplains since 1914* (London: Avon Books, 1996), 1.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ The chaplaincy is secular in the sense that chaplains, have responsibilities a traditional pastor may not have, work as a staff officer and may even have additional duties; the chaplaincy is religious in that chaplains have religious responsibilities similar to a pastoral role.

⁹ Gordon C. Zahn, *The Military Chaplaincy: A Study of Role Tension in the Royal Air Force* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969). Zahn may not wish to eliminate ministers from influencing the military but he was committed to eliminating chaplains as military officers from the military "... the pastor in uniform constitutes an affirmation—rightly or wrongly so—that there is no basic incompatibility between the values represented by the religious community and the war being waged by the secular ruler." Zahn, *The Military Chaplaincy*, 225.

¹⁰ Gordon C. Zahn, "Sociological Impressions of the Chaplaincy," Harvey G. Cox, ed., *Military Chaplains: From Religious Military to a Military Religion* (New York: American Report, 1973), 85-86. Zahn also did a study of the RAF chaplaincy, *The Military Chaplaincy: A Study of Role Tension in the Royal Air Force* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969).

¹¹ Zahn's focus only on Judeo-Christian religion would not fit a contemporary critique of the chaplaincy as an institution because the institution today has chaplains from other world religions and is more diverse.

¹² Zahn, 60. This is a quote from Albrecht Schubel, *300 Jahre Evangelische Soldatenseelsorge* (Muenchen: Evangelischer Presse Verband Fuer Bayern, 1964), 145.

¹³ General Patton's son died in 2004.

¹⁴ Doris L. Bergen, *The Sword of the Lord: Military Chaplains from the First to the Twenty-First Century* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), 236.

¹⁵ Cox, *Military Chaplains*, vii.

¹⁶ Cox, xii.

¹⁷ Cox, vii.

¹⁸ By "liberal wing" I mean those Christian churches and individuals that generally in most cases reject war, particularly and enthusiastically the war in Iraq.

¹⁹ John M. Buchanan "Congregation in Uniform" *Christian Century* (June 14 2003), 3.

²⁰ *Ibid.* The protested add was for the Navy chaplaincy.

²¹ Roger R. Venzke, *Confidence in Battle, Inspiration in Peace: The United States Army Chaplaincy 1945-1975* (Washington D. C.: Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Department of the Army, 1977), 157-159.

²² *Americal News Sheet*, 17 March 1968, 1. Quoted in Venzke, 156.

²³ "Department of the Army, Report of the Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations

into the My Lai Incident” (The Peers Report), Volumes I-III (1970).

²⁴ Douglas Linder, “Famous American Trials, July 2004, <<http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/mylai.htm>> (accessed 2 January 2006). This site at the University of Missouri Kansas City contains many of the primary documents of the My Lai atrocity and is worth review.

²⁵ Doug Linder, *Famous American Trials: The My Lai Court-Martial 1970*, <<http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/mylai.htm>> (accessed 2 January 2006). Seymour M. Hersh, *My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and its Aftermath* (New York: Random House, 1970), xii. The first mention of the atrocity was in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* 13 November, 1969.

²⁶ Chaplains were assigned to the Calley’s brigade but heard nothing of the crime, nor were they present.

²⁷ Venzke, 158.

²⁸ *New York Times*, 30 January 1972, 6.

²⁹ *CGSC AY 06-07: L100 Leadership Advance Sheets and Readings* (US Army Command and General Staff College: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas April 2006), L106RB-303. This chapter contains excerpts taken from the official report of the commission by LTG Peers. L100 is a common core document used in the Army’s Intermediate Level Education (ILE) for its majors.

³⁰ “Department of the Army, Report of the Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident” (The Peers Report), Volumes I-III (1970): Section Six: Suppression and Withholding of Information. The chaplain was criticized along with the Division staff: “As discussed in Chapter 10 of the report, shortly after 16 March 1968, W01 Thompson went to the Division Artillery Chaplain, CPT Carl Creswell, with a report of what he had seen at My Lai (4). Chaplain Creswell in turn, without reporting the matter to his commander, went to the Division Chaplain, LTC Francis Lewis, with the story. As previously discussed, LTC Lewis’ efforts at investigation were futile and he allowed the matter to pass without substantive effort to bring it to the attention of his superiors.”

³¹ *W. R. Peers, The My Lai Inquiry* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1979), 214-215. In addition to the chief of staff and other staff officers the commission proposed that charges be preferred against the division chaplain. Charges were never filed.

³² The assumption with this statement is that chaplains are visible engaged, involved in such facilities. For a chaplain to be assigned to a detainment facility without ability to constructively be prophetic is another matter.

³³ *CGSC AY 06-07: L100 Leadership Advance Sheets and Readings*.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, L105RC-255. From a brief synopsis of the LTC West case, compiled by efforts of JAG students of the CGSC AY05-06-001 class.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, L106RA-300. Article reproduced from the *New York Times* dated October 23, 2005. by Dexter Filkins. Few of us have walked in the shoes of a West or a Sassaman. I do not want to misrepresent their honorable contribution and service in this paper. Mentioning their examples is meant to be purely illustrative, suggesting that a chaplain does potentially have great influence if he or she is engaged relationally with the boss and his or her door is open. I believe that effective chaplains can be a great resource for the commander, appropriately offering in confidence divergent perspective assisting him in his own decision making process, even in situations as these. Whenever I see a tragic media scandal, I am one who always asks where the chaplain was. Was he or she engaged or neutered.

³⁶ *W. E. Peers, The My Lai Inquiry*, x.

³⁷ Zahn, “Sociological Impressions of the Chaplaincy” from Cox, 59. Enola Gay was a B-29 Superfortress bomber which dropped “Little Boy”, on Hiroshima. This was the first atomic bomb dropped in war.

³⁸ Zahn from Cox, 59.

³⁹ This is currently contrary to Army Chief of Chaplains Policy.

⁴⁰ David H. Hicks to MACOM Chaplains, 4 September 2003, “Chief of Chaplains Policy Concerning

Chaplains Bearing Arms,” Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Washington, D. C.

⁴¹ Adam Lusher, “The 10-hour battle for Curly, Larry and Moe,” *News.telegraph.co.uk*, 13 April 2003 <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/04/13/war213.xml&sSheet=/news/2003/04/13/ixnewstop.html>> (accessed 2 January 2006).

⁴² Venzke, 149.

⁴³ “The US Army Chief of Chaplains Newsletter: August 2004, Department of the Army, Washington D.C.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ James O’Neill, “The True Story of the Patton Prayer,” (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950. cited in *The Army Chaplaincy: Professional Bulletin of the Unit Ministry Team* (Spring 1995), 20.

⁴⁶ Ibid. O’Neill’s actual prayer did not ask God to kill the enemy. He phrased it in such a way to keep his own conviction that one should not pray for the death of another human being. The text follows: *Prayer: Almighty and most merciful Father, we humbly beseech thee, of Thy great goodness, to restrain these immoderate rains with which we have had to contend. Grant us fair weather for Battle. Graciously hearken to us as soldiers who call upon Thee that armed with Thy power, we may advance from victory to victory, and crush the oppression and wickedness of our enemies and establish Thy justice among men and nations. Amen.*

⁴⁷ Physicians also face similar issues.

⁴⁸ Matthew 6:24, New Jerusalem Bible.

⁴⁹ Waldo W. Burchard, “Role Conflicts of Military Chaplains,” *American Sociological Review*, vol 19, no. 5 (Oct., 1954): 528-535. See also Waldo W. Burchard, “The Role of the Military Chaplains,” (Doctoral Dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1953).

⁵⁰ Brown, 142.

⁵¹ Ibid, 142-143. If that were the case, then every chaplain would be compelled to leave the institution.

⁵² John Dart, “Frontline Theologian: Robert McAfee Brown (1920-2001),” *Christian Century*, 10 October 2001, <http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/m1058/27_118/79371655/p1/article.jhtml> (accessed 2 January 2006). Brown was not a total pacifist. He thought the war to stop Hitler was a just war, however, he was quite prominent in criticism of the Vietnam and Gulf wars.

⁵³ *Saving Private Ryan*, dir. Steven Spielberg, DreamWorks and Paramount, 1998, CD.

⁵⁴ *Band of Brothers*, dir. David Frankel and Tom Hanks, 6 discs, HBO Home Video, 2002, CD.

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Pro Deo et Patria: Possible or Problematic?

By Dr. Scott R. Borderud

The military chaplaincy is an appealing ministry. A popular recruiting brochure of the Army Chaplain Corps distributed during the 1990's displayed a split-image photograph of a young Catholic priest cleverly dressed on one side in clergy black with clerical collar, and on the other side in the Army green service uniform. The visual and textual message of the brochure was clear: one can be an ordained Catholic priest and a uniformed military officer at the same time, serving God *and* Country.

Such a recruiting approach communicates the appealing idea that a chaplain is a very special person, a unique hypostatic [elemental and indivisible] union, both fully minister and fully Army officer. This thinking is expressed compactly in the Latin motto of the Army Chaplaincy: *Pro Deo et Patria* [for God and Country]. This motto implies that the organization and its constituent members serve or aim to serve both God and the United States of America.

To those seminarians and ordained ministers considering future or new avenues of ministry respectively, this motto has special appeal. First, it touches the theological orientation of such persons. God is actually mentioned in the slogan of a government agency. This is in itself remarkable considering the increasing secularization of public life in America, reflected in the degree to which government lately has sanitized itself of particular religious words and symbols, often in response to lawsuits. These trends are certainly evident in the context of military ministry, where modern chapels are noted for their lack of distinctive symbols of faith, Christian or otherwise. Despite these developments, society expects its ministers to be God-persons who put God first, both in their personal lives and public vocations. Such persons thus feel welcomed to a chaplaincy which literally places God first. They read the recruiting brochure and become excited: the government, a secular institution, is actually willing to pay people to serve God vocationally in the context of military forces.

The second appeal, represented by "Country," is clearly a patriotic one. The increasingly disproportionate representation of chaplains with respect to faith groups on active duty today can be explained easily when one looks at the supply side of the equation: those denominations and faith groups which have made the largest increases in representation in the Army Chaplaincy since the advent of the All-Volunteer Force in the mid-1970's have also been those whose constituencies have been moderate or right-of-center on the political questions relating to war and the use of armed force. That would be the Baptists and Evangelicals. The Catholic Church and certain large Protestant denominations took official anti-war positions during the Vietnam conflict, and today these religious groups are woefully under-represented in the active Army. Their church leaders (many were seminarians during the period of Vietnam war protests), are not strongly inclined (or able) to release large numbers of their ministers for military service. Among pro-military churches and religious groups, the ecclesiastical leaders encourage ministers to become chaplains as a visible and tangible means of serving their country and of extending the influence of their doctrine to the single largest faith group in the military: those whose dog-tags read "no religious preference."

There are also other appeals, often explicit in the recruiting materials, which relate to officer pay, medical/dental benefits, paid annual leave, retirement system, and housing. For many ministers considering the chaplaincy, especially those from small churches and faith groups where pastors are not historically or presently well-paid, these may not be the primary attractions to military ministry, but they are significant evaluation factors in their career decision-making. These benefits sweeten the pot, and give candidates for the chaplaincy a sense of wonder: How is it that I can serve God *and* my country, and be paid so well to do

it? This seems almost too good to be true.

Is this the case?

The question this paper seeks to answer is simple: Does the *Pro Deo et Patria* motto of the Army represent an accurate expression of the reality or possibility of serving God and one's Country along parallel tracks as a military chaplain, or does it perhaps mask the divergent interests of these institutions, or even sublimate inherent church-state conflicts? Should we expect that chaplains are able to serve God and Country with normative internal and external harmony, or should we instead expect significant divergence between these entities and how one actually serves them? We shall answer these parallel questions by examining several aspects of military chaplain ministry: professional expectations; legal status; and organizational allegiances.

The Divergence of Professional Expectations

Army chaplains, like doctors, dentists, veterinarians, and lawyers, are directly commissioned from their prior civilian status without the normal officer grooming at West Point, through the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, or via Officer Candidate School. This, of course, is done for chaplains because the U.S. Government, within its constitutional fences, cannot produce its own ordained ministers. Therefore, the Armed Forces Chaplains Board relies completely upon the sponsoring denominations or faith-groups to prepare chaplain candidates educationally, ecclesiastically, and professionally for chaplain duties.

The military services do provide a short-course chaplain school experience for new chaplains which orient them to the unique mission and social structures of the military, and which give them foundational experiences in physical fitness training, wear of uniforms and military courtesies. Markedly absent from chaplain preparation for active duty are the normal officer courses in leadership, marksmanship, tactics, and other subjects relating to combat officership. Why are these missing? Because the Army never intends chaplains to command, to lead troops in battle, or to fight. In fact, it is the policy of the Army's Chief of Chaplains, for example, that chaplains shall not bear arms, even in self-defense or the defense of wounded comrades. It is at this point that we must offer our first qualification of the military chaplaincy's *pro Patria*: the chaplain is not professionally prepared to serve his country in the same unrestricted sense as other officers. His/her preparation is confined to those competencies which support chaplain duties. This preparation factor does not itself answer the question of exactly how a chaplain serves his country. It does however move us toward two possibilities. The first is that the chaplain does not really serve (defend?) his country at all. The second is that the chaplain serves his/her country, but in a qualitatively different way. Let us suspend the choice of these alternatives for the moment.

If preparation is the first indicator, the second relates to professional expertise. What are the professional skills and competencies of the chaplaincy? Despite the fact that chaplains receive, either in residence or via non-resident instruction, precisely the same advanced schooling as combat officers in the Army, they are never asked or directed to exercise their school-acquired expertise in the war-fighting or operational sciences and arts. Chaplains do not receive "branch-immateral" assignments to battle staffs, ROTC instructor positions, or major Army commands. Likewise, in most Army units, the chaplain is blocked from the routine additional officer tasks of Article 15-6 investigating officer, Combined Federal Campaign coordinator, military jury duty, report-of-survey officer, and the like. They are expected instead to be the "subject matter experts" on issues relating to theology, ethics, religion, counseling, and family relationships.

This statement requires refinement. Commanders expect chaplains to be experts in theology, but do not expect them to make theological pronouncements or judgments in the course of unit ministry which exclude service personnel of other faiths (or no faith). Regarding ethics, commanders routinely task chaplains to train Soldiers in Army Values, but never to lecture them on the ethical mandates of the chaplain's particular faith.

On religion generally, the commander often leans upon his chaplain to be the resident authority on religions in the area of operations (technically an intelligence officer responsibility), but not to promote his or another particular religion. This refinement extends into the exercise of chaplain competence in religious services as well. The Army Chaplaincy expects Muslim, Jewish, Orthodox, and Catholic chaplains to exercise their distinctive ordained ministry without essential modification in the regular and special chapel services of their faiths. This is generally not the case with Protestant chaplains. The nature of Protestant worship in the military community routinely restricts the exercise of their distinctive faiths in chapel services.

A brief reflection on American church history is in order. The increasingly fissiparous Protestant church landscape in America began with the immigration of European national church bodies from the colonial period through the settlement of the West. In the 19th Century, a variety of home-grown religious communities bloomed and pollinated, including the Latter Day Saints, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Christian Scientists. This inventory expanded with the north-south split of churches during the Civil War, and the theological split of Fundamentalists and Evangelicals from mainline denominations from the 1920's onward. Doctrinal and other splits within Baptist and other Protestant groups added to the fission. The most recent phase of this phenomenon has witnessed the formation of independent church bodies based upon certain church-growth principles and not theology or ethnicity.¹

This trend has produced a spectrum of "Protestant" churches. Presently, there are more than 1300 Army chaplains on active duty, representing more than 180 various faith groups. This compares to about 9000 chaplains representing some 39 faith groups during the Second World War.² More than 90 percent of the current list belongs to non-Catholic, non-Jewish faith groups or individual churches. These chaplains have the unenviable task of creating critical-mass worshiping congregations from among their micro-shares of the total military population. For purely practical reasons, these chaplains from such diverse ecclesiastical backgrounds must develop chapel worship formats and contents in which the distinctive features of individual chaplains' theologies and liturgies are minimized. This is for the sake of both cooperation with fellow chaplains, and the comfort of worshippers. Most active duty chaplains thus minister in a so-called "General Protestant" or "Collective Protestant" worship service. We should note that Mormons and Episcopalians would not consider themselves historically Protestant, yet they are routinely considered Protestant, and expected to participate with other Protestant chaplains in chapel services or religious education. There are exceptions to this expectation, particularly toward Missouri Synod Lutheran chaplains and other churches which restrict participation in communion or other sacraments.

Despite the general respect which chaplains in this broad category have for each other's distinctive beliefs, there remains a strong expectation, especially among more senior chaplains, that Protestant chaplains will work together. This expectation includes the participation of these chaplains together in single-congregation collective worship settings where faith-specific doctrines or practices are muted. Despite the clear wording of Title 10, U.S. Code, installation-level chaplains do not expect or encourage each chaplain from this major category arriving for duty to establish a worship service "according to the manner and forms of the church of which he is a member."³ These senior chaplains have good, practical reasons for such thinking. If individual "Protestant" chaplains insisted upon following the letter of this law, the result would be a very large number of sparsely-attended worship services. Such a scenario would hardly meet the religious need for corporate worship in most faith groups represented in the military.

The point of discussing this "Collective Protestant" problem is not to imply that the government, or the commander, or the installation chaplain has forced this situation upon junior chaplains. It is the context of military ministry in a pluralistic society which demands such non-specific, generalized religious worship for most soldiers of faith. It is enough for our purposes to admit that this happens routinely among most chaplains, and that this phenomenon demonstrates a significant divergence of expectations from training. We shall insist that all chaplains are expected to exercise a non-faith-specific workday ministry to all Soldiers,

and that the vast majority of chaplains (“Protestants”) are expected to exercise a non-faith-specific ministry in worship services as well. This is a professional irony: the chaplain is trained and ordained to provide a theologically distinctive and integrated ministry, but brought into a pluralistic military context. This ambient expects generic counseling and teaching by all chaplains, and generic worship participation from most of its chaplains. This represents a serious modification of the *Pro Deo* side of the motto for the sake of the *et Patria* side.

Beyond these expectations, chaplains are also generally considered bellwether advisors to commanders on unit morale, the ethical climate, policies, and the state of morals within the unit. The chaplains provide such advice alongside command sergeants major and other staff members. This statement also requires some precision. Commanders look to chaplains for advice on the above subjects because Soldiers speak confidentially with them, because chaplains stand aside of unit accountability, and because chaplains are asked to speak the unvarnished truth. These stated, commanders are not looking for theocratic solutions (e.g. day of repentance, stoning of adulterers, etc.) to unit problems. It is generally enough that a chaplain be aware of problems and communicate those to the command.

If this is the case, one does not need a theological degree or ecclesiastical ordination to tell a commander that the barracks toilets are broken, that the field rations are unsuitable, or that a Soldier was mistakenly unpaid. The military wants its chaplains to provide advice to commanders, and is willing both to pay for the professional stature of chaplains to give such advice, and to offer judicial protection (i.e. privileged communications) to the givers of such counsel. What the commander really wants in his/her chaplain is courage, integrity, maturity, and disinterest. He cares not a whit for theological depth or refinement. Thus, the chaplain’s professional expertise does not lend itself to serving God in the military in the same way as other ministers of his/her faith group would in a civilian setting, nor do chaplain competencies serve one’s country in the same way as other officers. We may use the vocabulary of military service, but these words do not carry the same meaning.

The divergence of professional expectation finally must focus on the question of actual practice of the profession. If the chaplain has neither the preparation nor the expertise to exercise officership in the general sense of leading troops in battle, how then can we explain chaplain ministry as serving one’s country? When an army achieves victory in the field, can the chaplain(s) be credited for its victory? Conversely, when an army suffers defeat, can the chaplain(s) be culpable? These questions beg the rationale for having chaplains in combat organizations in the first place. The constitutional and statutory explanation of this rationale has to do generally with the protection of free exercise of religion in the First Amendment, and the specific requirement for chaplains to hold religious services under Title 10, U.S. Code. Under the intense scrutiny of annual manpower surveys, those reasons standing alone could result in a minimalist chaplaincy, or perhaps the presence of ministers serving under contract to perform divine services for the military. These reasons do not alone demand the battalion-level assignment of uniformed chaplains. Some additional arguments have been used to buttress the legal ones.

In the last 20 years, the Army Chaplaincy has trafficked in terms such as “combat multiplier” and “spiritual battle-proofing” as a way of telling commanders how chaplains actually make a significant and positive difference in the spiritual and emotional preparation of Soldiers for combat. This approach insists that Soldiers whose spiritual lives are in order (as the result of effective chaplain ministry) will face the fear and uncertainty of battle with a type of confidence or resolve not shared by the spiritually unprepared. There are several difficulties with this thesis. The first is obvious: how does one quantify the contribution which a chaplain makes to the mission of the organization and its success or failure? This writer knows of no study in which a correlation has been observed between chaplain ministry to Soldiers, and the battlefield performance of those Soldiers and their units. Do solid believers (of any faith group) march further, carry greater loads, kill more enemy, or sustain fewer injuries than those Soldiers who never darken the chapel

door? The fact that the chaplaincy has been unable to establish such metrics or correlations tells us something very important: it is not really the chaplain's duty to multiply the combat power of the organization nor to "battleproof" (whatever *that* means!) Soldiers preparing for violence in the workplace of battle. Anyone in the military who attempts to justify the requirement for chaplains in the military force structure using this conventional rationale is doomed to failure.

More deeply, if we define "serving one's country" in terms of defending the nation and its interests, we are hard-pressed at this point to find evidence that chaplains actually do this. Aircraft refuelers, doctors, lawyers, and other support personnel have obvious and direct connections to the development, expression, and sustainment of combat power, but this is not the case with chaplains. If one were, for example, to examine the religious support annex to a typical combat organization's operation order, he would find information about when religious services are to be held, how memorial services are planned, how distinctive faith groups' worship is handled, and the locations of chaplains during various phases of battle. Nothing is mentioned or implied which would tell us exactly how the chaplain's activities support the mission or scheme of maneuver. The actual challenge for the chaplain is making sure that religious support does not interfere with the scheme of maneuver or that it positions the chaplain(s) to respond to the actual circumstances of battle and its casualties. From a purely practical or empirical perspective, we are led to believe that chaplains do not serve to defend their nation. They are, in the vocabulary of the Geneva Convention, "chaplains attached to the armed forces."⁴ The wear of combat uniforms by chaplains, despite the various protections they offer, serves only to confuse chaplains with the Soldiers they serve, and the mission those Soldiers undertake. Chaplains do not defend their nation, and in this sense, do not serve their country. They serve other interests.

During a recent class on the psychological stresses of battle at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the author posed this question to a group of mid-career officers: "Why is it that commanders want chaplains with them and their men in the field, especially during battle?" After some silence, a Moroccan Army major, Kamal Chemmaa, responded: "Because with all of the uncertainty of battle, the chaplain speaks about things which do not change." Imbedded in this response is the idea that the chaplain's expertise and practice is *pro Deo supra Patria* (above country). The knowledge of what is holy or sacred, what is divine or eternal is not part of the "contemporary operating environment," as the Army calls the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. From the perspective of actual practice, the chaplain offers little or nothing to help win such conflicts, and we do not look to him for direction or responsibility. We look to the chaplain to put this war or that death in some eternal perspective which gives comfort and hope to those who do the dirty work of governments, and to their kin. It is obvious that such a ministry serves individual Soldiers and their families. It is not clear that it serves or should serve the country's military objectives. Perhaps we can see this more clearly in another setting.

Doris Bergen describes the tense role of German chaplains during World War II: "In order to protect themselves from their detractors, military chaplains in the Third Reich labored to prove and re-prove that they met a real need of the troops and boosted morale. Yet the more successfully they did so -- and especially on the Eastern Front, it appears, they were successful -- the more they helped legitimate a war of annihilation. Merely the presence of chaplains at sites of mass killing in Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Byelorussia, and Ukraine, offered Germany's warriors the comforting illusion that despite the blood on their hands, they remained descent people, linked to a venerable religious tradition."⁵

Her essay serves as an astringent to the soft thinking that chaplains' ministries should somehow enhance the military mission, but it also might give the insight we need to understand why governments, even evil ones, support chaplains. If the *jus ad bellum* (just reasons for entering war) or *jus in bello* (just conduct of war) of the army he serves are wrong, the chaplain's service to country jeopardizes his service to God. This principle applies as well to wars in which neither side commits atrocities. Some wars become increasingly

pointless. Duff Crerar's examination of Canadian chaplains in the First World War notes how preaching themes shifted from the early war's crusade against a German Anti-Christ, to the later trench stalemate's courageous, comradely, suffering Christ.⁶ Even chaplains on the winning side must guard against over-identification of their ministry and message with command policy and war's rationale. Suffice for the present that both historical arguments and Geneva Convention status argue against the idea that a chaplain can safely serve Country without affecting service to God.

This does not mean that the government does not intend chaplains to serve its purposes. Studies in the aftermath of the 1996 Aberdeen Proving Grounds sex scandals between drill sergeants and female trainees resulted in actions by the Chief of Staff of the Army to increase the number of chaplains assigned to basic training/advanced individual training schools. These actions were not taken because the Army believes that chaplains can prevent the sexual misconduct of noncommissioned officers directly, but because the victims of this misconduct had no chaplain or other person with privileged communication within a reasonable distance from their barracks. The idea behind this is clear: the chaplain's presence gives Soldiers the protected opportunity to communicate a work-related grievance and seek guidance on how to address it at an early stage. This is not the only way chaplains actually serve the government's interests.

Leaders of the U.S. Armed Forces have become increasingly concerned about suicides and suicide prevention among service personnel. Because of their special status as non-command officers with privileged communication, chaplains have been actively involved both in the teaching of suicide prevention to troop units, and in the direct responses to suicidal servicemembers. The military has this concern chiefly for three reasons, none of which is spiritual. The first is force protection: any unnecessary loss of a Soldier is inherently bad. It reduces available combat power and forces the military to expend additional resources to recruit and train another to perform the same job. The second reason is unit morale: the death of a Soldier through suicide creates problems of emotional loss, sorrow, and guilt in those who survive and must continue the mission. These emotions can only reduce unit morale and thereby its effectiveness. The final reason relates to public relations. Any number of suicides statistically above demographic norms reflects poorly on the public image of the military and affects its ability to recruit.

We mention these responsibilities to acknowledge that chaplains actually do serve the specific interests of the nation in connection with their duties. It could be easily argued that these are not necessarily chaplain duties, and could be relegated to other persons in the military with privileged communications. This brings us to our second major consideration.

The Divergence of Legal Status

Military chaplains and their talk with clients are protected under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.⁷ This privileged communication is so universally respected within the military culture that chaplains are routinely exempt from a variety of normal officer responsibilities which might interfere with clergy-client relationships. Conversely, the Army routinely loads chaplains with certain types of duties precisely because the chaplain has absolute protection of communication with service personnel and their families. This is also why the majority of military families who seek counseling go to chaplains instead of other professionals on military bases. Other than a Judge Advocate General defense counsel, no other position in the military holds such protections to the same extent as the chaplain. Contrast this with officers generally. Their communication is, by the nature of officership, always official and subject to public scrutiny.

This protection of chaplains creates a predictable distance between him and his commander. The chaplain regularly hears things in private session with Soldiers, NCOs, and officers which could possibly affect unit readiness. Sometimes this information is time-sensitive. The commander would love to know this information to make decisions, to sustain the force, or to avert disaster. Unfortunately, the chaplain cannot and should not divulge this information to serve the commander's purposes, even if those purposes involve the highest

levels national security, or the loss of lives. Because military organizations place a high value on loyalty, especially upward in the chain of command, the silence of a chaplain could easily be misinterpreted as disloyalty or injurious to good order and discipline. Whatever the interpretation of motives or (in)action, the fact remains that the legal status and protection of the chaplain isolate him and his work from the interests of the state.

We then must ask: why should the state grant absolute privileged communication to chaplains when both the theoretical and practical consequences argue against it? We might respond sociologically. Every organization needs someone who is a disinterested person, a confidant or ombudsman to whom others may go with problems or complaints, without fear of reprisal or whistle-blowing. Perhaps this is a convenient way to explain the survival of the chaplaincy as an institution in the military, where we have found it increasingly clear that the chaplain does not otherwise serve his/her country in a substantial way. We think otherwise. The military's protection of the chaplain's communication with Soldiers is simply an extension of the absolute secrecy of the priest-confessor relationship, which has a venerable history in the West. Because our Constitution guarantees the freedom of religion of its citizens, it must import into the military's own law the various vehicles which realize this freedom. One of those is privileged communication. Another is the chaplaincy itself. We could further state that the constitutional right of the people to worship freely in the military context (*on this point of confidentiality*) trumps the needs of the state to execute its constitutional duty to defend. Thus, all of the additional responsibilities which the chaplain inherits hang upon this pivotal absolute clergy privilege. This is *pro Deo contra Patria* (against Country).

The Divergence of Organizational Allegiances

If there is a divergence of the chaplain's service to God and service to Country, it must somehow find its roots in the separate constituencies he represents, and also the consequent obligations and standards which these organizations enforce. Being a chaplain is not the same as holding dual citizenship. The latter condition involves an allegiance to two entities which are of the same class or type. The former status involves allegiance to entities of very different sorts. These organizations differ significantly in at least their constituencies, their agendas, and their obligations or standards for leaders. We should expect that the fundamental differences between Church and State should be reflected in the dynamics of chaplain ministry. Stated negatively, we should not expect that chaplains committed to the service of God will find service to Country without significant tension.

The pre-commissioning pastoral training and experiences of chaplains generally occur in the context of a confessionally-cohesive body of believers from which the chaplain has been ordained an official representative. As a rule, pastors, priests, and rabbis focus their pastoral care primarily on these believers. The baptism or circumcision of infants, the performance of marriage ceremonies, the conduct of worship services, and the burial of the dead are all sacramental functions of their offices. In most cases, the ministers perform these functions for or on behalf of members of their congregations. Such ministers have no legal or denominational obligation to perform many of their functions for those outside of their faith. In the chaplaincy, the military mission and care for Soldiers demolish these walls of inclusion and exclusion. This does not mean that the military would ever demand that a chaplain perform sacramental ministry against the dictates of faith or conscience. It does mean that the military has significantly expanded the constituency this chaplain serves. This expansion brings into pastoral responsibility Soldiers of different faiths and no faith. The chaplain will routinely spend an enormous amount of time arranging for the accommodation of religious practices for Soldiers of faith groups with which he would otherwise have no contact. Since Vatican II (and the consequent decline in active priests) this has been especially true of Protestant supervisory chaplains.¹⁰ They spend considerable working hours on the problem of providing religious support to large numbers of Roman Catholic Soldiers with a shrinking pool of active duty Catholic chaplains. The vocational justification

of such Protestant ministry must begin with a significant re-definition of service *pro Deo*. The question is not whether the military generally or the chaplaincy specifically accepts this re-definition. The real question is whether the ordaining body of the chaplain accepts this re-definition of ministry, especially when the installation chaplain tasks an Evangelical or Baptist chaplain oversight of a Muslim or Wiccan service on a military base.

Related to this question of divergent constituencies is the matter of obligations. The chaplain often enters active duty with a fresh set of ecclesiastical obligations codified in ordination vows. Ministers generally undertake such solemn vows for life, and they do not expect that a subsequent Oath of Office, taken at commissioning, will supplant these vows. So serious are these vows which bind the chaplain to his endorsing body, that the U.S. chiefs of chaplains will respond instantly to a request by the endorser to recall a chaplain from active duty. Even when a chaplain is engaged with troops in combat, the military must honor such requests without qualification. These requests are clearly not in the best interests of the Army and its war-fighting units in the field. It matters not. The allegiance of a chaplain to his/her ordaining body is absolute and permanent. The loan of chaplains to the military is always temporary. Chaplains in this sense serve at the pleasure of their ecclesiastical authorities, *pro Deo contra Patria*. When that pleasure turns to displeasure, in the instance that a chaplain has seriously run afoul of the teaching or conduct standards of his church, this person will find quickly that he cannot serve Country without serving God under the aegis of his endorser (*nullus Patria sine Deus*). Celibacy, divorce, and other matters important to religious groups may have absolutely no importance to the chaplain's commander, but could well end the chaplain's military career. Although the Army chaplaincy recently codified the means by which a chaplain may stay on active duty upon the loss of ecclesiastical endorsement (professional qualification), the regulations provide a very short period of limbo.⁸ No chaplain may continue ministry without current ecclesiastical sponsorship, regardless of years of service or rank. Thus, the obligations of a chaplain to his ecclesiastical body generally trump the obligations to his country.

We must note briefly at this point that a chaplain in serious trouble with the UCMJ should not look to the sponsoring church for a life-ring: the military law holds jurisdiction over chaplains, and the request for recall by a chaplain's endorser will not rescue him from the deep waters of a court-martial. In the recent case of Navy Chaplain (Lieutenant) Gordon Klingenschmitt, his commander brought charges against him for attending a press conference in uniform (against specific orders).⁹ Klingenschmitt's refusal to allow a representative of the government to determine the content of his prayers collided with the state's interest. That interest was to eschew a perception that it endorses a particular religion by allowing its specific prayers by a representative of the military. This is a recent, visible example of the clash of obligations in service to God and Country in an activity which is central, and not peripheral, to the official duties of a chaplain or minister. This is not *pro Deo et Patria*, but for God or Country (*pro Deo aut Patria*).

In summary of our discussion thus far, we observe that the *pro Deo et Patria* motto of the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps suffers from an overdose of hope and a deficiency of reality. At the heart of the *God and Country* problem is the coordinating conjunction "and." Institutions which include "and" in their title must necessarily face the tension of repeated internal competition for direction. The moment we ask chaplains to serve two masters, and do it faithfully, we place them in a difficult position. A Japanese proverb reminds us, "He who chases two rabbits catches neither one." This is one of three probable outcomes of chaplain ministry: serving God well; serving Country well; or perhaps serving neither well. We believe that the chaplain actually stands between God and Country. He represents God to his country through his endorsing body, and he represents his country and its Soldiers to God through his prayers and other sacerdotal ministries. In this way, *inter Deus et Patria* is much more representative of the actual situation. We are however, reluctant to offer this alternative motto as a replacement for the *pro Deo et Patria*, because either the current motto or a substitute must face a serious problem. That problem is the future.

Pro Deo and the Future Chaplaincy

The most publicly unpalatable aspect of chaplain ministry is its fairly recent support of fringe spiritual or religious groups which stand well apart from the mainstream religious life of America. One group is Wicca (i.e. witches). Despite the congressional grand-standing associated with the Army chaplains' support of Wiccan soldier worship at Fort Hood, Texas in 1999,¹¹ this author has no reason to believe that the Army Chaplaincy will not have at least one Hindu, Buddhist, Wiccan, or Satanist in its future ranks. The Constitution's protection of religious freedom and simultaneous proscription of "an establishment of religion" certainly places a legal and moral obligation upon the Government to provide for the free exercise of all religious beliefs, not just those acceptable to certain elected officials. This is the central rationale for installation chaplains' accommodation and support of Wiccan and other groups on military bases. In the case of all four groups mentioned above, the traditional monotheism of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam is absent from their belief systems. They may choose to serve *Patria*, but certainly not *Deo*.

Would the Army alter or drop its slogan at the point when such chaplains might enter the active forces? We have only to look at the actions of Chaplain (Major General) Matt Zimmerman, Army Chief of Chaplains from 1990-94, who in 1993 commissioned the first Muslim chaplain on active duty. He also directed, almost instantly, the removal of the Christian cross and Jewish tablets & Star of David from the Chaplain Corps Regimental Crest and other heraldry. Despite the very strong allegiance of many active and reserve chaplains to the "Cross and Tablets" of the old crest, it was no longer a symbol which could be worn by every chaplain in uniform. The admission of only one non-monotheistic religious person into the chaplaincy will automatically place the *pro Deo et Patria* in jeopardy, not because of the internal conflicts outlined earlier in this paper, but because of the external misrepresentation of the chaplaincy as monotheistic in its service. For these other groups, it could only be *non Deus sed Patria* (not God but Country).

The issue of future faith groups represented in the chaplaincy is much larger than symbols and slogans. The nature of military life demands that chaplains of all faith groups work together to support the religious needs of all Soldiers. Beyond this incontestable general obligation, we have also the devil-in-details of chaplains' institutional obligations. Were a Satanist chaplain assigned to a brigade-size unit ministry team, the brigade chaplain (regardless of faith) would have an *ex officio* responsibility to develop this chaplain to be effective in his/her ministry to troops. Likewise, were a Satanist chaplain promoted to major and assigned to supervisory chaplain duties, his subordinate battalion chaplains would be obligated to cooperate with this supervisory chaplain's religious support plans, perhaps *contra Deus pro Patria* (against God for Country). This scenario would be especially troublesome if the subordinate chaplain (Christian) were to receive an unsatisfactory performance evaluation from the Satanist. Undoubtedly, this has already occurred among non-chaplains somewhere in the military. The difference in this case is that such an occurrence among chaplains would involve the official representatives of their faith groups. Some ecclesiastical bodies might not wish their chaplains to serve with such implied risks.

A historical defense against this argument would point out the fact that chaplains have dealt with other confrontational interfaces routinely throughout the history of chaplain ministry. What is the problem here? Protestants and Catholics, long at odds theologically, have served with one another as chaplains since the earliest days of the Republic. Both of these groups have managed to deal successfully with the advent of Jewish, Mormon and more recently Muslim chaplains without apparent frictional losses to their own effectiveness. Our response to this good argument takes the form of a rhetorical question: Is there a point at which the *pro Patria* demands of pluralistic cooperation with anti-Christian chaplains in the future could totally eclipse the *pro Deo* motivations and principles of the majority of chaplains? We predict here that the Army Chaplaincy will face the future issues much as it has the past. Because it is a *re-socializing institution* like the rest of the military, it will train-out the troublesome individual theological convictions of its chaplains under the banner of *pro Patria*, while reinforcing the chaplains' deeply-rooted love for Soldiers and their

families (*pro Militis*).

We have looked briefly at the Army chaplaincy's motto, *pro Deo et Patria*, in the context of the actual dynamics and tensions of chaplain ministry. It appears to be a representation of the unique opportunity to serve one's God and one's country along parallel tracks. We find this to be a romantic misrepresentation, both of the reality of chaplain work, and of the legal and regulatory landscape which determines chaplain ministry. The tracks of service to God and service to the Nation are rarely parallel, but more often divergent or intersecting. In the latter case, collisions are inevitable. This is neither because we hold a pessimistic view of chaplain ministry, nor because we esteem chaplaincy leaders lightly. The inevitable, inherent, and normal conflicts of God and Country in chaplaincy service are simply the consequences of the manner in which two institutions with non-parallel values and objectives collide in the course of being what they are and doing what they do. The chaplaincy has lived with a misrepresentative motto for some time now, supported as it is by three monotheistic religions. That support does not and will not extend to other, newer religious groups represented in the future.

Endnotes

1. One example should suffice: The Willow Creek Association is a group of churches whose "seeker-sensitive" approach to worship is modeled after a mega-church by the same name, pastored by Rev. Bill Hybels. This association includes over 10,000 churches from over 90 denominations. Its Statement of Faith is clearly interdenominational. For additional information, see www.willowcreek.com.
2. Telephone conversation with Chaplain(Major) Keith Goode, Accessions Officer, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, U.S. Army, 21 December 2006.
3. U.S. Code, Title 10, C, II, 555, § 6031. "An officer in the Chaplain Corps may conduct public worship according to the manner and forms of the church of which he is a member." Also: B, II, 343, § 3547. "Each chaplain shall, when practicable, hold appropriate religious services at least once on each Sunday for the command to which he is assigned, and shall perform appropriate religious burial services for members of the Army who die while in that command."
4. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949. Article 24 (Personnel).
5. Doris L. Bergen. *The Sword of the Lord: Military Chaplains from the First to Twenty-First Century* (Notre Dame: UND Press, 2004, p. 166.
6. Duff Crerar. "Where's the Padre?": Canadian Memory and the Great War Chaplains" in Doris L. Bergen, *ibid.* p.146-7.
7. Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, *Manual for Courts-Martial* (Washington: GPO, 2005), "Military Rules of Evidence," Rule 503, p. III-24.
8. Army Regulation 600-8-24, Officer Transfers and Discharges, Table 5-2 gives a chaplain under such circumstances 30 days to be sponsored by another faith group, to choose another branch of the Army in which to serve (e.g. infantry, adjutant general, finance, etc.), or to be separated. During this period of non-endorsement, the chaplain may not conduct any chaplain-specific ministerial duties. It is thus technically possible for a chaplain without endorsement to continue serving his country, but this would necessarily be without God (= *pro Patria sine Deus*).
9. William H. McMichael. "Navy chaplain at center of prayer controversy to be court-martialed" in *Navy Times*, 19 May 2006.

10. Chaplain (Major General) G.T. Gunhus, Army Chief of Chaplains (1999-2003) and an ordained minister of the conservative and evangelical Church of the Lutheran Brethren, spent considerable executive energy on the strategic objective of raising the count of active duty Roman Catholic chaplains in the Army from about 100 to 300. He was not successful, despite a number of front-office initiatives. It is not clear how the rank-and-file of his sponsoring church would feel about the energy he devoted to increasing Roman Catholic “market share” in the Army chaplaincy. In partial defense of Chaplain Gunhus, we should also state that it became obvious to him during his tenure that he would never attain the lofty goal of 300 Catholic priests. From that point onward, he referred all criticisms from field commanders about the shortage of priests directly to the Military Archdiocese, whose problem it is and always has been.

11. Hanna Rosin. “Wiccan Controversy Tests Military Religious Tolerance” in Washington Post, Tuesday, June 8, 1999, Page A1. Also see Jeremy Leaming. “Georgia Lawmaker calls on military to stop Wiccan celebrations,” (First Amendment Center: firstamendmentcenter.org, 24 May 1999.

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Rethinking Morality in War

By Chaplain (COL) Franklin Eric Wester

Thirty years ago, when Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) framed the boundaries of the Cold War, Michael Walzer exclaimed in his landmark work *Just and Unjust Wars*: “Nuclear weapons explode the theory of just war.” For this reviewer, just as explosive was the assertion in America’s 2002 *National Security Strategy* (reinforced in 2006) that preemption is a long-standing facet of America’s security framework, a concept that has gained prominence in the published works of a number of contemporary ethicists. In the collection of five books reviewed here, thoughtful authors and editors add to that dialogue with their examination of a number of “hot-button” issues impacting our ethical environment.

Challenges in Ethics

What are some of the most critical challenges in today’s ethical environment? Do terrorism, genocide, and suicide bombers call for a major reevaluation and expansion of the study of ethics as that generated by MAD? How do we gain perspective related to theoretical ethics while actively prosecuting a global war against terrorism and religious extremists? Can we find correlations about ethics that will permit us to bridge the chasm between a western heritage and the eastern beliefs indigenous to the Levant? Is ethical thinking keeping pace with technology? Is it possible to reconfigure the Just War tradition to shoulder the ever-increasing moral responsibilities associated with ethics in warfare? Beyond the conceptual implication, the reports of continuing lapses of applied ethics in the conduct of modern warfare are sufficient cause for consternation.

Surveying the (Ethical) Battlefield

Numerous writers recognize the ethical challenges associated with today’s warfare. Most labor to apply the Just War tradition to these increasingly complex issues. Among the five books reviewed here, two focus precisely on such an approach, offering surveys aimed at students, scholars, and the general reader (in that order). These two works are *Rethinking the Just War Tradition*, edited by Michael Brough, John Lango, and Harry van der Linden, and *The Morality of War*, edited by David Kinsella and Craig Carr.

Philosophers Brough, Lango, and van der Linden examine a number of emerging issues relative to the Just War tradition including environmental justice, order and justice *post bellum*, child soldiers, targeted assassination, noncombatant immunity, and the effects of dehumanization in *Rethinking the Just War Tradition*. Contributors have provided their analysis and philosophical reexamination of the Just War principles related to such matters. The editors acknowledge that the tradition is “normative” in most western countries chiefly because Just War is frequently presupposed in contemporary debates about the use of armed force. They rightly ask, however, if all 192 countries that are members of the United Nations should be bound by the principles associated with Just War. The editors cite the *Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change* released in December 2004 that traces the “five basic criteria of legitimacy,” criteria that very much resemble Just War theory, yet were drafted by nonwestern leaders. Readers seeking the correlation between military ethics and their professional lives will find this new addition to the State University of New York series on “Ethics and the Military Profession” most enlightening and instructive. It certainly belongs in the library of everyone concerned with a reexamination of the Just War tradition.

Political scientists Kinsella and Carr, academics at the Hatfield School of Government, Portland State University, examine an extremely wide array of topics in their latest work *The Morality of War*. The editors

probe the history of *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello*, and *jus post bellum*, analyzing the pivotal topics of preemption, terrorism, sanctions, and war crimes. They successfully achieve their announced goal of acquainting readers with the historical and contemporary rationale associated with a number of the issues regarding when, why, and how war can be justified. The editors introduce each chapter with a brief commentary highlighting the main issues and possible counter-points. This book is best-suited for those readers who are beginning their study of the Just War tradition. The book is ideally suited to serve as a core text for any survey course examining morality in warfare.

Do We Need Warriors?

Christopher Coker, professor of international relations at the London School of Economics, provides a penetrating analysis of the history, contributions, and contemporary cultural challenges for the modern warrior in *The Warrior Ethos: Military Culture and the War on Terror*. Coker declares, “What keeps war an ethical activity is the warrior ethos.” He contrasts the warrior ethos in the western tradition with the new class of soldier that is emerging; soldiers not representing a particular state, but those sponsored by non-state or sub-state entities including criminal cartels and terrorist groups. The author questions whether the traditional belief that warriors represent a line of defense against an increase in war’s inhumanity is still valid.

The suicide bomber is only the latest, and certainly not the last, incarnation of the foot soldier. His emergence does not absolve the western warrior of his honor and the responsibilities that are part of his code. Instead, they (these new enemies) make the code more central than ever.

Coker goes on to expand the scope of his analysis—examining the contrasts between various cultures. He postulates that in the Levant, attitudes toward the city-state and citizenship are diametrically opposed to western (Aristotelian) concepts that western nations often attempt to impose on the rest of the world.

For Aristotle [and western thought], the city is the place of the political. Man is a political animal, the word derived from *polis* (the Greek city-state). For Rousseau the noble savage falls from grace and enters the city. There’s no escaping the city if you’re a western philosopher. For Ibn Khaldun, however, the Bedouin/nomad falls from grace when he enters the city. For he loses more than his integrity; he loses his fortitude, his ferocity, his passion. He makes a lousy soldier.

This book is a necessary read for anyone concerned with the role of today’s military, and well worth the reader’s investment. Coker’s breadth of scholarship is impressive. Equally appreciated is the depth of the specific research and application given the role of warrior attributes in the modern world. The author presents a myriad of challenges to the traditional warrior concept and highlights a number of the emerging practices associated with training and “incentivizing” a military force.

A Revolution in Military Ethics

Coker’s conviction that warriors serve as guardians of ethics could not be more overtly challenged than by the thoughts and philosophy expounded by Timothy Challans in *Awakening Warrior: Revolution in the Ethics of Warfare*. Challans, an instructor in ethics at the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, offers an enlightening treatise on moral philosophy. He appeals for a reversal in the direction that ethics education is taking in the military. The author traces ethical lapses beyond the responsibility of the individual and attacks on a broader context of a failed ethical philosophy. He asserts that most military members are blind to any real moral understanding.

The vast majority of military students I have personally taught in the classroom have many malformed moral beliefs. For example, most justify the exorbitant degree of collateral damage. They also justify harsh and coercive interrogation measures, even after understanding the manifestly illegal nature of such actions. They are more than willing to err on the side of excessive force or unnecessary harm over finding a balance

between due risk and due care. In addition to believing in the basic tenet of military realism, they also believe in the doctrine of political realism. These beliefs are basic building blocks of their world view, which is contemptuous of substantive moral concerns. . . . The world view they hold impedes real moral understanding.

This last point speaks directly to the condition the author is seeking to remedy; that the current philosophy of ethics, including the Just War tradition, is the culprit. For Challans, America faces historic, systems, people, and leadership challenges. In an effort to diagnose the latter, he proposes a solution to this conundrum in his subtitle, *Revolution in the Ethics of Warfare*:

Since our leaders have always and perhaps will always continue to fail us morally, and since the current conception leaves us to depend upon morally failed leaders, perhaps one potential solution is to change the conception—we need a moral revolution to bring about moral progress in warfare.

Challans examines the institutional ethics associated with such notorious ethical failures as My Lai. “Very few recognize the culpability that the Army’s leaders and the military institution itself have concerning the incident. While most want to chastise [Lieutenant William] Calley for the My Lai incident, few are willing or want to face the possibility that the Army as an institution in large part created Calley and those like him.”

Challans has drawn on his years of military service and teaching at West Point to craft an argument challenging the methodology and pedagogy associated with the teaching of ethics throughout America’s military. The author’s call for reform is based on his belief that current methodologies and content rely too heavily on religious prejudices that negate the ability of the warrior to think independently about the moral issues associated with the conduct of war. This call for reformation combined with a demand for a new set of moral principles to govern the ethical behavior on the battlefield is certain to garner the attention and ire of many readers and military leaders.

Good People or Good Institutions

Anne-Marie Slaughter, in *The Idea That is America*, holds forth historic virtues that may help US national leaders and citizens alike regain a positive reputation in today’s international environment. Slaughter, Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, advances seven values to lead America out of the environment of fear and mistrust in which she believes it currently finds itself. The author describes three essential attributes required for international rapprochement: “[F]or most Americans and most other people around the world, religious faith and humanist faith fit together . . . and [t]hese two faiths fit together best when both religion and Enlightenment humanism are strongly leavened by humility.” Slaughter asserts, “The Founders put little faith in virtue alone, even American virtue, to make a government work. On the contrary, their vision of American democracy was founded on a commitment to good institutions, not good people . . . and American democracy was founded on a commitment to good institutions, not good people.”

This work will be best appreciated by general readers seeking insight into the challenges associated with what Slaughter characterizes as entering a war “under false pretenses,” moral bankruptcy, loss of diplomatic clout, misguided practices of torture, and a self-inflicted national isolation caused by declaring you are “either with us or against us.” Her remedy centers on seven values: liberty, democracy, equality, justice, tolerance, humility, and faith. The author’s aim is to recalibrate and amend the nation’s foreign policy (and ethics) based upon the values presented. If the reader is looking for a formal evaluation of the ethical principles underpinning national policy this is not the book for you because it fails to address the technical aspects associated with ethical behavior.

The Next Step in Military Ethics

Publishing books based on rigorous research and quality presentation reinvigorates ethics education.

Writers and editors who put forth such efforts not only further the professional education and enlightenment of their audiences, they raise expectations of what is on the horizon in the world of ethics. Both of the collections by Brough, Lango, and van der Linden and Kinsella and Carr inform and instill readers “to rethink the just war principles individually.”

In *Awakening Warrior*, Challans argues for moral education unshackled from Just War theories. He develops a thesis built on the belief that calls for fostering fully reflective political and military lives built on principles emphasizing the regulative idea of restraint. He proposes a model of moral autonomy employing philosophical ethics compatible with good order and discipline. It is well worth the reader’s investment in terms of wealth and time to reach Challans’s call for revolution—we must jettison the mistaken emphasis on moral authority and remove the camouflage of the warrior ethos.

Anne-Marie Slaughter approaches the issues associated with a change in ethical theory from a virtues ethic viewpoint or philosophy, rhetorically asking:

What role should America play in the world? We should stand for our values, the values that this country was created to achieve and that define us as a nation. Standing for these values is both an end and a means. It reflects who we are as a people; it also serves our long-term national interests.

That answer may seem obvious, but many in my profession—scholars and practitioners of foreign policy—would argue instead that American political and economic interests often conflict with our values, and when they do, we should go with our interests.

Finally, Coker offers readers insight regarding the true character of warriors. The author leaves his audience with an understanding that the warrior ethos serves as much more than just an instrumental aspect of ethical conduct in war. Coker conveys the unique role that men and women in uniform have assumed in today’s society and carry into the public sector. All of these works will provide soldiers and civilians alike with new ethical perspectives and philosophies associated with the “way ahead” in their understanding and practice of ethical behavior.

More awareness and analysis of institutions and ethics are exactly the emphases needed for developing unit and senior leaders. Renewed professionalism takes ethics beyond descriptive and prescriptive information to meaningful reflection and analysis at meta-ethical and normative levels. Quickened professional awareness by military leaders moves ethics beyond cognition to courage and action. A professional community holds its members accountable for discretionary judgments in application of the military art. The initiatives at West Point in forging leaders of character and competence applying the ethical development model of James Rest are recommended in addition to these five tomes.

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
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Book Reviews



The Ghost Soldiers: The Forgotten Epic Story of World War II's Most Dramatic Mission

Hampton Sides
Doubleday Publishing, 2001

The Cabanatuan Prison Camp on the Philippine island of Lazon housed the survivors of the infamous Bataan Death March, and hundreds of other U.S. and Allied prisoners from various campaigns against the Japanese. For three years, these “Ghost Soldiers” lived in misery and brutality, victims of dysentery, malaria, starvation, and physical abuse. In *Ghost Soldiers*, Hampton Sides skillfully recounts the circumstances that lead up to the February, 1945 raid which freed more than 500 American and Allied prisoners of war. This daring rescue and escape, designed and implemented by U.S. Army Rangers, was once known to every American schoolchild but has long been forgotten.

Sides weaves a riveting narrative together with expertly reconstructed events to allow the reader to visualize the horrors of the Cabanatuan prison camp and the immense risks taken by U.S. Army Rangers in order to rescue the sickly and virtually helpless prisoners. Cabanatuan was a prison camp for the weakest prisoners, a type of unofficial death camp, as the strongest prisoners were previously moved into slave labor camps closer to Japan. The population of this camp at times swelled over to 12,000. As many as 4000 prisoners were buried outside the gates.

The Prologue of the *Ghost Soldiers* is worthy of a book in itself. The urgency of the need to rescue the POW's from the Cabanatuan Prison Camp is described in vivid and horrific detail, as the Japanese began a policy of slaughtering POW's before they could be rescued by the ever advancing U.S. military. Because of the massacre at the Puerto Princesa Prison Camp late in 1944, it became an urgent moral necessity to rescue the prisoners of the Cabanatuan Prison Camp before they were mercilessly murdered. The handful of

survivors of the Puerto Princesa Prison Camp massacre gave their own personal survival stories, which in the prologue skillfully sets the tone for the entire book.

Sides is a master historian and story teller who carefully weaves the scenario for the rescue raid upon the Cabanatuan Prison Camp. He personally interviewed numerous people involved in the planning and execution of the raid, from Philippino Scouts, to U.S. guerrilla leaders in the Philippines; to the commanders of the operation; to U.S. Army Rangers who performed the mission; to the Cabanatuan Prison Camp survivors who were carried out of the camp on the backs of Rangers.

On Jan. 28, 1945, 121 Soldiers from the elite but untested U.S. Army 6th Ranger Battalion slipped behind enemy lines in the Philippines. They intended to march 30 miles to the Cabanatuan Prison Camp, attack the compound, release the prisoners, and transport all 500-plus prisoners back to the safety of US lines. An interesting comment about this mission is that the rescue of the Cabanatuan prisoners was not a military necessity. There was no strategic advantage in eliminating the prison camp. This rescue mission was conceived and implemented on moral and ethical grounds, not for strategic advantage.

General Walter Krueger, who gave the final authority for the rescue, called the rescue attempt “a mission of mercy.” Lieutenant Colonel Henry Mucci, field commander of the rescue attempt, informed his Rangers of their upcoming mission in the following manner: “There [is] a prison camp full of the last ill and stick-figured American survivors of Bataan and Corregidor. The task before the Rangers [is] to liberate these prisoners before the Japanese slaughtered them all. You're going to bring out every last man, even if you have to carry them out on your backs.”

Mucci warned the rangers of the immense danger of this covert operation, and offered any of the married men or any man reluctant to join the mission the opportunity to remove himself from the roster, with no

ramifications. Not one Ranger dropped out.

A unique aspect of *The Ghost Soldiers* is the place of prayer, faith and the role of chaplains that is woven throughout the book. I will address each of these points individually.

The Place of Prayer

It is refreshing to read an account of military combat operations in which the presence of God is sought, acknowledged, and appreciated. As an Army chaplain, I found this to be a most rewarding aspect of *The Ghost Soldiers*. After briefing the Rangers on the dangers of the rescue mission, Mucci stated, "There'll be no atheists on this trip." Upon adjourning the meeting, he said he wanted every last one of them to meet with the chaplains and pray on their knees. Services would be held in a half hour. "I want you to swear an oath before God," he told them. "Swear that you'll die fighting rather than let any harm come to those prisoners." The role of prayer is acknowledged as effective throughout the book, in such places as a prisoner's mother praying for her son, the prayers of the rescue team leaders for secrecy, and the answered prayers of the Philippine villagers who welcomed the U.S. troops as liberators from the hated Japanese. Mucci, an expert in covert operations, was also a man deeply committed to prayer. Knowing the dangers of transporting hundreds of wounded or weak prisoners over jungle paths and streams, he was not embarrassed to admit that "I prayed that there wouldn't be any rain before we got back, because it was the kind of river that could rise a couple of feet in a very short time." After the success of the raid, Mucci gave credit "by luck and the grace of God."

The Place of Faith

Examples of faith from the rescuers and survivors of the Cabanatuan Prison Camp are abundant. Survivor Tom Thomas stated, "I was well beyond what they thought our endurance was. Way, way beyond. I was so tired I couldn't move, couldn't even wiggle. Yet I'd take another step, and take another, and another. Something was driving me, something outside myself." The prisoners were not bashful to claim the fact of supernatural miracles in their lives attributed by God. Army Ranger Roy Peters, when realizing that the

Japanese were in an ideal situation to discover the covert raid, said, "The Lord had just closed Japanese eyes where they couldn't see -- that's the only way I could figure it." Thomas, while suffering from diphtheria, allowed a weaker prisoner rather than himself to have the last remaining medicine. When the deathly Thomas did not get worse, and later had a full recovery, he could only say that he had experienced a miracle. When the starved prisoners were able to find some Japanese food supplies before their rescue, they claimed that the food had been given to them "providentially." When one of the rescuers, Roy Sweezy, a Roman Catholic, was wounded and dying outside the camp, the other Rangers took it upon themselves to baptize their dying comrade. Another Roman Catholic Soldier, Francis Schilli, led the service. As the author stated, "Schilli took his friend in his arms and poured a dribble of canteen water on his forehead. Solomnly, he mumbled, The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost," and everyone, even the unbelievers, said "Amen."

The Role of the Chaplains

From the beginning through the end of *The Ghost Soldiers*, the esteemed role of chaplains is everywhere evident. Those chaplains mentioned by name are Robert Taylor, Hugh Kennedy, Frank Tiffany, and Alfred Oliver. All were prisoners at the Cabanatuan Prison Camp, were horribly ill, and were rescued in the Ranger's raid. There is an interesting account of German missionary Roman Catholic priest who consistently aided the prisoners of Cabanatuan by carrying message and supplies in and out of the camp. While in captivity, chaplains were involved in comforting the sick, performing funerals for the dead, holding religious services, counseling the distraught, as well as maintaining well-established espionage and covert activities. In *The Ghost Soldiers*, the role of the chaplain as a prisoner and a pastor is especially evident.

In a world of perpetual suffering, the chaplains played an exceedingly important role in the life of the camp. Theology was an immediate, and intensely practical, matter. The mysteries of survival often condensed down to spiritual mysteries. The prisoners saw daily evidence of the spirit world, felt the constant beckoning

tug of dean comrades beseeching them to join the ghostly ranks. The men saw the way some individuals kept their faith even through their moments of deepest anguish, while others seemed to give up easily and willed themselves to go, almost as though surrendering the spirit were a disease in and of itself.

Cabanatuan's chaplains constantly found themselves in the midst of the most profound life-and-death questions. As mediators, as maintainers of morale, as defenders of a guttering flame, they were presented with a nearly impossible task. Favoring scriptural themes taken from JOB, the Babylonian Captivity, and the trials of Christ, the chaplains wrote their sermons in tiny, cramped letters on the back of can labels. Every day they had to explain the unexplainable. They were the ones who were supposed to have the answers.

Of all the U.S. Army chaplains who survived Cabanatuan, Robert Taylor's account is the most famous. As the chaplain for the 31st Infantry Regiment, Taylor was a Texan by birth and Baptist by denomination, having earned a Ph.D. from Baylor University. Known as a fiery preacher, Taylor had previous to his imprisonment earned a Silver Star for Bravery on the battlefield. He survived the Bataan Death March.

At Cabanatuan, he served in the most hopeless position, in the hospital "zero wizard" ministering to the terminally ill. Taylor maintained an extensive illegal correspondence with Philippino guerillas, smuggling food and medicine to the prisoners. He was eventually caught, tortured, and worse of all thrown into a bamboo "heat box" for at least nine weeks, with the intent of sweating the truth out of him. Later, he was sent to a prison camp in Manchuria, and was released when the war ended. Staying in the military after the war, Taylor rose the rank of Major General, becoming the highest ranking chaplain in the U.S. Armed Forces, eventually becoming the Chief of Chaplains for the U.S. Air Force in 1958.

In *The Ghost Soldiers*, Sides has uncovered and presented to the public an account of a daring World War II rescue mission that by the testimony of those involved was miraculously successful.

It was estimated that 1000 Japanese troops were killed in the raid, in stark contrast to four Americans who died during the raid -- two Rangers dies in the

firefight, two prisoners died of poor health. The immense success of this covert operation can not be simply dismissed by a militarily and tactically superior force. It was neither. There was something more going on in this rescue attempt than merely a routine military raid and rescue mission. The entire operation was saturated in prayer. In humility, the favor of the Lord was pursued for a righteous and benevolent cause. Chaplains both inside and outside the Cabanatuan Prison Camp were fervent in prayer, and their prayers were answered. One of the prisoners, Bert Bank, gave this testimony to the power of prayer.

He said, "I didn't pray in any particular tradition. I just prayed for myself, for my friends. Prayed for the strength to make it through this. I was not angry at God. Who was I to second-guess God? But I was theologically confused. Why had I been spared? Why had my friends died? They were good people. They loved their families. They were honest and true. You ask these sorts of questions all the time, and you never get a satisfactory answer. God does strange things. But sometimes you can feel a presence. You can sense that this is all happening to teach us something about the nature of free will."

For all members of the Army's Unit Ministry Teams, I highly recommend reading and discussing *The Ghost Soldiers*. This book will make you think clearer about the role of faith and prayer in war. The movie, *The Great Raid*, is also helpful for UMT training. The accounts of the survivors, especially the chaplains, will drive you to your knees in thanksgiving to God for the freedoms we enjoy in our country.

*Reviewed by Chaplain (LTC) Kenneth Lawson,
the Installation Chaplain at Fort Buchanan,
Puerto Rico.*

Awakening the Spirit, Inspiring the Soul: 30 Stories of Inter-spiritual Discovery in the Community of Faiths

Wayne Teasdale, editor and Martha Howard, translator
Skylight Paths Publishing, 2004
Hardcover, 188 pages

I first became aware of this anthology when I read one of the stories, "A Muslim as the Catholic Worker"

by Eboo Patel, in the February-March 2006 issue of the journal *Sacred Journey*. The story wove together the threads of Islam, Patel's religion of birth, interfaith inspiration, and faith-based engagement in social action. I wanted more, so I bought the book.

I wondered whether all of the stories could be as inspiring as this one in which Patel told how he was inspired by the social involvement of the Catholic workers. Even though he admired their devotion, commitment, and involvement, he knew he was a Muslim. Shortly after his encounter with the Catholic workers, he went home to his native India and found that his grandmother, a Muslim, was sheltering abused women. When he asked her why, she responded, "Because I am a Muslim. This is what Muslims do." He realized then that his Muslim grandmother was motivated by her faith to the same kind of social concern as he found in the Catholic workers. It was enough to draw him back to a serious consideration of the roots of his faith.

The anthology of stories has met my expectation. Each story is inspiring in its own right. The autobiographical selections recount the experiences of spiritual awakening of the contributors, many of whom are under 30-years-old. Some of the awakenings occurred as people were challenged to explore the roots of their own faith traditions, others as people engaged in interfaith dialogue.

Wayne Teasdale, who edited this book before his death, set out to collect spiritual autobiographies that would take steps toward "building the foundation for a viable spirituality that can serve to unite rather than divide humanity for the countless millennia ahead." Teasdale was a member of the Parliament of the World's Religions' Spiritual Life Circle. The book was the outcome of the committee's work.

Awakening the Spirit has value for anyone interested or engaged in the multifaith conversation or bridge-building. I'm convinced many of our Soldiers, of various faith traditions, have equally exciting spiritual stories to share with us. The stories in this collection may be a ticket to opening the door to story sharing.

*Reviewed by Chaplain (LTC) Robert Flaherty,
U.S. Army Reserve.*

His Excellency, George Washington

Joseph J. Ellis, Random House (large print), New York, NY (2004)

Although interested in history, I would probably not have read this book had I not heard the author speak on the C-SPAN broadcast "Writers on American History."

The fervor that Ellis had for the subject and his skills at storytelling, verbally, sparked my interest and I immediately ordered the book.

I'm glad I did make the purchase because the writing of the story lived up to the author's telling of it but in a format allowing greater depth and breadth, including detailed end notes.

Ellis explores the life of George Washington as a man, a natural leader from his youth, and someone set apart for his times as if destined to prepare a people and a place for times to come.

The word "providential" recurs frequently throughout the book. Incidents are related of Washington's repeated survival of bullets literally going through his clothing and having several horses shot out from under him while other men died all around him. Yet he lived to tell about these events (and he did in his own voluminous writings). We are given the distinct impression that the future first president was chosen by God for great things, yet for the greater political good and not some spiritual gain.

The term "His Excellency" in the title is the suggested address for the presidential office chosen by John Adams, a contemporary and (according to Ellis) jealous successor. But part of the enjoyment the book gives is the "gossipy" background information that such a title was met by derision by other members of the Continental Congress who then suggested Adams be referred to as "His Rotundity."

And so it is all here, the fineness, the foibles, the flair and the foolery. All in all a great read that I highly recommend. It's an unbiased take on an "Indian" scout and farmer who reticently became the first President of the United States...His Excellency, George Washington.

*Reviewed by Paul Villano, Knowledge
Management officer for the U.S. Army Chaplain
Center and School.*

The Fifth Discipline

Peter Senge

Doubleday, New York, NY August 1990

The purpose of this book is to outline how to create a "Learning Organization." Senge states that "as the world becomes more interconnected and business becomes more complex and dynamic, work must become more 'learningful'." Senge states five Disciplines are necessary to become a Learning Organization.

He has evangelistic fervor as he writes about the need for organizations to change. The book resulted from his study and instruction as the Director of the Systems Thinking and Organizational Program at MIT's Sloan School of Management. His seminal thinking on the Five Disciplines continues to influence organizations around the world to include, Ford, Apple, Proctor & Gamble, Hanover Insurance Royal Dutch/Shell. The book is also a key text book for the U.S. Army -- which has adopted the book as a helpful tool for Army Transformation. Many federal institutions also use the book as a guide to changing the culture of their organization.

As the title suggests, the book revolves around five "disciplines": Systems Thinking, Personal Mastery, Mental Models, Shared Vision, and Team Learning. The foundational discipline is Systems Thinking.

Without Systems Thinking, the other disciplines cannot possibly be mastered or employed. A considerable portion of the first part of the book challenges the reader to consider the processes involved in making a business, or personal, decision. Senge claims that many businesses eventually falter because they refuse to learn how all the parts make up the whole. One of his chapters is titled, "The Art of Seeing the Forest *And* the Trees."... a chapter devoted to helping the reader understand the importance of seeing the whole picture, the "system" that affects every decision being contemplated.

The second discipline (although the order is not important) is Personal Mastery. Senge maintains that Mastery "means approaching one's life as a creative work, living life from a creative as opposed to

reactive viewpoint." An Army chaplain will appreciate this discipline because he encourages the individual to continually "clarify what is important to us." A job is not just about the corporate vision, but the individuals' personal vision and understanding of his or her life goals. "Lifelong generative learning" is Senge's phrase to suggest that a learning organization is not possible unless "people at every level practice it."

The third discipline is Mental Models, Senge describes these models as "surfacing, testing, and improving our internal pictures of how the world works." He suggests that our personal Models determine how we make sense of the world and take action. Discovering one's Mental Models is tantamount to discovering "what makes you tick" and therefore, helps one understand how this impacts organizational behavior.

The fourth Discipline is Shared Vision. Senge says at its simplest level, a Shared Vision is "the answer to the question, 'What do we want to create?'" A Learning Organization has a common vision, a shared picture of its future, an enthusiastic focus that drives every person to accomplish that vision.

Team Learning is the last Discipline and suggests that a Learning Organization must be aligned across the board. Key elements of Team Learning are dialogue and discussion – two skills critical to quality teamwork. As an organization works towards Learning Organization principles, it soon discovers that success simply cannot happen without interaction, thoughtful sharing of insights and a purposeful focus on understanding of each other.

Senge's book has found a profound place in organizations that truly want to change and capture the necessary requirements for doing business in a vastly different world than our forefathers. The complexity of a "connected" world with information coming at us with incredible speed demands we take the time to be disciplined in our approach to the future. Since the Army has already adopted this book as a key text for its own transformation it is worth taking seriously.

The Fifth Discipline is a "must read" for anyone desirous of organizational change. As Senge says, "this book is for learners, especially those of us

interested in the art and practice of collective learning...for managers...for parents...for citizens.” Every Army chaplain and chaplain assistant would profit from reading this timely and thought-provoking book.

Reviewed by Chaplain (BG) Douglas E. Lee, the Assistant Chief of Chaplains for Mobilization and Readiness, Office Chief of Chaplains.

The Christian and War: A Biblical Study

Chaplain (LTC) Kenneth E. Lawson
Associated Gospel Churches, Greenville, SC
(2005)

Scripture commands “thou shalt not kill.” Christ told his followers to love their enemies and do good to those who would spitefully use and persecute them. Did not Jesus teach that if someone smites you on the cheek you should turn the other also? These and other New Testament sayings appear to support the pacifist view that Jesus has not only forbidden war, but has removed its occasion. Such a position argues that nonviolence is practical and even testifies to the courage of countless martyrs throughout church history who sacrificed their lives rather than take up arms against their captors. Other devout Christians have maintained the view of Augustine who allowed that, while war is by its nature violent and evil, it can be just if fought for a just cause, such as the restoration of peace, the preservation of righteousness, the protection of life, and fought by duly authorized officials and their selected combatants.

So how do we square “thou shalt not kill” with a so-called just war? In his book, “The Christian and War: A Biblical Study,” U.S. Army Chaplain (LTC) Kenneth E. Lawson does exactly that through a careful exegesis of key scriptural passages on the subject. Lawson’s premise is that there is no inherent contradiction between the godly Christian life and defensive combat. In other words, a Christian can go to war, even kill an enemy, and remain an obedient Christian. He proves this first by explaining that the biblical prohibition against killing relates to murder, not warfare. Lest one think this applies only to the Old Testament where we find recorded numerous divinely sanctioned battles, the

New Testament likewise enjoins the use of deadly force to punish evil persons who threaten peaceful societies (Rom 13). Second, Lawson supports his premise by noting that both Jesus and the apostles nowhere condemn military involvement; instead, they advise only that soldiers behave ethically, and even commend their faithfulness -- an incredible response when one considers that the soldiers they confronted were representatives of one of the most repressive regimes in history, the Roman empire!

Pacifists, Lawson maintains, usually have an ulterior motive. They could be sincere Bible believers, who like early Christian noncombatants would not wish to join an army whose soldiers might be hauling their sons off to jail or worse! Then there are the idealists who fail to take Scripture seriously (the liberals) or contextually (the Quaker types) but who suffer from the same problem of misinterpretation -- that God doesn’t endorse war and he doesn’t want his children to go to war. But that view, as Lawson so adeptly explains, is counter to God’s own views on the subject via scriptural revelation. Likewise, the liberals and pacifists (often one and the same) misinterpret the love of God. The New Testament God, they say, is simply too loving to condemn anybody and would never endorse violence as a remedy for human conflict. They would just as soon negotiate with rather than annihilate terrorists, since God loves even them.

But this view fails to take into account the profound wickedness of men and the righteousness of God who must punish evil to be true to his character and often uses armies as his instruments of judgment. It is the old argument of pitting God’s love against his justice. The Bible, as Chaplain Lawson correctly explains, states otherwise: “For the holy God of Heaven to love humanity does not mean that He permits us to go on in all kinds of wickedness without judgment.”

If you want to read something scripturally sound and wholly sensible on the view that “there is no inherent contradiction or conflict between being a man of faith and performing as a soldier for one’s country,” this booklet is exactly what you need.

Reviewed by Chaplain (LTC-retired) Gerald L. Priest, Army National Guard, and Professor, Detroit Baptist Theological Seminary.

Editor's Notes

After a brief hiatus, we welcome the return of our regimental professional bulletin, *The Army Chaplaincy*. For many years, under several names, it has been a major voice for the Army Chaplain Corps, providing a forum for mature thought on vital subjects that impact the work of Army Unit Ministry Teams.

Our journal begins again with this latest issue, "Maintaining the Moral High Ground." Rich and diverse contributions are made here by strategic thinkers who support Spiritual Leadership for the Army Family in the field of ethics. Articles squarely address moral issues that are challenging our Army and UMTs in this persistent conflict.

This latest issue may look like those of previous years, but there are several significant changes. First, the Chief of Chaplains has changed how editorial decisions are made. *The Army Chaplaincy* now has an invigorated Editorial Committee from the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School which serves as a peer review board given authority to approve (in the main) the content of each issue. The Editorial Committee members (alphabetically) are: Dr. John Brinsfield, Regimental and School Historian, Mr. Steven Hoover, our new managing editor; Mr. Frank Spang, USACHCS Distance Learning Division Chief; Mr. Paul Villano, USACHCS Knowledge Management Officer, and the undersigned as Editor-in-Chief.

As before, each of our issues will focus on a central theme. Themes will be announced in a "Call for Papers" by the Managing Editor on behalf of the Editorial Committee. But, the Editor also will invite subject matter experts for each issue who will serve as ex-officio Committee members. For this issue, special thanks go to Chaplain (COL) Eric Wester, who with the help of Chaplain (MAJ) Steve Austin, and a top team of USACHCS senior Chaplain Assistants, SFC Charles Heard and SSG David Thomas, organized and led a world-class Ethics Consultation at USACHCS in 2007. This event brought together nationally-renowned ethicists and other authors who have provided several key articles in this issue. In addition, Chaplain Wester has also contributed a very helpful introductory article and a review essay of his own, which was previously published in the Winter 2008 issue of the Army War College journal, *Parameters*.

Finally, we are changing how we publish. To make it virtually available to all, *The Army Chaplaincy* publishing will be primarily web-based. Readers will be able to download each issue or save individual articles from the public websites of the Chief of Chaplains (<http://www.chapnet.army.mil>) or the United States Army Chaplain Center and School (USACHCS) (<http://www.usachcs.army.mil>). We will still mail out a limited number of printed issues to military installations, libraries, and academic institutions. We are grateful for support in this effort from our publications experts, Mr. Kelvin Davis (Chief of Chaplains' website), Mrs. Jody Dunning (paper print publishing), and Mr. Paul Villano (USACHCS website).

Our goal is to provide Unit Ministry Teams and other interested readers with a professional journal of scholarly articles and timely book reviews that are intellectually challenging and strategically relevant. Submissions for the next issue should be on the theme of World Religions. All articles submitted for consideration in this or other upcoming issues should be sent in Microsoft Word™ format to editor@us.army.mil. Thank you for your interest.

Christopher H. Wisdom
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Editor-in-Chief

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